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ABSTRACT • ....___... __ _ 
The thesis is a~ attempt to provide a more 
comprehensiv.e accom11t of: the context and character of Hooker 1 s 
arg~men~ in the Ecclesiastical Polity than has hitherto been presented. 
The preface outlines the problems involved in. such 
an examination. Part one includes both a short examination of how 
distincti~e attitudes to change colour political argument(chapter one) 
and an1 accountt of Hooker's own response to a radical attitude to 
change( chapter two) .Part Two pro-wides a v.ery compressed narrativ,e 
of th.e progress of reformed religion in England( chapter three) and 
of Hooker's composition of the Ecclesiastical Polity(chapter four). 
Part Three endeaViours both to examin1.e the nature of Calvinist 
thought( chapter five) and to describe Hooker 1 s reaction to the 
movement itself(chapter six).Part Four investigates Hooker's pre-
-
suppositions about God and His Intelligible Universe(chapter seven), 
Reason: and Conduct( chapter eight), and J.lfatural Law and Political 
Society( chapter nine) .Chapter ten(Metaphor and practical Argument) 
represents an attempt both to extend and to summarize my account of 
the character of Hooker's thought. 
Part Fiv.e opens with a general investigation of the 
place of authority and tradition in the area of what Hooker's terms 
1 things indifferent.' This is illustrated more particularly in the 
Interpretation of Scripture( chapter twelve), in the public worship 
of the Christian community (chapters thirteen, fourteen< and fifteen), 
and in regard dio the 'power of dominion' in: Commonwealth and Church" 
(chapters sixteen andsSe"Wenteerr).The conclusion endeavours to draw 
together·.~the various strands of Hooker's argument and to make a final 
comment on the nature of this argument. 
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PREFACE 
The launching of a book is an event in the world~ but 
in time the book may surface in strange circumstances 9 en-
crusted with meanings foreign to its author's original inten-
tiono Thereforep since a book may be written which is intended 
not merely to offer a 'thought' but to persuade an audience 
to act on the expressed opinionsp it is necessary to an under-
standing of th±s prescription to restore it to its original 
setting in human activityo For in books of a practical 
character 'words are part of action and they are equivalents 
to actions' o 1 
This introduces us to what may be termed the historical 
dimension in the study of political thought. The aim in a 
historical appreciation is to restore to a work the author's 
own meaning as one might restore a water-mill to its original 
condition to show how~ creakingly but unmistakably, the wheel 
turned when newo 2 In shortp the attempt is to retrieve some-
thing from 'the erosion of immediate intelligibility' occasioned 
by the passage of time.3 But just as in restoring a mill to 
its original condition one may find that the original plans 
were inadequate and the finished product does not operate as 
intended 9 so it is necessary in the history of ideas to show 
that the intelligibility of a work is not as transparent as 
lo Bronislaw Malinowskip Coral Gardens and their Mag±c 9 
London 9 1935, vol.2, Po9o 
2. An analogy that has its origins in J o l\1. Dunnp The Poli ticar 
Thought of John Locke 9 Cambridge 9 1969 9 PoXo I have 
altered it slightly and extended its use as the following 
remarks showo 
3o The phrase is Ro Jo McShea'so See his The Political 
PhilOS:QJ2.,hL...Q.f-.§I>inoza,- New- York 9 l968:r p.vl •. ~ 
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originally thought and that its intellectual foundations 
are not as solid as once presumed. In sum 9 mamy arguments 
do not, indeed cannot, do what they pretend to do, and in 
attempting such operations prove themselves incoherent. 
And it is proper in any intellectual enterprise to uncover 
incoherent argumemt. 
In this regard 9 the structure of the Ecclesiastical 
Polity has not, to my mind, received adequate attention. It 
is true that there are a few general studies available but 
these would seem to be mainly the work of theologians in 
search of a pedigree. This is a perfectly proper purpose on 
their part, but it is not mine.. It is the identifying mark 
of such studies to seek in the past support for opinions that 
are still, in the present, regarded as useful and valuable. 1 
In the process, the intentions of the author, in whose works 
these opinions have been located, and the structure of his 
argument, are steadily lost sight of. To recover these in-
tentions as far as possible and to exam.tne as adequately as 
I can the structure of the argument is my own aim in taking 
up the work of Hooker. 
My own purpose, then, is chiefly historical in charactere 
I seek to identify as far as possible Hooker's contemporary 
meaning. This involves the judgement, in my estimation, that 
Hooker is not a philosopher who qua philosppher has mnch of 
interest to convey to us today. It will be seen that in the 
main Hooker expounds his own compound of theological - cum -
1., In the Preface to Eo T. Davies The Political Ideas of 
Richard Hooker, London, 1946, the then~ of vJells was 
of the opinion that 'the working of a mind as massive 
and logical as was Hooker's must always be of interest 
and real valueo The study of it would, I think, prove 
especially beneficial to a generation whose standards 
---seem-t-o- be unduly and inc_reasingly indebted to_t?-~se set 
by Hollywood.' 
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philosophical views that are a reflection of the Great Chain 
of Being traditiono But his thinking 9 while it cannot be 
claimed as a new departure 9 is not a borrowed or stolen cloak 
worn to hide sterility of mindo He was working within a 
certain tradition 9 and here he was in complete control of 
its assumptions and preceptso He did not 9 however 9 examine 
these assumptions critically 9 and it seems that many of his 
modern commentators have not endeavoured to do so eithero 
This is not to imply 9 as is so often the fashion today 9 
that the uniquely philosophical method of st~dying a thinker 
is to consider only the intrinsic cogency of his argumentso 
Belonging to a tradition seems too loose an adjustment in a 
person's thought to be susceptible of philosophical inter-
pretatimno But to regard a theoris~s intentions and his 
relationship to ijis predecessors as a matter of extraneous 
influences on his work is dangerously misleadingo With a 
thinker of HookerRs calibre it is an utter waste of time to 
study him for intrinsic philosophical merit aloneo He has 
very littleo This should not 9 of course 9 lead us to the con~ 
elusion that Hooker considered that his arguments had no philo-
sophical cogencyo He thought that they had, but this cogency 
is for him determined entirely by the tradition of thought 
in which he worked and which he regarded as authoritativeo 
Such an attitude determines the intellectual content of his 
worko 
The cogency of HookerRs general arguments 9 since they 
are offered as philosophical 9 must be investigatedo This 9 however, 
is only a part of my enterpriseo Much more important for 
Hooker was the supposed usefulness of these arguments in 
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the situation with which he was faced. He was, in short, con-
cerned chiefly with practice, or at least with the influence 
of certain beliefs on practical activity. He tends to be imp-
atient with theoretical problems which he finds confusing to 
his purpose. But his disregarding them does not necessarily 
strip him for effective action. Incoherence in argument at 
any level of experience can be an incumbrance. 
The distinction that Hohker draws between necessity and 
indifference marks the point at which his thinkit1g moves from 
one level to another. To be fair to Hooker, this distinction 
between necessity and indifference is something of a differ-
entiation between theory and practice, but it cannot be con-
sidered adequate as a philosophical distinction. The reason 
why it cannot be held to be adequate is that the necessary 
principles that govern the conduct of mfin not only attempt 
to explain but also to prescribe the authorised ends of his 
activity. The distinction between necessity and indifference 
is really little more than one of ends and means. Clearly, 
Hooker is mainly concerned Vlith practical application, and 
the very character of necessity allows for its direct relev-
ance to practice. 
I have ascribed to Hooker's aims and arguments a practical 
character. By this I 'mean that his project arose out of a 
particular situation, and for the most part Hooker had this 
situation in mind throughout the work. Such were the ideals 
and dispositions that generated this situation that Hooker 
- viii -
felt compelled to outline the general nature of his own 
position. In the later books he did of course attempt to 
examine in some detail the particular structure of the Eli~abethao 
Ecclesiastical Polityp and he naturally found it to be perfectly 
reasonable. My immediate concern is not, however, with his 
examination of Elizabethan Church practice in these books, but 
with what Hooker considers to be the presuppositions of his 
entire project. In my view he assesses the situation according 
to two distinct sets of principles although in his own mind 
they were perfectly integrated. 1 VJhat the immediate object 
of my attention is now is the particular point of view he sets 
forth in Book One of the Ecclesiastical Polity. For the argu-
ments employed there to substantiate his position are circular 
in character. An& this circularity characterizes his pppDnents' 
position likewise. In short, their arguments, which I term 
practical since they are primarily meant to have effect in 
practice, are particular (and peculiar) forms of practical 
argument. I shall term them systematically misleading practical 
argurnent. 2 By this I do not wish to signify that such argtunents 
need be conscious and deliberate tricks. They are, however, 
·illusory in that such arguments cannot have the authority they 
are proclaimed to have.3 They are, for instance, claimed as 
absolutely true and they cannot, because of their circularity, 
1 .. 
2. 
3. 
The two sets of principles a~e those set forth in Book One 
where he outlines his absolute presuppositions about the 
nature of experience, and at the beginning of Book Five, 
where he proposes four principles by v.rhich in general the 
activities within the area of things indifferent may be judge( 
An adaptation of Ryle's 'Systematically Misleading Expressi~ 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol._XXXII, 1931. 
John Grote writes: 'By "illusion" as distinguished from 
reality we mean what, given us as apparent fact by one sen-
sitive power, will not stand the test of others'. Exploratio 
Philosophica, 2 volsq Cambridge, 1900, vol.l, p.l3. 
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be falsified in-time, for the time of their fulfilment is 
r .. -:.· ·-~":·t· 
always ahead of p~~g:s~ practice. Yet they are practical in 
intent for what they proclaim is to be pursued in practice. 
But practical argument is always subject to the contingent. 
The vocabulary employed to recommend \vhat is to be done does 
not, it is true, change as rap·ii:dly as the situation (the result 
would be madness), but the situation itself has in it elements 
of uncertainty alwayse It is ever contingent, for the sufficient 
conditions necessary to control such a situation cannot be 
present in practice. That is why judgement is necessary, and 
even this is no guarantee of success. Decisions are always, 
from an ideal point of vision, taken on inadequate information~ 
To have all the conditions necessary to bring about a situation 
is to be infuat situation. And in such a state no act of a 
purposive nature, as we know it now, is possible. For to be 
in that state is to be in an essentially unchangeable and ideal 
situation. Thus those who propose an ideal condition and 
support it by circular argument often mistake the necessary 
conditions of practical activity. They expect that practice 
will in the end conform exactly to their ideal. Such a result 
would mean the extinction of historical time. 
Although ideals of this nature are practical in that they 
offer a vision of perfect order which must be sought, they 
cannot in principle be contradicted by the presuppositions of 
all practical argument and activity. And practical argument 
and action, if it is to attain success in any degree, must be 
geared to as specific a time and place as possible. 1 Although 
1. The crit~r±a for purposive action are success and satisfac-
toriness. Argument in practice revolves around attempts to 
bring about more satisfactory circumstances. And such argu-
ment, therefore, must take into account the particular order 
of the present, and how and vihenaat a particular time in the 
-future su-c-h- a more satis-f'ac tory- situation migh.t- b:te. brought 
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misleading practical arguments are in principle not subject to 
one particular time and place (in that sense they are trans-
historical) they are nonetheless 9 despite their formal structure, 
to be judged according to the criteria of practical argumento 
The point about a circular argument in practice is that it can 
only be punctured on the nail bed of timeo Of course the 
argument has 9 so to speak, to be put in motion firsto And 
some such arguments are deflated at birth by time's indifferenceo 
However, so long as a number of people believe such arguments, 
that is, take them at their own estimation, then these arguments 
may be said to have 'caug~t on'o From our point of view their 
ideal ends cannot logically be reached 9 for they contradict 
what we may term the presuppositions of practiceo But such an 
argument in practice merely bounces off the protective skin of 
any circular argumento 
The Calvinist argument 9 for instance, partakes of this 
circular charactero For in this tradition of thought the elect 
see the world in like fashion and for them the truth is what 
theyseeo By definition those who refuse to acknowledge the 
truth as they see~t are not of the electo Hooker's own argu-
ment is somewhat similar in its circularity, but only in parto 
He has an escape clause with his distinction between necessity 
and indifference 9 and in practice this is serviceable enougho 
However, this characterization of the two arguments will 9 I hope 9 
become somewhat clearer as we proceedo 
The cogency of Hooker's argument and the character of the 
tradition in which he worked naturally form the centre of my 
abouto For some discussion of practical reasoning see 
Ao Kenny, 'Practical Inference', Analysis 9 volo26, 
l965~66p PPo65-75o 
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worko Associated with this argument are the vocabulary and 
literary devices used to 'clothe' its structureo And here it 
might be noted that this study is an illustration ofp and perhaps 
a corrective to 9 Professor Greenleaf's general work on two 
traditions of political thoughto 1 What we have in the present 
study with greater detail and, I hope 9 with enhanced under-
standing, is an examination of one thinker employing such ideas 
as ordered correspondenc~s·between hierarchies of sub-groups 
throughout natureo Greenleaf appears in his study of the ideas 
of order and empiricism to assert a correspondence of his own, 
which the book does not substantiateo For in illustrating 
the political implications as he sees them of the idea of order 9 
he makes use of theorists of royal absolutism only 9 and in 
examining the political ideas of the empiricists, he finds them 
to be anti-royalist and always anti-absolutisto 2 
This I believe to be misleadingo Even within his own 
book the dichotomy which he propounds can be seen to collapseo 
For the thinkers that Greenleaf employs to illustrate his 
theme just did not view matters as he claims they dido Far 
from conceiving the universe to be either a created or a 
natural order, they saw it as being both simultaneouslyo What 
reason suggested observation confirmedo In such a reciprocal 
~'i\... 
lo Wo Ho Greenleaf, Order, Empiricism and Politics, Oxferd 1964o 
2o Greenleaf, ibid,·r_po8; 'I first explain the world-view of 
order which was fundamentally based on a Christian-inspired 
metaphysic and the arguments of which were characteristically 
elaborated by the process of analogy called "correspondence 11 • 
In England this style of thought tended politically to be 
associated with the idea of absolute sovereigntyo It thus 
provided a Ehilosophical basis for the doctrine of the 
divine rignt of kingso' (JVIy underlining.) 
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relationship scientific observation did not contradict what 
God had revealed. One of the greatest achievements of the 
eighteenth century and perhaps the most 'empirical' of all, 
namely the classification of animals and plants by Buffon and 
Linnaeus, rested on an acceptance of the great chain of being. 1 
And Petty, who appears as an empiricist in Greenleaf's work, 
composed some notes on the 'scale of creatures•. 2 It thus seems 
to be a common feature of human thought that particular ex-
periences are often accommodated to principles and values 
apparently external to them. 
Greenleaf's dichotomy is, then, incoherent and so indeed 
is his correspondence between political opinion and a com-
prehensive vision of human experience. Hooker with his idea 
of order is no less clear on Parliament's proper place in the 
political arrangements of the English Commonwealth than Bacon, 
the empiricist, is. Coke, who frequently has recourse to the 
vocabulary of the idea of order in his Reports)stands far more 
for the rights of the subject embodied in the rule of law than 
Bacon. Indeed, these examples point to a peculiar problem in 
the study of political thought, namely the relationship between 
an all-embracing vision of reality, which may often be expressed 
in a metaphorical or mythRcal form, and political experience 
itselfe And it is to this problem that for the moment we turn. 
The relationship that exists between political activity 
and the disposition that propels and is an aspect of that activity, 
le Natural theology as a context for political and scientific 
thinking survived well into the nineteenth century. See, 
for instance, Re M. Young, Mal~hus and~ Evolutionists: 
The Common Context of Biological and Social Theory, 'Past 
and Present', no. 43, 19b"9. 
2. The Pe~~Papers, ed. by the Marquis of Lansdowne, 2 volso, 
London, 1927; vol. II, pp.21-35. 
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and a comprehensive doctrine which purports to explain or 
describe what in general is happening, is certainly problematic. 
It is clearly not deductive in any precise sense of that term. 
The particulars of actual experience and their significance 
are not logically deducible from a comprehensive doctrine 
even if the believer may consider such an operation to be 
possible in principle. It is commonly thought that the 
app~opriateness of a particular action can ue tested against 
the general tenets of the view held. But this, of course, 
depends upon the previous acceptability of the 'explanation' 
offered. And indeed much may be accommodated within a very 
general frame of referenceo Such a process is circular 9 not 
deductive. 
Much of what Collingwood has written about absolute pre-
suppositions might fruitfully be applied here. As Collingwood 
explains them, the general and comprehensive principles of any 
mode of experience are not 'major premises' nor 'universal 
propositions' from which the specific and particular statements 
that men utter are to be inferred deductively. Rather, the 
specific statements and questions of any activity depend in 
part for their meaning and relevance on general doctrines. As 
Collingwood has it, the specific propositions either 'arise' or 
'do not arise', depending upon the general principles assumed; 
and the general doctrines are related to them, not as axioms 
to entailed propositions (as is often thought to be the case 
in theory), but rather as 'presuppositions' to consequential 
questions or indeed actions. 1 The relevance and acceptability 
1. R. Go Collingwood, An Essay on ~etaphysics, Oxford, 1940; 
part one, passim. 
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of narrower concepts or principles is thus referred to - and 
made contingent upon - the relevance and acceptability of 
broader concepts; and in any activity the most general pre-
suppositions of all partly determine the basic concepts and 
patterns of thought employed in their interpretation of that 
particular areaof thought. 
Now in the effort to make experience intelligible many 
'world views' often have recourse to metaphors and analogies. 
Such analogies and metaphors are often drawn from other areas 
of experience and then applied to political experience. Much 
prescriptive thought employs this type of imagery because it 
is held that it can relate what is strange to what is familiar, 
what is new to what is old. In such a fashion it endeavours 
to make the world more determinate. The effort extends to 
describing what is happening and to 'explaining' why it ought 
or ought not to have happened. It is a necessary corollary 
that it also prescribes what one should do ~n the future. How 
effectively this may be done does perhaps depend on the concrete-
ness of the opinions involved. However, effectiveness in 
prescribing particular actions in the immediate future is not 
the only criterion (one wonders how far it is a criterion) in 
the continued existence of a particular way of explaining or 
describing reality. The strength and success of a particular 
view of reality is a reflection of its 'persua·siveness', and this 
is as much (if not more so) dependent on disposition and circum-
stance as effectiveness in prescribing in particular cases. 
Metaphors and analogies, then, are reflections of an 
attempt to provide useful 'persuasive' tools, both for ourselves 
and for others. It must be noted, however 9 that if the meta-
phors are taken as complete, that is if the metaphor is held 
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to be real1 , then there is no political debate, merely des-
cription and authoritative prescription. 2 On the other hand, 
one may illustrate or describe by the use of imagery, and yet 
be able to respond to a particular situation in a variety of 
wayso This is the case with Hooker. Numerous correspondences 
illustrating order are frequently drawn. Yet, although the 
extended metaphor of the Great Chain of Being offers a comp~ete 
description of reality and allows such correspondences to be 
drawn, the distinction between necessity and indifference again 
gives enough latitude to stretch considerably (if not actually 
break3 ) the entire chain. 
In simple outline, then, what is aimed at in this study 
is a more coherent and historically accurate account of what 
Hooker was maintaining in the Ecclesiastical Polity than has 
yet been presented. 4 My purpose is to grasp as far as possi~e 
the structure and the application of Hooker's arguments though-
out. I have endeavoured~ however, not to confuse accomplishment 
and intention, and I have consequently noted any incoherence 
in Hooker's arguments at points where what he was maintaining 
was not internally consistent and yet not necessarily meaning-
less. The criterion of what Hooker is maintaining is necessauly 
1. Such metaphors are also 'dead' and/or extended. For further 
explanation of these terms see chapter nine of this work. 
2. One thinks particularly of Filmer's Patriarchi~. 
3. It cannot actually break for that would be self-defeating. 
It would represent a fissure in the constellation of 
absolute presuppositions. 
4. There is 9 I consider, no completely adequate treatment of 
Hooker's thought. The best wor~s (excluding articles) on 
Hooker are those by Peter Munz, The Place of Hooker in the 
History of Thought, London 1952, and the chapter in A. P. 
D'Entreves Medieval Contribution to Political Thought, Oxford 
1939. I have not seen D'Entreves' Riccardo Hooker, Torino 
1939, but I have consulted his Oxford D.Phil. thesis which 
is an examination of Hooker's thought. 
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historicale But the internal consistency of any argument that 
pretends to philosophy is always a matter of philosophical (non-
histori-c-al) judgement. 
The structure of the following study I have divided into 
five parts. Part One seeks to characterize the disposition 
of the disputantse Part Two providesthe historical setting 
to the conflict between Hooker and his opponents. In it I 
have noted something of the progress of reformed religion in 
England and of the beginnings of a reaction to the 1 movement 1 o 
Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity is seen as one (if not the most) 
extended work in this reaction to the PresbY-terian movement. 1 
Part Three endeavours both to examine the nature of Calvinist/ 
Presbyterian thought and to describe Hooker's reaction to tfue 
movement itselfo Part Four is an attempt to explain the character 
of Hooker's principles and arguments. This is chiefly an inves= 
tigation of Book One of the Ecclesiastical Politya Since, how= 
ever, Hooker endeavours to elucidate these principles throughout 
the entire work, clari~ication of the argument presented in 
Book One is increased somewhat by statements made elsewhere. 
The principles that are outlined concern the nature of experience 
in general, and moral conduct and political activity in particular 
I end this section with a general chapter in which I seek to 
summarize and extend my explanation of the nature of Hooker's 
thought. Part Five is an examination of how Hooker attempts 
to use these principles in countering the practical arguments 
of the Presbyterians and otherse In it I hope to bring out 
the emphasis Hooker places on authority and tradition in the 
area of things indifferent. This is illustrated in three areas 
le It is, of course, the most famous. 
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of exp.erience, namely, in the interpretation of Scrip~ure, in 
the public worship of the Christian Community, and in relation 
to the 'power of dominion' in Church and Commonwealth. 
Throughout this study we shall see Hooker employing his 
basic ideas of reason, revelation and experience, and his 
distinction between necessity and indifference. It is by 
way of.these notions that he sought to validate many of the 
customs and institutions of Elizabethan England. And our under-
standing of how he attempted to do this is increased by noting 
the incoherencies in his arguments. It will be seen that 
practically anything may be accommodated within a metaphorical 
structure, of which the concept of natural law is a part. 
Indeed, we are ultimately forced to conclude that despr.te the 
formality of the argument much, if not all, depends upon the 
character and disposition of the disputants. And this is as 
might expect in any activity of a practical 1 response. 
Hooker's own particular disposition is, therefore, our 
last reason for studying him. For the great strength of con~ 
servative opinion and political thought in England naturally 
raises the question of 'origins'. In this connection the 
name of Burke almost too readily springs to mind, for many of 
one 
the basic assumptions of conservative thought are present there .. 
These include, of course, the deep sense of tradition, the 
lo This has certain implications for the study of political 
thought.. See (i) J .. G. A. Pocock, '.The History of P.oli tic.a~-< 
.T4ou.gp.t: a M.e.thodof-ogic~l .F:n_q_uiry, in J?hi+~l&XL :Politics 
and Socie!l 2nd oeries, ed. F. Laalett and W. G. Runciman, 
Oxford (Blaclcwell) 1962; (ii) Q .. Skinner, 'Meaning and Under-
standing in the History of Ideas', Hist,£.FY and Theory vol.VIIT 
1969; (iii) J .. M~ Dunn 'The Identity ofthe History of Ideas' 
Philosophy, vol. XLIII, 1968 
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great distrust of 'radical' thought~ and emphasis on the rule 
of lawo But 9 wlthout denying the specific contEibution of Burke 
to the English conservative tradition 9 it would be historically 
inaccurate not to recognise that such things as a profound dis-
like of radical reform 9 a sense of community 9 and a great 
emphasis on law and tradition were not present in previous 
English thinkerso It will be 9 therefore 9 one of the purposes 
of this work to show the importance of the Ecclesiastical Polity 
for the English conservative traditiono 'For assuredly it is 
the work which 9 more perhaps than any in our language 9 embodies 
that conservatismo ,l And the principle that English conservatism 
embodied was that of the rule of law as against private opinion a 
lo Fo Do Maurice 9 rlloral and Metaphysical Philosophy~ 2 volso 
revo edo 9 London 1872 9 PPo l90-l92o 
PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
- 2 ~ 
CHANGE AND DISPOSITION 
Political thought is about order and achievement within 
the worldo It is generally 9 I consider 9 a response to a change 
in the order or lack of order in immediate experienceo Such 
situations may provide the occasion for thought of an abstract 
character to offer surrogates and substitutes for the apparent 
lack of certainty that is an inevitable consequence· of changeo 
Part of the air of certainty that pervades this type of thiruring 
stems from its being quite abstract for all its wealth of detailo 
For the particulars stressed usually bear little relationship 
to the circumstances of their inceptiono It has been one (if 
not the) characteristic feature of political thought since the 
Reformation that it has been ready with blueprints to bring 
change to a halt in a regime of perfect ordero 1 And this order 
is held to be theoretically viable Before its practical creation 9 
and its very perfection is a radical criticism of present arrange-
mentso It is 9 accordingly 9 a sin to compromise merely lby_~:tink~rin~ 
with this or that corrupt practiceo To enjoy what is present 
without recognizing its depravity is~ consequently 9 irrational 
and inhuman from the radical standpointo The fundamentalist, 
finding that much is radically bad in present political society 9 
calls for its transformation in the light of 'rational' principles 
and idealso In this way he hopes that new societies 9 the blue-
prints for which are 'on the boards 1 9 will be createdo His idea 
is that society should be consciously and deliberately re-fashioned 
lo It is likewise a characteristic feature of this manner of 
thought 9 almost desptte itself 9 to be slightly vague about 
details of its scb.emao This, of course 9 need be of little 
moment until the chosen commence to dispute among themselves 
-ov:e±> these -ve::ry details o- - -
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according to p~econceived ideaso 1 
This fundamentalist diposition appears in practice tor 
the first time in the sixteenth-centuryo Its origin 9 however, 
is not to be found in the purely politirial but is an attitude 
otiginally foreign to properly political experience, Radicalism 9 
gen:erally 9 is a dispos-ition of thought, that is brought to bear 
on the political from outsideo (And this is no less true of 
the thought of Marx, Bentham and Paine 9 for instance~ than it 
is of Calvinismo) The particular social conditions of the 
sixteenth century 9 therefore, provided the occasion for the 
widespread p~ctical influence of this fundamentalist disposition 
which informed the Calvinist 'movement'. As Michael Walzer has 
it 9 the sixteenth century saw 'the -~ppearance of revolutionary 
organization and radical ideology'. 2 The saints considered 
that revolution was at hand for they saw themselves as divine 
instruments~ wreckers of a corrupt society and recreators of 
a godly communityo 
In what we may term traditional societies (that is, before 
the Industrial Revolution) the radical was a reactionaryo Con-
sequentl~ the effort at radical change took the form of an 
attempted recreation of a previous ideal stateo This attitude 
had a long history but it had hardly been efficacious on a 
large scaleo In the sixteenth century, however, it clearly 
had widespread repercussionso Of course the attempted changes 
lo This fashionable trend in political thinking has so overcome 
one admirable academic that he has been led to conclude that 
'theory has become the opium of the masses'o Eo Kedourie, 
'Revolutionary Nationalism in Asia_an~_Africa', Government 
and Opposition, volo 3, 1968 9 Po 464o 
2o Me 1;Jalzer, ~he.=Revolution.of j;heS,!!>j._n_ts: A Study in the Ori-
gins of Radical Politics, New York, 1968 9 Po lo 
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did not recreate the ideal state at all 9 but merely occasioned 
'rapid 1 change in a 1 £orward' directiono For action 9 whether 
the occasion £or its inception is an ideal £orm £ound in the 
past or a goal to be reached in the £unure, always takes timea 
That is why, in practice 9 while it may be important to differen-
tiate between the reactionary endeavouring to 'return' to an 
ideal arrangement and the 'modern' radical attempting to create 
his projected vision o£ a perfect future, this fundamentalist 
attitude common to both of them has a similar effecta They 
both act in the present to destroy that present order utterly 
and to create a perfect future or to bring about a return to 
a per£ect past conditiono This is logically impossible 9 and 
all that happens is change from one situation to anothera 
Change may thus be considered 1 slow'·or 'rapid' according to 
one's dispositiono Both reform and revolution as aspects o£ 
change are still endless processeso Change cannot come to a 
halto Yet for all that 9 to the conservative the attempt at 
're£orm' may still get out of hand and change may appear too 
'fast 1 o '*here hath arisen a sect in England .. ··which seeketh to 
reform even the French re-formation .... 11 
The radical attitude and response to change, then, the 
conservative in particular has £ound to be dangerous nonsense, 
both potentially and actuallyo For the conservative himself 
political activity requires considerable judgement 9 an appre-
ciation of subtle gradations and distinctions, and a sense of 
timing and relevanceo And these are the things that cannot be 
set out in definite rules and preceptso Theycre learned £rom 
actions and £rom trying to act 9 and £rom making use o£ present 
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materials. Radical argument 9 consequently 9 may be considered 
irrational in that 'rational' argument itself is based on long 
and deep experience and issues in a judgement about actual 
political arrangements. Such is the only proper response to 
changeo 
This clash between conservative and radical provides 9 in 
my view 9 something of a thread running through Post~Renaissance 
political thought 9 and especially English political thoughto 
This clash of dispositions we may come across on numerous 
occasionso For instance 9 it may be seen in the disputes between 
various radical sects and the parliamentarians and the royalists 
in the Civil War 9 in the confrontation between Burke and Paine 9 
in the arguments of Maine and Spencer 9 and in the extended 
writings of Bentham and Coleridgeo Of course, the 'formal' 
content of many of the works of these authors are very differento 
But, if we pay attention to the way in which they make use of 
these contents 9 so to speak 9 we find, I consider 9 distinctive 
attitudes to changeo And it is these attitudes that are of 
considerable importance in practical argumento They inform 9 
if I am not mistaken, the tactics and style of many a dispute. 
This is the case between Hooker and his opponentso 
- 6 -
HOOKER AND THE RADICAL DISPOSITION 
Hooker is one of the first to face up to the full impli-
cations of fundamentalism in practiceo Such a disposition led 
him to examine his awn attitude toward change and to concern 
himself with the various authorities 9 their place and extent 9 
within a historical community. This is hardly surprising 9 for 
the sixteenth century saw considerable discussion of the modes 
of authority 9 their structure and transmission within the 
Christian Community. And in the period under consideration 
the state was ' so clearly linked with religion that no state 
that changed its religion ever survived in its old political 
form'ol The attempt by the Calvinists 9 therefore 9 to establish 
a 'true' church involved them willy-nilly with change in general 9 
with political authority and the social ordero For the sake of 
establishing a proper church 9 the dissolution of the old order 
was demanded and deemed necessaryo This involved rearranging 
politi~al and religious relationships in such a way that the 
church could be removed from that area of corruption that had 9 
in effect, given it a historyo For the true church had a time-
less form 9 established by divine acto Its members were obliged 
to. maintain its rigid identity over and against historical 
changeo 
The arguments employed to support such a contention will 
be examined more fully in the following chapterso Suffice ithem 
to remark that they are, I consider 9 circular in charactero 
lo Lord Act6no Quoted without reference by Ho Butterfiad, 
Lord Acton 9 London, 1949 9 Po 6o 
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That is~ they display the characteristic feature of what we 
have already referred to ~systematically misleading practical 
argumento 1 Such argument is a persistent characteristic of a 
part of Hooker's thoughto In the face of what he considered 
to be a radically subversive argument 9 Richard Hooker in Book 
One of his Ecclesiastical Politl reiterated a traditional view 
of experience designed to display the ilirrationality of his 
opponent's argumento This is the most general aspect of his 
purpose, which is to destroy 9 by argument 9 the Presbyterians' 
intellectual foundations. The ground is thereby cleared for 
a discussion of the particulars of present experience, not the 
details of an experience long since past. The discussion both 
of the ~essary principles of reality and of its details 9 
accordingly, proceeds to the end in view 9 namely the legitim-
isation of the Elizabethan Settlement. For all his air of 
intellectual objectivity Hooker has a practical nnd in mind, 
and his arguments are directed towards that end. 
In his argument Hooker uses certain key words and endeavours 
to construct their relationship to each other. For at least 
fifteen hundred years several of the words he employs had 
provided the means by which the few, who were able 9had exchanged 
politiual ideas at all levels of discourse higher than that of 
substantive law. Among such words were nature, experience 9 
law, justice, custom, reason, virtue and ordero The considerable 
stability of the intelligibility of these words in relation to 
each other, and the intricate symbiosis by which all sustained 
one another, had for centuries effectively guaranteed the 
general meaningfulness of political discourse, although they 
lo See the Preface to this vJOrk. 
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did nothing to assure its practicality and immediate relevance 
despite vague assertions to the contraryo The balance 9 however 9 
by which these words maintained their value was seriously dis-
turbed for possibly the first time in the late fifteenth and 
early sixteenth centurieso This disturbance was a reflection 
both of intellectual dissatisfaction with certain aspects of 
scholastic traditimn and later of the~isintegration of the 
Church of .Romeo It was, indeed 9 the Christian Humanists who 
first endeavoured to reform the Church and to remove what they 
considered to be intellectual and moral errorso What may be 
termed the high point of this 'school' was More's Utopi~ol 
But, for an increasing number
9
the attempt to reform progressed 
too slowly 9 and the corruption of the Church felt increasingly 
unbearableo For this corruption was itself a sort of moral 
and spiritual disordero The effort-, therefore 9 to reform and 
to shake off the shackles of the Papacy by political and 
religious groupings was brought on by and, in turn, created 
disordero 
vJi th the repudiation of the Roman Church and the disorder 
consequent thereupon 9 there emerged traditions of thought that 
offered ways out of the impasseo Mingling with these attempts 
to pursue religious reform and to attain unity were the politics 
of the 'secular' princeso The character and failures of their 
style of activity occasioned three 'secular' modes of thinking 
about politicso 2 They were the Machiavellian, with its emphasis 
lo Thomas More, Utqpia, edo Edward Surtz 9 So Jo and Jo Ho 
Hexter, Yale Edition of the Complete Works of Sto Thomas MorE 
vole IV, New Haven 9 1965o The introduction by Hexter is 
particularly good-and sets Utopia within what he-terms the 
Christian Humanist traditiono 
2o By secular I mean that they were not immediately related 
to the Great Chain of Beingo 
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on 'real' statesmanship1 ~ the Polybian or Venetian image of 
the immortally stable, mixed constitution which carried down 
to the end of the eighteenth century the Hellenic vision of 
political 1space 12 , and, in Eqgland at least 9 the idea of 
the Ancient Constitution3 o These images of political order did 
not impinge particularly on Hooker's sphere of vision, although 
his thought has affinities to the tradition of the common 
lawyers and he did have some comments to make on Machiavelli 
and the 'atheists' at the beginning of Book Fiveo vfuat did 
concern him greatly was, of course 9 the Calvinist vision with 
its notions of election and 'true church'o These ideas were 
part of a schema of universal history which envisaged a sequence 
of godly and anti-godly actions forming an eschatological vmyth'o 
The truechurch 9 consequently 9 was less a historical phenomenon 
than the institutionalization of the laws of redemption in timee 
This church was exclusive in that, if rigid and immutable stan-
dards of conduct were to be adhered to, any corrupting in-
fluerrces had to be removed and destroyedo Ideally 9 life was 
conducted in an orderly imitation of the sacred.4 Those who 
took part in this ritual were the saints, and in pursuit of 
their ends,ties of mutual confidence 9 sympathy and kinship 
1. 1 Real' means external and not 'moral 1 o For traditionally 
moral activity has its origin in internal intentiono Real 
statesmanship was thus a rejection of the 'Mirror of Princes' 
genre and took as its measure politival successive irres-
pective of 'moral' intentiono 
Zo So Fink 9 The Classical R~publicans 9 Evanston, 1945~ and 
J o Go Ao Pocock 9 il'Machiavelli 9 Harringtnn. ~n.d F.rw:lisq 
Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Uentury 1 9 William 
and Mary Quarterly, volo 22 9 1965o 
Jo Go Ao Poc9ck 9 The Ancient C~ns~tution_and the Feudal Law 9 
Cambridge 9 1957o . 
Underneath the argument something of the institutllional con-
tinuity in Geneva may be seen in Eo Wo Monter, Calvin's 
Geneva, New York 9 1967, and Studies i~ Genevan Gove~nmen1 
~-1605 9 Geneva 1964o 
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lost their valueo Thus the expression of order and brotherhood 
was achieved by the spiritual COIJ1I11Union of those who shared 
in the holy sacrament of the Lord's Supper 9 by the exclusion 
from it of the unworthy and by the outward signs of saintliness 
and electiono This alone constituted the true identity of the 
saints o The proof of divine justice,~ beneficet.ence and wisdom 
lay in positive recognition 9 without ostensibly any interpolation~ 
of the facts asserted by Scriptureo Moral righteousness became 
a matter of visible proofs within an eternal community. 
In the face of this radical attitude towards change 9 and 
of the threat to the authority and identity of the traditional 
church in England (for its destruction is what the Presbyterian 
project amounted to) 9 Hooker took up what he considered to be 
the proper framework of thought to answer such _·irrational 
and mistaken longingso He consciously accepted the traditional 
political vocabulary in its entirety,·and sought to show its 
relevance to the matter at hando He attempted to correct the 
fissure in the constellation of these words which the Calvinists 
had caused by changing their setting and reference. By so 
altering the setting of these words they were able to reject 
as irrelevant to ecclesiastical considerations the idea of 
traditional experienceo But they were not Utopians in the 
sense that the perfect society or discipline existed merely 
in the imaginationo For they considered that the true con~ 
stitution had once existed and that the experience could9and 
should9be recreatedo 
Thus it was that within a traditional frame of thought 
Hooker came to examine particular details and laws 9 and much 
if not all of what he has to say is prescriptive in intention 
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and toneo For 9 in contrast to the huge Summa of Aquinas 9 
Hooker was mainly concerned with a particular community and how 
it could be 'placed' in the traditional context he had outlinedo 
Yet 9 while he endeavoured to do this 9 it must nonetheless be 
noted that 9 for Hookerp the community itself was founded on 
tradition and law 9 and on the sharing of certain common experiences I 
particular patterns of conduct 9 and mutual sympathyo Hooker's 
work 9 therefore 9 is perhaps a reflection of the new sophistication 
and awareness of the individuality and identity of the traditional 
community that may be discerned in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centurieso 1 
vfuile he had great faith in the thought he subscribed to~ 
Hooker was clearly afraid of the results of the radical attitudes 
to changeo He certainly admitted 'the aptnesffi of men's minds to 
accept and believe' the new doctrineso 2 Under pressure from this 
type of thinking we see a thinker subtly shifting his ground from 
reliance on merely natural law principles and arguments to an in= 
creasing emphasis on tradition and the value of historical trans= 
mission as a mode of action and knowledgeo And in the emphasis 
which Hooker placed on the church as a traditional community 9 
transmitting its interpretations or original revelation in ways 
which invested them chiefly with prescriptive and presumptive 
value 9 we may perhaps recognize not merely an appeal to tradition 
as a mode of authority sometimes preferable to 'charisma' 9 but an 
intensified a-wareness of the traditional rommunity -which is often considered 
lo This may be seen in the historical writings of the periodo 
On this see Po Burke 9 The Renaissance Sense of th~ Past 9 
London 9 1969; Fo Jo Levy 9 Tudor Historical Thought 9 San 
Marino 9 1967; Fo So Fussner 9 The Historical Revolution 9 
London 9 1962; Jo Go Ao Pocock 9 ~he Ancient Constitution and 
the Feudal Law 9 Cambridge 9 1957o 
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the ideal conservative response to this fundamentalist dis~ 
position of thoughto This aspect of Hooker's thinking is but 
a reflection of the importance ascribed to historical experience 
that provid,es the counterpoint to the political thought of 
post-Renaissance radicalismo In this conservative style of 
thought 9 political order and historical change are no longer 
necessarily in conflict with each otherp but are bound up in 
a concept of e~perienceo Such a concept makes it possible to 
criticize and recombine the information which is carried down 
from the past until there emerges the image of a past diff~ntly 
ordered and yet linked to the present thiDough lines of insti-
tutional transformationo In this way we come to possess images 
of institutions determinate in space and timeo 
On the whole 9 then 9 Hooker's thought was in~red not by 
'philosophical' consideratimns but by practical interestso 
Clearly what concertLed ::him was how effectively his ideas in-
fluenced the community in which he li~d 9 as much as how com-
pletely he had captured and conformed to some abstract idea 
of the trutho It would be wrong 9 of course 9 to conclude from 
this that practical considerations were for Hooker not in 
some sense bound up with the 1 truth 1 o For certainly he believed 
that the ideas outlined in Book One of the Ecc~esiastical Polity 
were tr~e 9 that is 9 they reflected God's reasono But it is 
equally clear that Hooker considered that these ideas embodied 
certain values in addition to explaining the nature of realityo 
On his terms it would have been peculiar if they did noto 
PART II 
THE OCCASION 
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3o 
REFORMED RELIGION IN ENGLAND 
(i}, 
The reform of the Church in England conducted by Henry VIII 
was a political acto In place of the Pope as head of this 
Church 9 he proclaimed himselfo By this act 9 legal ties with 
the Papacy were abolishedo 'This realm of England' 9 runs the 
preamble to the Act in Restraint of Appeals of 1533 9 'is an 
empire 1 o England was 9 thereforev free to determine her own 
ecclesiastica] arrangementso And Henry endeavoured to combine 
this replacement of headship with a position of conservatism 
in regard to doctrine and ceremonialo 
reign proceeded 9 extremely difficulto 
He found this 9 as his 
In 1539 9 for instancev 
Parliament 9 at Henry's bidding, passed a Bill entitled 'An Act 
Abolishing Diversity in Opinions'o 
This conservative position of Henry VIII's was 9 ~en 9 always 
in jeopardyo It was challenged, on the one side, by Protestants 
and, on the other 9 by those who sought a return to Romeo In 
general there was an increasing tendency for initiative to slip 
out of royal handso After 1547 initiative towards change 
shifted to a group of subjectso Henceforward there was to be 
a constant struggle between the Crown, desperately attempting 
to retain religious uniformity under royal auspices 9 and a'move-
ment' of Protestants straining and pulling to reshape the 
1 nationa~ religion according to their own strongly-held viewso 
Yet 9 when Mary Tudor became Queeri of Engiand in 1553 9 
there was not a single great Protestant realm in Europe 9 only 
a few petty German and northern principalities whose rulers 
were all t-oo--1-i::kely to :17eturn to the Roman obedience-if_ the_ 
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situation ceased to bep as it looked like doingp to their ad-
vantageo For better or worse 9 however 9 Protestantism of a radical 
character was still in ex~ence in l600o It did not collapse in 
the face of the Catholic Counter-Reformationo Nor was it en~ 
tirely defeated in England despite the royal attempt to establish 
and maintain a 'conservative' or moderate Protestantismo And 
that it did not do so was unmistakably the result of the 
initiative of the followers of Calvino 
The Calvinists more than any other introduced an extreme 
fundamentalism in religious thought which spilled over into 
'political' action. Thus in England, the mere existence of a 
centre mf initiative and action independent of the Crown was 
grave enougho But after 1559 it was even more dangerous by 
reason of its 'radical' charactero The old factionalism of the 
past had been personal 9 familial or dynastic in natureo This did 
not entirely disappear 9 but the cohesion of this new 'movement' 
was its radical or fundamentalist dispositiono Commitment to 
abstract p±inciples of belief which were intended to act as the 
springs of necessary action was novel in the sixteenth centuryo 
But it wasp as many were to discover 9 extremely useful both in 
regard to religious experience itself and to 'political' activityo 
(ii) 
From out of the confusion occasioned by the early Reformation 
Calvinism 9 with its particular conception of order and authority 9 
appeared to offer a complete resolution of consequent difficulties 
both political and religiouso The impulse behind this desire for 
discipline was an endeavour_to keep corr~ption in the world under 
control and thereby to ensure that the godly church was not con-
taminated by the diseases found in the natural ordero For 9 since 
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they lived in a world which was the battlefield of God and Satan 9 
those who sinned 9 those who surrendered to Satan 9 were courting 
a visitation of God's wratho Virtue 9 to adapt a phrase of 
Josiah Royce's 9 consisted at the very least in holding the 
devil by his throato Originally 9 perhaps 9 all the Protestant 
sects had been anxious to secure real freedom of scriptural 
interpretationo They had also paid lip service to the idea that 
the true church was a kingdom not of this world and that they 
ought not to·- make use of force :for spiri tlltal ends o But this 
proved to be a practically impossible position to hold in an 
imperfect world 9 and 9 in response to the chaos of the first half 
of the sixteenth century 9 the Calvinists were led to demand 
holy discipline 9 which they believed could only be provided by 
the allegedly Apostolic form of theocracyo And this saddle of 
discipline was readily borne by those to whom the ideas of 
struggle and godly warfare were ever the spurso Thus holy 
discipline tended to replace traditional legal order 9 peace 
and tranquillity were held to be the outcome of final victory 
onlyo The end of the struggle was the establishment of the true 
form of church organizationo 
Inevitably 9 in contrast to the conservatism of the Eliza-
bethan Church 9 the more extreme Protestants were disposed to 
demand freedom from traditional political controlo This did 
not merely add up to a separation of Church and Commonwealth 9 
it implied that the magistrate should be subsumed under the 
Churcho In other words 9 the extreme Protestant argument led 
almost inevitably to theocracyo In place of the Papacy as the 
'external' authority 9 its adherents put an inspired interpretation 
on scripture 9 an inspiration 9 as Hooker frequently pointed out 9 
often adjusted exactly to their own most pressing needso In 
reality 9 they could not afford to allawfor freedom of scriptural 
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interpretation 9 for that would have resulted in anarchy againo 
And indeed 9 if one interpretation was admitted to be as good 
as another 9 there was no 'necessary' or absolute case against 
the traditional church (or churches) which to some extent was 9 
after all 9 based also on an interpretation of the Scriptureso 
To meet the desire for 'true' order 9 which allegedly the 
traditional church did not provide 9 and to realize ~he wish 
for the correct principles of organi~ation~ which obviously the 
bishops and theologians of the Church had missed or failed to 
transmit 9 the systematic formulation of the new doctrine in 
scriptural terms was undertakeno The result was 9 amongst many 
other works 9 Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion 9 his 
Commentaries? his Sermons 9 and the supposed practical application 
of the principles displayed in these works at Genevao It was 
here that many of the Marian Exiles saw 9 dominant over a whole 
community, a system of doctrine and discipline which was ap-
parently self-containedo It ruled not only men 9 women and 
children 9 and took control alike of public and private life9 
(thereby obliterating that distinction) but it also committed 
to an ecclesiastical court or consistory 
'the care of all men's manner 9 powers of determining 
all kinds of ecclesiastical causes 9 and authority to 
convent 9 to control 9 to punish 9 as far as with ex~ 
communication 9 whomsoever they should think worthy 9 
none either small or great excepted~ol 
In many such men as Knox 9 the years of exile appear to have 
accentuated an already radical dispositiono And the longer 
they remained on the continent 9 the more easily they took up 
the extreme position of the Church at Genevao In many waysp 
because they had no opportunity to practise what they preached 
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on a large scale~ it is understandable that they tended to 
be more virulent in their language 9 and more forceful in their 
conclusions 9 than Calvin himselfo Exile thus made them more 
doctrinaire in their fundamentalismo It added the bitterness 
of frustrationo The more deprived of opportunity for action 9 
the more frenzied they became in proclaiming the trutho1 
By 1558 Calvinism was in a position to become the dominant 
version of 'Reformed' religion2 9 and it was the intention of 
the radical group of the exiles, who returned on the death of 
Mary, to impose the newly 'recovered' true Word of God upon 
England 9 and to reform her Church according to that Wordo 
Geneva, however 9 was as repugnant to Elizabeth as Rome 9 and no 
matter how sincere;ty Calvin may 9 in certain of his works, have 
paid respect to the civil magistracy in its proper sphere 9 and 
no matter how generously_he paid his respects to the godly 
princess of England 9 political authority in Geneva was subor-
dinate to a higher authorityo So it appeared to Elizabeth and 
to some of her advi~trso They~ consequently 9 accepted neither 
the Genevan nor the Roman solution to ecclesiastical organizationo 
The civil power in England remained supreme, in no way directly 
' 
subject to the control of the spmritual powero And while the new 
The other group of exiles remained loyal to the Prayer 
Book and to the general organization of the Church as it 
had been elaborated by Cranmero This group wascomposed 
of such men as Je~el 9 who supported Coxe in the defence 
of the Prayer Book at Frankfurto For the Marian Exiles 
and their activities see Co Ho Garrett, The Marian Exil~9 
Cambridge, 1938o This is a useful book but with certa1n· 
·· large _flaws o See the review by J o Eo Neale in English 
- Histori~al Review, volo 54 9 1938 9 PPo 501-504o Walzer 
has some interesting comments to make 9 The Revolution of 
the Saints, New York 9 1968 9 PPo 92-113o 
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For a short but very perceptive sketch of its infiltration 
of European society in general see Jo Ho Hexter, 'Utopia 
and Geneva' 9 in Action- and Conviction in Earl_ Modern Euro e 9 
edso To Ko Rabb and Jo Eo Seigel, Princeton 9 1 9o 
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English theology was Protestant it was not Calvinistico1 
Once Elizabeth was on the throne many of·her subjects 
considered that in her they had at least a semi-godly or 
potentially godly princesso 2 They thus obeyed. To the extreme 
radicals 9 however~ the true Church was constituted 9 not merely 
by the Christians of whom it was composed 9 nor by the sincerity 
of their profession 9 but by the v tru.thfulness 1 of the doctrine 
publicly preached and upheld by authority~ and by the sincere 
administration and reception of the sacraments 9 safeguarded by 
the exercise of godly discipline. The Church of Rome itself 
was corrupt because the Papacy had perverted the doctrine, 
sacraments and discipline of the 'true' Church. It was thus 
no longer an effective Christian church. Where the essential 
marks or signs of the true church were to be found 9 the presence 
of any number of what the radicals termed 'cold statute prates-
1. For detailed histories of the Elizabethan Settlement see 
J~ E. Neale 9 'The Elizabethan Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity 
English Historical Review 9 vol. 65~ 1950~ and W.P. Haugaard 9 
Elizabeth and the English Reformation~ Cambridge 9 1968o 
2o Millenarian views were not necessarily a threat to the Crov.m .. 
In this regard the works of John Foxe were extremely im= 
portant. For it was he who conditioned generations of 
English Protestants to a belief in the historic .mission o.f 
their role to crush the Romist Anti-Christ. Deference to 
the godly-prince was a decisive aspect of this enterprise. 
Yet his Book of Martyrs merely offered comfort becausefue 
martyrs' sufferings were set within a chiliastic framework. 
Foxe encouraged men in the belief that they were living 
in the fifth age of history, the last age, when Christ and 
Anti-Christ resolved their struggle. In the face of this 
end a passive disposition was considered to be the most 
'godly'. No wonder Foxe's book was one of the few chained 
books in Elizabethan churches. For an examination. of these 
millenarian views see two important works: Vl. Haller 9 
Foxe's 'Book of Martyrs' and the Elect Nation, London 1967 9 
and W. H. Lamont, Godly Rule: Politics and Religion 1603-1660 5 
London, 1969. 
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tants' could not invalidate the authority of that Churcho 
For religion was a public duty~ not a private vision 9 nor a 
voluntary profession aloneo The Word was to be obeyed and obeyed 
universallyo Consequently 9 when the radicals attacked the 
'imperfections' of the Elizabethan religious settlement 9 it 
was not so much to request a toleration of their own opinions 
as to demand the imposition of true reformation by public 
authnrityo Their complaint was not that religion was made a 
matter of compulsion 9 but that the law failed to conform to 
the pure ideal that they had done their best to set fortho 1 
(iii) 
Tentative answers to the radical position were given from 
the beginning of the reigno 2 But~he divisions were not clear 
cut~for many of the assumptions of the radicals were shared by 
many of their opponents~although the rad{?a_"l __ e~phasis and con-
·fGO'il-'1 
elusions were not necessarily acceptable.3 Both sides were 
lo By far the best book on Elizabethan radical protestantism 
is Po Collinson's The Elizabethan Puritan Movement 9 London 
1967o 
2o For some indication of the whole spectrum of opinion see 
Co Cross 9 Jhe Royal ~~remacy in the ~lizabethan Church 9 
London 9 l9b9 9 pp o 19-57 o 
3 .. One must 9 I suppose, refer to the dispute over the word 
'Puritan' and indeed the word 1Anglicanism 1 o To my mind 
the best discussion is that by Bo Hall 9 'Puritanism: the 
Problem of Definition' in Studies in Church Histor~ 9 edo 
Go Jo Cuming 11 volo II 9 London=l9b6 9 PPo 283-296a Hall 
draws a number of distinctions and stresses the non-usefulness 
of the word 'Puritan 1 o I have myself tried not to use the 
word and have drawn my own distinctionso In this regard 
I have steered a course between the extremes of Co Ha and 
Ko George, The Protestant Mind of the English Reformation 9 
1570-1()40 9 Princeton 9 19617"and Jo Fo Ho New~ Angli~ca_n_a_@ 
Puri tan 9 London9 1964_o The Georges see ~o significant 
ffilerences between the divisions of English Protes-iantismo 
As can be gathered from his chosen title, New takes the 
opposite viewo I take the view that there are differences 
although it is perhaps not helpful to use the labels Anglican 
and Puritano Also of interest on the controversy is Co Ho 
George 9 'Puritanism as History and Historiography111 Past_ and 
- Pr·esent-9 --vo·l o 41-9 :1:968-o -- - - -- -
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agreed that Scripture was the test of truth; that all of the 
Scriptures carried the same weight 9 the Pentateuch being no 
less inspired or inspiring than the Gospels; that the Bible was 
in no way ambiguous and could not contradict itself; that any 
difficulties could be resolved by conscience and that all 'good' 
consciences mumt agreeo Nonetheless 9 defences of the Elizabethan 
church settlement were offered and the radicals were criticized 
on certain doctrinal points. 
The problem revolved around the way the Scriptures were 
interpretedo The radicals claimed their authority from the 
fact that the truth was obvious and they recognized it. In 
contrast 9 representing the established church 9 John Jewel 9 
while accepting the the absolute finality of scriptural 
authority 9 considered that the Scriptures were not as trans-
parent in their meaning as the more extreme claimedo 1 His main 
concern was to provide an interpretative authority without 
accepting the solution eithe1of the Papacy or of the opposite 
extreme of complete dependence upon the discipline of the 
Calvinistso While he accepted the premise that traditional 
interpretation was of great value 9 he rejected the conclusion that 
the Papacy was necessarily the rightful judge of tradition. 
Similarly 9 while he agreed with the Protestant view that divine 
'inspiration' was necessary in interpretation 9 he held that this 
was not self-validating and must meet the test of general agree-
menta He endeavoured to find what he considered to be an 
On Jewel see Wo Mo Southgate 9 John Jewel and the Problem ~ff Doctrinal Authorit~ 9 Harvard 9 19b2:~his is a straight-
forward 'life and ideas' work. There is an edition of 
Jewel's Works 9 ed. John Ayre 9 4 vols. 9 Cambridge: Parker 
Society 9 1845-1850. 
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'objective' authority whose meaning was demonstrable by reasono 
But as to how he considered such an authority to be demonstrable 
by reason hardly bears looking intoo 
In general 11 Jewel's faith in his authorities and the 
demonstrability of his scriptural interpretation by their aid 
was just as naive as the faith of the early reformers in the 
clar±ty of scriptural meaningo But his writings do cmnstitute 
the first comprehensive attempt of Elizabeth's reign to validate 
the authority of the English Church 9 and to prove the catholicity 
of its doc:brineo Jewel 9 it appears 9 was distrustful of rapid 
change and stressed the value of common law and of all things 
derivative from past usage and customo 1 It would 9 however 9 
be foolish to elevate the differences between the Elizabethan 
divines, at this stage 9 into full-scale theological disputeso 
It has even been remarked 11 by Elton for example 9 that the 
Elizabethan radical protestant 'movement! for the most part, 
directed its attention to subsidiary matters of ceremony and 
doc:brine 11 except where matters of God's authority 11 man's de-
pravity and the all-sufficiency of Scripture were concernedo 2 
The suggestion has been made that the explicit content of the 
con§roversy in the Elizabethan Church was not theological 9 and 
in particular that Calvin's doctrines of grace and predestination 
went almost unchallenged 9 even by most of the bishops 9 until 
near the end of the sixteenth centuryo 
This is to carry matters to their opposite extremeo 
As Dro Ho Co Parker has rightly remarked 3 9 the label 'Calvinist' 
lo This is well brought out in Part Two of Sou-thgate's bookc, 
2a See Chapter 7 9 Po69 9 no I of this worko 
3o Ho Co Parker 11 Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge 11 
Cambridge 9 195~PPo )23 - 390o 
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has often been used without proper discrimination (I hope that 
this does not apply to the present study) 9 and it by no means 
accurately describes the doctrine of grace propounded in the 
Thirty Nine Articles, nor even its treatment in vlliitgift's 
Lambeth Articles of 1595 9 which are invariably cited as proof 
of their author's Calvinist orthodoxyo For Whitgift, the 
doctrine of the Church of England was not based on the work of 
any one theologianp least of all Calvino The radical protestant 
strategy had invariably been to appeal consistently to the 
example of Continental protestantism in support of their pro= 
posals to make the church in England a 'reformed' churcho 1 
Cartwright frankly admitted the influence that the continental 
reformed churches had on his views and 9 in his controversy with 
Whitgift he had asked 
'Is a R-eformation that is good in France not also good 
in England? Would the Discipline which is proposed for 
Scotland be detrimental for this kingdom here? Surely 
God hath set these examples before your eyes to encourage 
you to proceed to a complete and prompt Reformation'o2 
Cartwright, who had been in exile during Mary's reign? turned 
naturally to Beza and Geneva for supporto 
It was in the dispute between Whitgift and Cartwright that 
theological differences became explicit 9 although no formal 
treatise was composed on either sideo Ultimately 9 it becomes 
possible to distinguish Whit~ift from Cartwright not only by 
referring to 'choices' of ecclesiastical arrangement but also 
to the presuppositions of their argumentso For Whitgift 9 
lo And not just to Calvin and Beza 9 and the example of Genevao 
See Ro Do Linder 9 'Pierre Viret and the Sixteenth~Century 
English~ PJ;'otestants' 9_ Archi v _ftl:r;_jl.§.for_!lla tions_g.e:scp_ichte 9 
volo 58 9 1967 o - --- -
2o John Whitgift 9 The Works of Jq~n~itgift 9 edo John Ayre 9 
3 volso 9 Cambridge 9 1851-53 9 v6lo III 9 Po 314o These 
volumes contain some of Cartwright's writings that refer 
explicity to the dispute with Whitgifto 
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man was a fallen yet rational creature to the extent that 
he could attain to 'natural' knowledgeo To Cartwright 9 man 
appeared as thoroughly corrupt and wholly incompatible with 
God until he had become regen~rate by joining a Reformed com-
munityo Whitgift distinguished 9 and related 9 grace and nature 
hierarchically 0 while the Presbyterians separate the two spheres 9 
never 9 in their minds 9 to be joined again in a complementary 
fashiono Whitgift regarded the Church in time as a visible 
body 9 while Cart·vvright viewed the Church as a gathering of 
visible saints in a timeless 9 completely self-determining 
communityo Yet these differences are 9 it may be recalled 9 not 
outlined explicity in some formal composition but are ideas 
aired only in occasional w±itingso 1 
Cartwrightp possibly in all innocence, failed to see the 
poli tic·al implications of his programmeo Perht;Jp.s, however 9 
he was merely being disingenuous 9 for he must surely have known 
what he propounded was pcblitically dangerous from the opposition 
aroused by the Presbyterian movemento It was left to 
Whitgift and later to Hooker to draw their own conclusions 
both from the doctrine 1tself and from its attempted implemen= 
tationo The disciplinarian vfuitgift had occasion to show what 
he thought th~ practical implications were when 9 in 1583 9 he was 
chosen by Elizabeth to become Archbishop of Canterburyo He and 
the Queen agreed in seeing nothing but political disaster in the 
Presbyterian ambitions and organizationo \Vhitgift's attack was 
thorough and prolonged 9 and in the end apparently successfulo He en 
lo Originally I included a long- section on the whole of the 
Whitgift-Cartwright controversyo I have, however, decided 
to remove it since it was unduly long for what it was: a 
catalogue of differing opinions, and since it has 9 sub-
sequently9 been examined in a short article by Jo Fo Mo New 9 
'The vlhitgift-Cartwright Controversy', Archiy fil~ormation~ 
~ -Geschich te 9 _-v:ol~~59, 1968 o . ____ ~ 
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played the High Commission to seek out non-conforming clergy, 
applying his articles of 1583 under the 'ex-officio oath' to 
compel conformity or to force expulsion. 1 And time brought 
several advantages to his struggle. With the outbreak of war 
with Spain the support which radical protestantism had enjoyed 
among the more moderate but uneasy laity began to declineo 
Thirty years of usage were conferring some authority and 
stability on mhe Church and the Prayer Booke The Presbyterians 
no longer had a monopoly in intellectual and pastoral distinctiono 
And some of their most important sympathisers in Church and 
Council died between 1588-1590 .. 2 The violently abusive 
Marprelate Tracts of 1589 perhaps alienated more opinion than 
they attractedp and they gave Whitgift grounds for fresh vigour .. 
It was during this period that Hooker began to writee 
la Pe Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan Movementp London, 1967~ 
PPo 243 - 291.~~~="~-~- -
2.. Notably Leicester and Walsinghamo 
RICHARD HOOKER AND THE ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 
Hooker 9 it would appear 9 came to owe much to the patronage 
of John ~lliitgifto He was not 9 however 9 Whitgift's candidate 
for the post that brought him to London for an extended periodo 
It was only after Whitgift's candidate for the Mastership of 
the Temple had been officially rejected because of ill-health1 
that the Queen chose a second candidate recommended by Sandys 7 
the Archbishop of York 7 whose son this candidate had tutored 
at Oxfordo 2 Thus it was that on 17 March, 1584 9 Richard Hooker 
received letters patent appointing him Master of the Templeo 
He had been selected as master mainly because he considered the 
laws of England to be legitimate 9 whereas another possible can-
didate 9 Walter Travers 9 who was already the Reader of the Temple 7 
considered some of its laws to be corrupto Hooker himself was 
young enough never to have known any other ecclesiastical govern-
ment than the episcopalian 1 (he was born in 1554) 9 while Travers 9 
once he had seen the Calvinist regime of Geneva 7 was convinced 
that Presbyteriansm was the one church government that conformed 
to the letter and spirit of the Scriptureso 
Since 1581 when he preached at Sto Paul's Cross in London3 9 
Hooker's opinions had been known to audiences other than those 
at Oxford. This sermon in fact had given immediate offence to 
many radical Protestants 9 for Hooker had opposed Calvin's belief 
in the unity and oneness of God's willa Hooker himself maintained 
la J. Keble (edo) Works of Richard Hooker 9 Oxford 9 1836 7 
Introduction 9 Po 39o~ 
2. Jo Strype 9 T~e ~ife and Acts of John Whitgif~ 7 Oxford 7 
1822 7 3 vols_o_:--vol o 1, p o 346 o 
3 o Mo IVJ:aclure, The Paul's Cross Sermon -I534-T642~ Toronto 1958 9 
Lr-'7 ...... ~ ,.....,....,... 
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that in God there are two wills ~ an antecedent and a consequento 
One report gave his teaching thus: 
'Predestination is not of absolute will of God 9 but 
conditionalo The doings of the wicked are not of the 
\\Till of God positive 9 but only permissive o The reprobat.es 
are not rejected 9 but for the evil works which God did 
foresee they would commit 1 ol 
It would be too crude to consider that this reported judgemE!nt 
as well as other opinions that Hooker was to develop in the 
Ecclesiastical Polity were a mere reflection of Hooker's Oxford 
backgroundo In reality very little is known of Hooker beyond 
the simplest biographical details before his controversy with 
Traverso Enough general evidence is 9 however 9 available to 
correct the familiar view of radical Cambridge and conservative 
Oxfordo 2 The notion 9 therefore 9 that Hooker's thought is a 
straightforward reflection of his university education is not 
supported b.) the meagre evidence availableo All that is certain 
is that up to 1584 Hooker had spent most of his life at the 
University of Oxford 9 and that?by the time of his dispute with 
Travers1 many of the leading presuppositions of his thinking 
had sunk deep into his mindo Beyond that it is impossible to 
go 9 because of the lack of biographical materialo But since 
Hooker's mind was in the main quite conventional in its fur-
nishing (though more sophisticated and better arranged than 
most) 9 this is perhaps no great lasso It would appear 9 however 9 
that the detail of the later books does reveal the influence 
of his stay at the Templeo This would account for the general 
similarity between the legalism of the later books and some of 
lo Ro Bayne, The Fifth Book of Hooker'~ 'Ecclesiasti~al Polity' 
London 9 1902, Introductiong Po .. XXo 
2o Po Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan Movement 9 London 1967, 
Po l29o MoHo Curtis, Oxford and Cambridge_~n Transition, 
1558-1642, Oxford 1959, pp. l9l-3o Mo Ho Curtis, ~ibrary 
Catalogues and Tudor Oxford and Cambridge', Studies in the 
~ena~~sanceg vol~-V~ 1958 9 PPo lll=l20o 
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the ideas of the common lawyers. 
Soon after his appointment Hooker and Travers clashedo It 
would~ however 9 be superfluous to enter into details of this 
dispute as they have recently been well analysedo 1 In general 9 
Travers' objections to Hooker's beliefs stemmed from the familiar 
Presbyterian premiseso Travers 9 for instance 9 condemned the 
justification of the corrupting teaching of the Roman Church 
on salvation by workso He objected 9 as others had done previously: 
to making predestination the conditional and not the absolute 
will of Godo He found equally unsupportable Hooker's consideratlin 
that assurance can come by reason rather than by the Scriptures 
aloneo These objections were outlined in various sermons con-
tradicting those delivered by Hookero In the end Travers was 
silenced by Whitgifto 
While Travers and Hooker were at the Temple it is noticeable 
that the clash between them was purely about doctrine 9 the 
questions of Presbyterian ordination and discipline were directly 
as yet a matter of disputeo Yet the principle reason why Whitgift 
refused to have Travers restored to his post was not merely for 
his doctrinal opinions but also because of his lack of episcopal 
ordination. He was not licensed to preach in the English Churcho 
Travers 9 however 9 contended on scriptural grounds that his 
ordination was a 'true' ordination 9 and it was 9 consequently? 
unreasonable to repeat it 9 especially in a corrupt ceremony. 
His ordination should allow him to preach in every country 9 for 
God's will is oneo Whitgift 9 nonetheless 9 refused to be moved 
by such argumento 
lo So Jo Knox 9 Walter Travers: Paragon of Elizabethan 
Puri tanism 9 London 9 19b2~~PPo 70-88o 
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Travers went on to make a direct supplication to the Council 
to which Hooker wrote his Answero 1 Although Travers himself 
gave no written reply to this answer 9 Hooker had not seen the 
end of the controversy 9 for the supporters of Travers apparently 
remained in the Temple as a vocal groupo Indeed 9they are known 
to have persisted in the Temple for at least five years 9 since 
Hooker, in 1591 9 requested ~lliitgift to find for him some quiet 
country living, saying 'I am weary of the noise and oppositions 
of this place 1 o2 He went on to remark that his contest with 
Travers had been the more unpleasant for him 9 
'because I believe him to be a good man; and that belief 
hath occasioned me to examine mine own conscience con-
cerning his opinions; and to satisfy that, I have consulted 
the Scripture 9 and other laws both human and divine 9 
whether the conscience of him and others of his judgements 
--ought ·to be so far complied with as to alter our frame of 
Church government 9 our manner of God's worship 9 our praising 
and praying to Him 9 and our established ceremonies 9 as 
often as his and others' tender consciences shall require 
us; and 9 in this examination, I have not only satisfied 
myself 9 but have begun a treatise in which I intend a justification of the law of our Ecclesiastical Polityo 23 
Hooker resigned the Mastership of the Temple in July 1591 
when he was appointed to a country living in Wil tshire-9 But 9 
if Hooker wished to leave the hurly-burly of the Temple 9 he 
did not go so far as to depart from the City of London altogEiher 9 
for 9 as Professor Sisson has shown49 he was never resident in 
his new parisho He remained in the city at the house of his 
father-in-lawo His reasons for staying in London were not 
known since he could probably have written what he had intended 
in his parish~ (as in fact he was late~to do when he was given 
lo This is contained in Hooker, WoJf.k:s, volo III. 
Jo Keble (ed.), Works, volo I, Introduction, Po 85o 
Jo Keble (ed.), Works, vol. I, Introduction, Po 85o 
Co J. Sisson, The Judicious Marr~age of Mr. Hooker 9 Cambridge 
45-4-bo -1940, PPo 
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a further appointment)G It is now clear,therefore, that the 
Ecclesiastica]lPg~ was not the enterprise of a pious scholar 
who had little or no knowledge of political activityo It was 
written for the most part in London itselff 
could draw on the help and advice of friendse 
and here Hooker 
? 
Two in particular 
areknowno They are George Cranmer,and Edwin Sandys 9 son of the 
Archbishop of York, a trained lawyer and Member of Parliamento 
Their annotations to the Sixth Book still survive to show how 
actively they helpedp 1 Moreover, in the Dedication to the 
Fifth Book, Hooker speaks of the 'long-continued and more than 
ordinary favour' he had enjoyed from the Archbishop of Canterbury 9 
John Whitgifto 2 Indeed, Hooker's enterprise may be considered 
as a continuation of Whitgift's own occasional writingso The 
Ecclesiastical Polity was, consequently, no lone and secret 
ventureo It was from the first favoured by Hooker's friends 
and supported by Whitgift who, together with the Queen, was 
the most vigilant enemy of the Presbyterianso 
lo Jo Keble (ede) 9 Works 9 volo III, Appendix to Book IVo 
Sandys was to become an important politician in the reign 
of James I and to write a work on religion and politics 
in England o See To K o Rabb 9 1 The Editions of Sir Edwin t:' 
Sandys 1 s "Relation of the State of Religion"', Huntin~ 
Library Quarterly, volo XXVI, l962-l963o -
2a . Ecclo Polo, Book V 9 Dedicationo 
PART III 
CHALLENGE AND REPLY 
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5o 
REFORMED RELIGION: DISCIPLINE OUT OF THE WORDl 
English radical protestant thought during Elizabeth's 
reign was generally Calvinist and fundamentalist in inspiration 9 
and it is appropriate to examine the head-waters of the tradition 
of which English Presbyterianism was one of the lower reacheso 2 
This style of thought may be seen 9 in its widest context 9 as 
part of the crisis of authority that the Reformation in the 
profoundest sense waso This crisis was brought about by a 
desire on the part of many members of Christendom for a form of 
Christianity that was original 9 and thereby 'truly' authoritativea 
By this they meant that the Word was to be interpreted in what 
was considered to be the correct fashion, and that proper em-
phasis should be placed on the individual's relationship to Godo 
Truth was to be uncovered by casting off the corrupting compli-
cations of time 9 and by returning to the example so evidently 
displayed in the Scriptureso The main attacks of the early 
reformers? accordingly 9 were directed against ecclesiastical 
arrangements whose hierarchical principle and temporal en-
tanglements had imposed a strongly political character on the 
life of the Church and against a mode of thought whose chief 
exponents were considered to be Aquinas and Aristotleo 3 
The phrase is Perry Miller's: Orthodoxy in Massachusetts 9 
Gloucester 9 Massa 9 1965 (first edo 1933l 9 chapo 2o 
I am well aware 9 of course 9 that every interpretation of a 
tradition changes that tradition and may come to have dis-
tinctive features of its owno See chapter 3 of this worko 
3o In Luther's opinion Aristotle was 'that buffoon who had mis-
led the Church'o Quoted without reference in Ao Macintyre 9 
A Short HistoDy of Ethics 9 London 1967 9 Po l22o 
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With regard to religious conduct the reformers advocated the 
most uncompromising and radical changeso But in politics as, 
such it appears that they had little interesto Luther 9 for 
instance 9 emphatically rejected any hierarchical distinctions 
among Christian believers?for before God all men are equalo 
And to be before God is a matter of graceo Men are not saved 
by works 1 for none of the deeds of men are in any sense goodo 
Purposive activity 9 impelled by the will 9 is an aspect of the 
total corruption of man's natureo Yet he concluded from this 
degeneration that a political and social hierarchy was natural 
and necessaryo He condemned outright peasant revolt9 and ad-
vocated the bloody massacrefby the princes of GermanyDof peasant 
rebels against lawful authorityo In short 9 Luther was more than 
willing to raise the most fundamental questions about all forms 
of religious authority 9 for it was the individual Christian 
and his relationship with God that was of supreme importanceo 
But 9 even when he had a poor opinion of rulers and tneir motives 9 
his interest in political institutions and conduct was little 
roused a 
The political problem inadvertently bequeathed by Luther 
and exacerbated by the Anabaptists centered on a developing 
crisis in the concept of order and authorityo The prolific 
and vocal criticism of the Papacy by many of the early reformers 
had actually amounted to a demand for the release of the individual 
Christian from a miasma of institutional arrangements and 
traditional controls which had hitherto governed his conduct 
and determined his identityo The Church had endeavoured to 
determine the conduct of its members through a conorete body 
of law 9 to bind them into some kind of unity through emotional 
as well as material commitments 9 and to guide the whole religious 
experience through an ecclesiastical authority vri th the aid of 
the political powerso In other words 9 the Catholic Church pro-
vided a set of restrainst and encouragements designed to mould 
human identity to accord with a certain imageo To condemn the 
Church as Anti-Christ 9 as some of the reformers did 9 was to 
work towards the release of religious activity from the authori-
tative order which had formed ito This followed from the denial 
of the name Christian to the Catholic Churcho For the reformers 
were themselves in search of the true meaning of what it was 
to be a Christiano The essence of this identity had been tern= 
porarily lost9but many were not long in convincing themselves 
that they had rediscovered the truth 9 which was necessarily tq 
be imposed on the less fortunateo 
Now this liberating tendency was encouraged 9 determined 
even 9 by one of the most important ideas of the early reformers 9 
namely the notion of the community of Christians as a fellowship 
bound together by ties of faith and united in a quest for sal-
vationo It was supposed that believers could live in a religious 
community without any need for the application of authority 
and forceo In other words 9 there was 9 or could be 9 a rigid 
separation of religious conduct from political activity within 
a given communityo It was Luther's hope 9 which he bequeathed 
to the tradition of German Pietism 9 that they 9 the ttro areas of 
conduct 9 could be kept apart without disturbing and jeopardising 
the authority of political institutionso To some this was im-
' 
possible 9 and the dominating obsession of such people as the 
Anababtists was with preserving the purity of the religious 
community in the midst of a corrupt and 90rrupting worldo They 
sought to achieve this end by separating their community from 
the traditional political society and by denying that their 
members owed any obligation to political authority at allo 
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But~of course 9 there was no complete withdrawal from the 
necessities of historical existence even for religion's sakeo 
And the result of these opinions was to jeopardize a whole 
tradition of order and authority 9 for 9 clothed as they were 
in the language and vocabulary of religion 9 and aimed as they 
were at an audience that considered religious experience to be 
universal 9 they could not fail to impress a set of attitudes 
that would have profound repercussions on the conduct and out-
look of their follawerso Yet 9 because religious experience 
and political activity were so intimately connect.ed by traditional 
usage 9 any attempt to separate the two could bring all the 
authority of the old tradition down on those who made the effort 9 
and so 9 without organization 9 the Lutheran church appeared in-
creasingly vulnerable to political pressures 9 while the Anabaptist 
congregations seemed to have escaped the 'world' only to have 
been overcome by internal disorderso Paradoxically 9 it became 
necessary for a vision of religious experience which emphasized 
the personal relationship of the believer with God and the 
voluntary nature of the religious community to have some order 
and organizationo 
Calvinism was a reflection of this paradox 9 and yet it 
offered an escapeo For it implied both the destruction and 
creation of ordero Anti-Christ had brought order to the world 
at the expense of true Christianity; now true Christianity would 
destroy this old order and create a new communityo But what 
was important about Calvinism was not simply its passion for 
order 9 but the fact that this passion was centred primarily not 
on the state or commonwealth but on-the churcho While politics 
played an important role in Calvinist thought and action 9 it 
did ao mainly in relation to a conception of the church as the 
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new communityo And as far as this church community was con-
cerned 9 it attempted to provide those organizational principles 
that Luther and the Anabaptists had failed to supplyo Thus 
Calvin proposed a church polity that should aim.at self-
sufficiencyo And as mark of its self-sufficiency was a disc!ipline 
that was rigid and uncAanging through timeo Most 9 if not all, 
the details of this new schema were to be found in the Scriptureso 
Calvinism1 was,then,the doctrine that provided the organi-
zational principles that the early reformershad either thought 
unnecessary or lackedo Yet, in theory at least, Calvinism is 
not to be considered as a doctrine that was merely organizational 
in intento 2 How 9 in the end 9 it brought discipline out of the 
word is a complicated process which reveals the ambiguities of 
Calvinism,and of all those creeds that insist they possess the 
'truth' which is yet not recognised by allo 
The centre of Calvin's thought from which he considered 
that all else followed in some fashion was the clear distinction 
he attempts to draw between God 9 who is independent and self~ 
determining, and the world of man and natureo In matters that 
directly concern God's divinity, therefore, freedom and not 
necessity is the appropriate criteriono Consequently, God is 
distinct in every way from the nec-essary regularity or irregu-
larity of the natural ordero Yet since this creation is God'S 9 
it follows that these necessities are created to serve, or to 
be directed or orientated towards 9 the sovereign rule of Godo 
2 .. 
This examination of Calvinism owes something to M.Walzer, 
The Revolution of t}1e _Saints 9 New York, 1968 (1st edno 1965); 
William Haller, The Rise of Puritanism, New York, 1939; 
Po Miller, The New E~~l~nd Mirid: the Seventeenth Century, 
Cambridge, Masso 9 1954o There is an interesting revievr of 
Walzer's book by Ro Te Vann, in Histor~& Theorx 9 voloVI41968, 
As Walzer appears to consider ito 
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In short 7 Calvin's God is independent of 7 yet ruler over 7 the 
created ordero In this way Calvin propounds a distinction 
between divine command and the natural worldo There is nothing 
that mediates between these two orders of existence except the 
divine institutiono There was thus no place in Calvinism for 
the 'natural' and rational God of Aquinas and Hookero Their 
unit:®ry view of reality was not shared by Calvin. 
Just as man in Hooker's thought reflects the unity and dis-
tinctions vJi thin existence~ so 7 according to Calvin 9 man is 
created with the capacity to reflect in himself this distinction 
between voluntary determination and natural necessityo The true 
fulfilment of manp as Calvin fre~ently reiterates 9 is voluntary~ 
absolute obedience to Godo In history 7 however, man falls short 
of this goal and surrenders to natural necessity 9 thus causing 
disruption and disorder in himself 9 as well as in the natural 
worldo Sinful or fallen man 9 consequently 9 must be driven ex= 
ternally by the necessities of nature 9 by 'natural law 11 9 in 
addition to political coercion 9 in the direction of that genuine 
obedience he ought to will to accept of his own ac.cordo In his 
fallen state man is driven back to the point of voluntary 
devotion toward Godo The very fact that he must be driven from 
the outside 7 is 9 however, the stigma of his depravityo 
That man is wicked and sinful makes necessary the ever-
present need for control and restrainto In this way political 
1.. For a discussion of natural law in Calvin see Jo To McNeill 7 
'Natural Lav1 in the Teaching of the Reformers 1 9 Journal of 
.Religion 2 volo26~ 1946. This article which argues for the 
great importance of natura~ law in the works of the Reformers 
has been severely criticized by Walzer for not dealing ade- -
quately with the radical theory of the Fall and the separat:ion 
of the spheres of freedom and necessity in the discussion of 
natural law. See The Re~o:J-E_tion=oJ~~the __ sLa}_A~,§, 9 p o 32. 
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order within the world is justifiedo Such conditions qualify 
and condition even the holiness of the sacred communityo In 
man's or;iginal 9 innocent state 9 of course 9 politi!Eal order 
and coercion were unnecessaryo Calvin subscribed to the tradi-
tional Christian view 9 which Luther likewise accepted 9 that man 
in his innocence knew directly the law off God and required no 
special revelation nor external authority to bring him nearer 
to ito Politically 9 and even religiously 9 however 9 this state 
was of little importanceo In it Calvin had little interesto 
The Fall in contrast was of interest in this respect 9 that 
it had created a completely asocial man 9 a creature hating sub= 
mission and continually striving to dominate otherso Initially~ 
therefore 9 man's alienation was double in character - from God 
and from societyo 1 'Innumerable ar~ the evils that beset human 
life; innumerable 9 too 9 the deaths that threaten ito 12 Only 
by divine aid could men be saved from this great uncertainty 
and anxietyo For all men 9 therefore 9 and not merely for the 
Elect 9 God has established social and political order• 
1 For he knows with \r.Jhat great restlessness human nature 
flames 9 with what fickleness it is borne hither and 
thither 9 how its ambition longs to embrace various 
thing3 at once o 1 3 
But of itself social and political order does not bring spiritual 
peaceo It does at least provide or 'promote general peace and 
tranquillity' o 4 
In the order of nature lordship and political authority 
have a necessary placeo Authority and submission to a social 
ancll. political order are not the products of natural socia:Oility 
nor of rational consent 9 they are both thB creations of God 
1 o The following three paragraphs owe much to \!Jalzer o 
2o Calvin 9 In,P_ill.\tt§.s of t_he CJlD:~itan_Jleligion 9 edo JoTo McNeill 
London 9 19b"l 9 I 9 xvii_ 9 lO~ __ _I'"- _223o 
------~~~----Ibid III. Xo 6. Po 724 4o Ibid9 IV9 xx9 29 Pe 1487o 
who 
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'to shame men which are reasonable creatures 9 saieth 
that the feare of princes and magistrates ought to 
extend even to brute beasts'.l 
And it was God who instituted princes and who implanted fear 
in the hearts of their subjects. This was proved 9 Calvin wrote 9 
whenever we see thousands of men 9 ambition in them all 9 living 
in a quiet obedience to a prince. And 'all the kingdoms of 
this world are clearly founded on the power and beneficience 
of Christ'. 2 Moreover 9 God inspires in men that 'fear without 
·v1hich it is certain they (me~ would never submj_ t 1 o 3 God was 9 
therefore 9 the creator of all political authority and ordero 
Peace and ordcer were achieved 9 then 9 firstly through obedience 
to the commands of established authority. But Calvin has nothing 
to say of cfvilization and the growth of human achievement in 
this regard. Society and polity were merely matters of disci-
pline and ordero And in keeping with this attitude toward 
political authority 9 Calvin regarded the magistrate merely as 
an office-holder 9 occupying his particular 'calling' within 
society 9 and just as potentially corrupt as other men. In 
short 9 the polity ·was a matter of force and order. It provided 
som:ething useful and necessary. Yet order was not continuous 
in the world for 9 in\order that men may not bec-ome too involved 
with their earthly desires 9 God 
1. 
2. 
'to counter this evil~ •••o instructs his followers in 
the unity of the present liffe by continual proof of its 
miseries. Therefore 9 that they may not promise themselves 
a deep and secure peace in it 9 he permits them often to 
be troubled and plagued either with wars or tumults 9 or 
robberies, or other injuries 1 o4 
Calvin 9 Sermons upon the Fifth Book of Mose_12.9 Lond.onp 15839 
sermon 3~Po 214. (Copy in the John Rylands Libraryo) 
Calvin 9 Commentar-.i.~s s>P. __ tp.e _Boolc of the Prophet Daniel9 
Edinburgh 9 1852 9 2 vols. 9 vol. 1 9 p. 179o 
Calvin 9 Homilies on I Samuel 9 quoted Doumergue 9 
vol 0 v 9 Lausanne;- i917 9 p. 493 o 
Cal viii 9 Institutei?."9 III 9 ix 9 1 p- ·p o -Tl:-2--'713 o · 
Jean Calvi_g 
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And often kingdoms may fall too for apparently no cause, for 
'God has many reasons, and often hidden ones, why he raises 
one man and humbles another; yet this point ought to be 
uncontroverted by us. No kings can possess any authority 
unless God extends h·is hand t·o them and props them up. 
Vllien he wishes to remove them from power, they fall of 
their own accord; not because there is any change in the 
changes of the world, but because God, as it is said in 
the Book of Job (xii 9 18), deprives those of the sword 
whom he had formerly entrusted with it'ol 
This, then, is the state and nature of fallen man according 
to Calvin. Obedience to God is difficult to achieve. And in 
Calvin 1 s thought Christ alone·.$g the one wh1w;B,s voluntarily 
obedient to God and, therefore, his 'Body' (the Church) is the 
incarnation of a new order, an order where men organize their 
conduct accordingm God's will with enthusiasm and willing 
obedience. Religiously, and, to a very important degree, prac-
tically, the church is a special community distinct in theory 
and practice from the old order of natural necessity and co-
ercion. It is a community where v~gorous, self-conscious 
participation in moral and ecclesiastical affairs is the order. 
As a distinctive 'movement', Calvinism, whose discipline is 
constructed in relation to these considerations, organized an 
independent style of conduct in which self-determining voluntary 
activity was the ideal. Activity is thus thought of as a 
successive imitation of sacred actions. In regard to this area 
of activity,which the Church circumscribes, a new vision of 
time is constructed in terms of moments of creation (or recreation 
rather than moments of transmission. 
Calvin thus places an important emphasis upon.·a voluntary 
and sacred pattern of church organization in order to guard 
against all infringement of the 'common right and liberty of 
1., Calvin, Co.!!£Ile~tari_es on_ t}1~ ~oc:l~ _9! J!?-~ P~oph~t Daniel 9 
vole 1, Pa333-334. 
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the Churcho 1 This emphasis on both personal election and 
sacred institutional pattern marks a crucial relationship in 
Calvin's thoughto For as one is chosen by God, so one is able 
to choose with respect to the ordering of God's 'new community'o 
But the new community should be 'an actual exemplification of 
the Divine Institution 1 o2 And from this comes the emphasis of 
a great volume of Calvinist literature that the form of the 
Church polity 9 unlike those of political order, did not depend 
upon historical tradition, .and circumstance, upon preSJ~i'l t 
authority and legal arrangements, but had been set for all time 
in the Word of Godo Political order was subject quite simply 
to apparently _-_irrational change 9 but the church only to corrup~ 
tion and reform, and return to first principleso Christian 
conduct must, therefore? always endeavour to recreate the 
sacred institutional root of the Churcho 
All this, Calvin suggests 9 might be discerned by a 'true' 
Christian within the Scriptureso And these Scriptures are 
self-validating despite the flood of Calvinist literature on 
all aspects of their contento True Christians know by illumin-
ation, by faith that the Scriptures are the Word of Godo They 
have an inneE.' persuasion, in this cas~ granted to them by God, 
so compelling that it becomes the complete guarantee of their 
religious experienceo This inner certainty not only assures 
them that the Scriptu:t:es are the Word of God, but compels 
them upon reading the~ (the Scriptures) to grasp their meaning 
and believeo Forihe elect there is, consequently, a double 
lo Calvin, Institutes 9 IV, iii, 15, Po l066o 
2o Ibidp IV, iv, l, Po l068o 'Tt will be useful to recognise 
in these characteristice of the ancient church the form 
which will represent to our eyes some image of the divine 
institution.• 
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illumination~ providing firstpthe rule of faith~ the Scriptures 
themselves» and secondbthe rule of Scripture 9 that is» the means 
for believing and discerning its messageo And this double 
illumination of the rule of faith and its application gives 
the true believer complete assuranceo 1 
Now the basic evidence for the first Calvinists of the 
truth of their views was inner persuasiono This inner per-
suasion was not at all illusory» yet in the world itself they 
need the comfort of fellow travellers (this phrase is not used 
in the derogatory sense)o An& their success was a sign for them 
of the correctness of their viewso And so 1ful persuasion doth 
separate the chosen children of God from the castaways and is 
the prayers of the Saintes 1 0
2 The argument and the prouess 
is~of course~circularo The criterion of religious experience 
is inner persuasion 9 the guarantee of the authenticity of inner 
persuasion is that it is caused by God (and so is their success)» 
and of this they are assured by inner persuasiono 
Calvinism was thus in a special sense a religion of the 
Book 9 and it emphasised the divine origin of the Scriptures 
rather than their transmission. It is not the situation 9 the 
present that makes any difference to the content of the message 9 
but the actual message itself that is supremely importanto Yet 
the message is not opaque for a book 9 even a sacred Book, stands 
in need of interpretation. For they are composed of words which 
are not entirely dependent on usage and presumption onlyo Thus 
' as durable material objects they cut across the processes 
of transmission and create new patterns of social time; they 
speak direct to remote generations 9 whose interpretation of 
Calvin 9 Institutes, I, vii 9 1-5 9 PPo 74-8lo 
Theodore Beza 9 A Disco~~~e of the True and Visible Marks 
of the catholioue=cEXLrCh~~London~ T5:12, p:~4~ 
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them may differ from that of intervening transmitters 
of the tradition they express •••• [And] every reader 
is a potential radical; non-traditional interpretations 
arise 9 and with them the question of the authority to 
be employed in reading and interpreting documentsvol 
It is 9 therefore 9 not merely a question of random inspiration. 
PerJlaps more important is VJhat the Sacred Book contains. And 
here Calvinism attempted to cut off other potential and actual 
interpretations. The justification for what they considered 
the Sacred Book contained was again circular. Yet this was 
not enough to impose j)he divine institution whose form was 
outlined in the Scriptures. Once religion becomes a matter of 
institutional order it becomes subject to the criteria of prac-
tine. And in this regard 9 the example of Geneva 9 the godly 
city 9 was particularly importanto~ 
Just as God 9 then 9 is distinct from· the created order 9 
but at the same time is the one who ultimately directs all things 9 
so the church is both distinct from and also the ultimate 1 mode~f 
for human conducto Accordingly 9 the church defines the principles 
for directing moral and religious conduct 9 and is 'assisted' 
by the political powers in implementing aspects of its discipline. 
The Geneva achievement makes it clear 9 however 9 that 9 while the 
ide~l was always a voluntary 9 self~determing order in which 
men responded to God 'of their own accord 1 9 a fact supposedly 
manifest by the institutional independence of a relatively 
consensual church 9 Calvin was in no way opposed to a high degree 
lo J. G. Ao Pocock 9 'Time. InstitlJtions and Underate3:~dil1J?:.~ tm 
Essay on Traditions and their Understanding' in PoliGics 
and Experience 9 ed. by Po King and B. C. Parekh 9 Cambridge 9 
19"69 9 p 0 225 0 
2. Ro M. Kingdom 9 Gell§va and the Comin_g~ of thEL_ Wars of Religion_ 
in France 9 Geneva 9 1956 9 and Geneva and the French Protestant 
Movement 9 Geneva 9 1967. These books give a good idea of 
Calviriiit organization out of Geneva. The latter book also 
has a discussion of resistemce theory. 
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of regimentation in religious and political affairso He appears 
to have been ready to use many means to achieve the idealo For 
·to Calvin 9 the present moment was a dtcisive time in the actual 
realization of God's kingdom 9 a ka~~9 1a crisis reached in 
the fulness of time, like the age of the Prophets 9 or the age 
of the Apostleso It was necessary 9 therefore 9 for the truly 
elect to be a disciplined group 9 the supreme example of the 
new religion's power and authorityo And as they had proven 
their godliness by their rigorous se~control, so they carried 
their message forth into the worlda They could not withdraw 
to contemplate some private vision 9 for it is not 'sound theology 
to confine a man's thoughts so much to himself 1 o Indeed 
'It is 
higher 
soul a 
of his 
certainly the duty of a Christian man to ascend 
than merely to seekaand secure salvation of his o~m 
[He was in fact] to set before him as a prime motive 
existence zeal to show forth the glory oli God. 1 2 
A magistrate 9 therefore, who subscribed to the true faith was 
obliged not only to resist a plundering and heretiqal tyrant; 
it was also his constant duty 9 in a world whose normal progress 
was of degeneration and corruption 9 to endeavour to lead men 
back to the worship of Goda 
And here we may note another contradiction or ambiguity in 
Calvinismo Calvin himself, when he came to discuss temporal 
authority in the lEt book of the Institutes of the Christian 
Religion 9 condemned resist~nce on the ground that it involved 
rebellion against that order which, because it is there 9 must 
be the gift of divine dispensationo The magistrate is the vicar 
of God and to resist him is to resist the ordinance of Goda At 
For an interesting discussion of the term ~aip~ see Ja Ea 
Smith, 'Time, Times and the Right Time: chronos and kairos' 
The Monist 9 volo 53 9 l969o 
Calvin 9 1 Reply by John Calvin to the Letter of Cardinal 
Sadolet to the Senate and People of Geneva (1539) in 
Theological Treatises 9 trans o with introduction by J aKo S·a· Reid L6:riaon·:c~r54-9 :P~-· 2Z8~- · 
----~---
45 = 
the same timep when he came to deliver i;he 'Sermons on the Fifth 
Book of Moses' in 1555~ he laid upon the magistrate the obligation 
of establishing true religion as his first duty and punishing 
the wicked as his secnndo And indeedp as sbon as a situation 
actually arose in which a strong Calvinist minority had every 
pr~ect of protecting itself against persecution by resisting 
it - that is to say in Francep Scotland and the Low Countries = 
the duty of establishing true religion was stressed at the expenses 
1 of the duty of submission to the heretic or wicked rulero 
Thus it is that from an emphasis on the voluntary nature 
of individual obedience to God we arrive at two general charac-
teristics of palvinist politicso They are the politics of 
perfection 9 and they are the politics of uniformityo 'Political 
activity is recognised as the imposition of a uniform condition 
of perfection upon human conducta 12 And this dilemma at the 
centre of Calvinism is that of all movements that insist that. 
a perfect condition may be imposed in an im~erfect worlda 
Initially 9 of course 9 their coming together is9and must be9 
voluntary 9 but because their identity appears to revolve round 
a frail notion of perfectiong they must assert themselves against 
untrutho Only in this way can those in possession of the 'truth' 
not dis~ate or lose their new found identityo They devise new 
organie.ations to oppose the corruption of the old institutionso 
The covenant 9 for instance 9 represented a moral commitment to 
obey God's law 9 based upon a presumed internal assurance and 
lo The logical point of Calvin's radica~m appears to be the 
concept of holy war discussed in the Sermons on Moseso For 
some indication of how much more radical this notion was in 
Calvin-than in Augustine and Aquinas 9 -see a short article 
by Mo Walzer 9 'Exodus 32 and the Theory of Holy War: the 
History of a Citation 1 9 The Har'!a_rd =Theol()_g_i9al Review? 
vola 619 1968o 
2 o Ma Oakeshott 9 }:l_~nalis!Il~ in Poli tics9 London 9 1962 9 p a 6 o 
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consento :rt was a self-imposed submission to divinely authorized 
law? but this self-imposition had external implications~and the 
social enforcement in God's name supposedly brought one nearer 
to a recognition of its importanceo With the covenant 9 Christian 
discipline was definitely substituted for traditional political 
order; all the citizens of the holy commonwealth conscientiously 
accepted an absolute dominion which they recognized as godly. 
And thus they assumed the identity of the elect by voluntary 
submission to Godo 
The paradox or ambiguity of this position is also illus-
trated by the practical effects of the pursuit of its implications 
Traditional authority and order 9 on the one hand 9 was clearly 
subject to disruption by 1 conscienti0us 1 meno They placed 9 or 
came to place 9 no value on the traditional political order if 
it did not seek to impose the true and godly disciplineo And 
even if it did seek to do godly work 9 its status 9 authority 
and identity would be transformed in the great changes that 
would follow the imposition of the true disciplineo On the 
other hand 9 the new discipline could prove immensely attractive 
to thost communities subject to constant disruption from other 
sourceso Its stringency would appear as a welcome antidote to 
anarchyo 1 
In ~heory and in practice 9 then 9 the paradox of a creed 
and movement that betrays both an inclination toward regimen-
tation and toward self-determination reveals itselfo It would 9 
indeed 9 be hard to study Calvinism without attending to the em-
phasis upon an independent 1new order' that is set apart from 
lo It was Hooker's oplnlon that Calvin brought order to Geneva 
and this in itself was to be commendedo \ihat happened after-
wards to Calvinism was for Hooker quite another mattero See 
his remarks in the Preface and Chapter 6 of this worko 
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both the realm of natural necessity and political coerciono 
Both Calvin and the Presbyterians in England were passionately 
concerned with the church 9 and in their opinion the necessary 
first step in reforming both the commonwealth and the church 
was the 'liberation' of the churcho It was necessary to free 
the church from mundane traditions and activities. And what 
stood out from these actions was the sacredo Action in this 
sphere of existence was regarded in its ideal form 9 not as the 
transmission?but as the recreation of the sacredo Thus~those 
who composed the church were ideally recreating that divine 
moment eternally present in the ·word. The church was 9 in effect~ 
an· ·.attempt to create and perpetually recreate that realm of 
freedom that Christ alone completely knew. The spiritual 
'actions' of the members of the church were a timeless communi-
cation through the eternal Word with Godo They were~ therefore 9 
the true elect 9 recreating 9 in their estimation 9 and confirming 
their election by every charismatic or godly act. Anything 
that falls short of this ideal is a corruption. 
Thisp then 9 is the rationale of the Calvinist creedo To 
those who entered its sphere it appeared completely cogento 
One of the reasons for this was that the arguments that led 
to the conclusion that the divine institution was revealed in 
the Scripture~ere circularo For the true believer sees the 
truth in the Scripture~ 9 the guarantee that the Scriptures contain 
the truth is that they are the Word of God 9 and of this he is 
assured because he has seen the trutho The true elect 9 the 
Calvinists 9 however, all see the same things (or nearly the 
same things)o By definition, those who do not acknowledge the 
truth of the Calvinist creed are not true Christians. 
Now the crucial point for Hooker in this circular argument 
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is the radical separation of the realm of freedom and choice 
from the area of natural necessityo This separation stems from 
Calvin's idea of God and the relation of God's creation to 
Himselfo Politically these notions could not fail to have 
various repercussions 9 despite the theoretical separation be-
tween the spheres of 'human' activity 9 and despite Calvin's 
apparent support for the magistrate within his own sphereo For 
religion in the sixteenth century was 9 of course 9 one of the 
constitutive elements of social compositiono Strife was un-
doubtedly embittered by the absoluteness of the demands of the 
new ideaso In tfue end Calvinism represented politics as a fight 
for the 1 truth 1 9 not 9 for instancep the endless composition 
of claims in conflicto True religion 9 if it could not conquer 
by its truthfulness 9 must be established by use of the sword 
of necessityo But since Truth does not abolish time and his-
torical imperfections 9 a pernicious confusion resultedo The 
ambitions on a comraonwealth of the designs of a sect took on 
the purity of a holy warp compromise was a sin and a sign of 
corruption 9 and a tone of exasperated intransigence became 
common between rivals and opponentso 
We may conclude by suggesting that such intransigence was 
the product of the participants ta.:lking past each othero 
Circular arguments were proclaimed as producing the vision of 
truth; and such argument is des-igned to silence further dis~ 
cussiono Yet in reality arguments claimed as absolute usually 
increase the volubility of human discourse unless 'truth' can 
gain Viotory in practiceo Then there is merely the endless 
repetition of that trutho_ It must 9 howeyer 11 be noted that it is 
only by the ordinary means of practical activity that true 
believers are able to practice what they preacho Hence the 
need for and frequent discussion about 'godly instruments 1 o 
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And while perfection has never been a realizable state in 
conditions of historical imperfection 9 there has been no shortage 
of visions of perfection and equally no lack of attempts to 
impose these dreamso 
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HOOKER'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE REFORMING 'CAUSE'o 
The opponents of the Presbyterians in the 1590s employed 
what has been termed a 'smear' technique by accusing them of 
advocating anabaptist doctrineso 1 For in so doing they 
threatened all the established institutions of the English 
Commonw~altho Many of the leading advocates of Presbyterianism 
denied the charge~ but the widespread support of their ideas 
in the lower orders of society merely increased suspiciono 
Hooker 9 consequentlyp felt it necessary to remark on the 
social character o£ re£ormed religion before passing on to 
an examination of the arguments involvedo The most ex-
tended of these remarks are to be found in the Preface~ 
but the Dedication to Book Five should not be overlooked 9 
for even here Hooker cannot forbear to make some passing 
comments on the politically dangerous character o£ the 
'reform' movemento 
And 
He warns not to underestimate its potential strength. 
'i£ any marvel how a thing in itsel£ so weak could 
import any great dangerp they must consider not so 
how much small the spark is that flieth up9 as how apt 
things about it are to ~ake fireo Bodies politic 
being subject as much as natural to dissolution by 
divers meansp there are undoubtedly more estates over~ 
thrown through diseases bred w~thin themselves than 
through violence from abroad:';o 
Hooker himsel£ is well aware how long the 'cause'has been ig= 
nored by those he considers ought to have kno\qn bettero As a 
lo See Co Ho George? 'Puritanism in History and Historiography' 
Past and ~resent? volo XLI, 1968o 
2o Ecclo Polo 9 Dedication? Book Vo 
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consequence its strength has increased and it has attracted 
converts from all corners of societyo1 It is the duty 9 therefore 9 
of all those who are aware that the 'disease' may spread 
further to cure it as soon as possible and by all means availableo 
Hooker 9 as we know, offers in the Ecclesia~ti2a1 Polity to 
examine the entire legal arrangements of the English· Churcho By 
this he hoped to 'prove' that the reasons pr~erted by the 
reformer were at best merely probable and that their zeal and 
ambition were consequently misplacedo But the Preface is hardly 
the work of a man who is seeking merely to clear his own mind 
and arrive at some settled conc~usionso Rather 9 it is an_open 
attack on the character of reformed religion in general 9 and 
we may discern in it no great admiration for the original 
fqunder 9 Calvino For the tone of Hooker's writing in regard 
to Calvin and the establishment of the discipline in Geneva 
appears, to me at least 9 to be somewhat ironicalo The first 
two sentences about Calvin are completely disarming: 
'A founder it had 9 whom 9 for mine own part 9 I think 
incomparably the wisest man that ever the French church 
did enjoy, since the hour it enjoyed himo' 
Hooker goes on to remark that his education was in civil law 0 
But (and here is the rub) 'divine knowledge he gathered 9 not 
by hearing or reading so much 9 as by teaching others' 0 2 In 
short 9 he was never so devout as when levying claims on otherso 
Similarly 9 the habits of the Swiss city~states in religious 
disputes 9 and the manner in which Calvin finally settled in 
lo According to Hooker 9 'there are divers motives drawing men 
to favour mightily these opinions 9 wherein their persuasions 
are- but--weakly- settled; and- if' the passions of th-e mind be 
strong 9 they easily sophisticate the understanding; they 
make it apt to believe upon very slender warrant:9 and to 
imagine infallible truth where scare any probable show 
appearetho 1 Ecclo Polo 9 Dedication, Bko Vo 
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Geneva is described in such a fashion that both the inhabitants 
and Calvin himself appear quite foolisho 1 For the Vtruth' of 
the discipline was not the cause of its final establishment. 
In the end it was the fashionable reputation of Calvin that 
brought about its adoption by the people of Genevao They had 
previously expelled Calvin for they wisely 'would not quietlY,~> 
w~thout contradiction or murmur 9 submit themselves unto the 
orders which their solemn oath had bound them to obey 1 • 2 In 
the event 9 however? Calvin returned since 1 they thought it better 
to be somewhat hardly yoked at homeg than for ever abroad dis-
credited', for having expelled from heir presence a man of 
international reputeo 3 
It was true that order and authority were needed in Geneva 
and it was because of this need that Calvin's discipline pre -
vailedo Hooker affirms that 
'This device I see not how the wisest at that time living 
could have bettered, if we duly consider what the present 
estate of Geneva did then requireov4 
In short 9 a recipe for order is always of some use in conditions 
of anarchyo But the actual discipline imposed by Calvin was 
not considered by Hooker to be absolute~ indifferent to t±me 
and place, and readily applicable to all politieso In general, 
1. 1 It was the manner of those times 9 (whether through men's 
desire to enjoy alone the glory of their own enterprises 9 or 
else because the quickness of their own occasions required 
present dispatch; so it was) that every particular church did 
that within itself 9 which some few of their own thought good 9 
by whom the rest were all directede Such number of churches 
then being, though free within themselves 9 yet small 9 common 
conference beforehand might have eased them of much trouble. 
But a greater inconvenience it bred, that every later en-
aeavoured to be certain degrees more removed from conformity 
with the church of RQI!l.e, than the rest befor~ had been: where~ 
upon grew marvellous dissimilitudes, and by J:>cason thereof, 
jealousies, heart-burnings 9 jars and discords amongst them.' 
Preface, ii, 2o 
2o Preface 9 ii, 2. 
3o Preface, ii, 4. 
-4. :Prefa-ce, ii, 3-. 
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Hooker concludes that 'that which Calvin did for establishment 
of his discipline 9 seemeth more cornmendable than that which he 
taught for the countenancing of it established 1 • 1 Thus 9 while 
order and authority were required 9 Calvin's discipline is as 
contingent as any other form of order. It is not the absolutely 
'true' discipline for 
'what argument are ye able to show 9 whereby it was ever 
proved- by Calvin 9 that any one sentence of Scripture 
·doth necessarily enforce these things~ or the rest wherein 
your opinion concurreth with his against the orders of 
ymur own churcho'2 
Nonetheless 9 many do hold that what Calvin has to propound 
is necessarily trueo His books are 'almost the very canon to 
judge both doctrine and discipline by' o 3 r!fany 9 consequently 9 
are able to defend themselves against their detractors and are 
well instructed in the doctrines of reformed religiono But 
in the Preface Hooker is not in the main concerned with actual 
arguments. It is the 'vulgar sort' who make up the majority 
of the Presbyterian movement that are the object of his attentiono 
He advises the intellectual leaders of the movement .to 
'Weigh what doth move the common sort so much to favour 
this innovation, and it shall soon appear to youp that 
the force of particular reasons which for your several 
opinions are alleged is a thing whereof the multitude 
never did nor could so consider as to be therewith wholly 
carried; but certain general inducements are used to make 
saleable your cause in gross; and when once men have cast 
a fancy towards it 9 any slight declaration of specialities 
will serve to lead forward men's inclinable and prepared 
minds o '4 
Generally, while Hooker may to some extent admire the mind of 
his fellow intellectual Travers 9 he clearly cannot stomach those 
who are certain for the simplest of reasons 9 especially when 
lo Preface 9 iip 7o 
2o Preface, iip 7. 
3o Preface, iip 8o 
4a Preface 9 iiip 5o 
----------
----------- - -----
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the~conclusions are contrary to the opinions of the established 
churcho 1 Their simplicity is a sign of their ignorance of their 
duties as members of the community of Englando Thus 9 while the 
Ecclesi~stical Polity may be a sophisticated and complex argument 
against a mistaken but worthy set of beliefs 9 the Preface is 
a veiled plea for the legal prosecution of those who are not 
amenable to 'rational' argumento 
This denigratory and sarcastic tone is repeatedly to be 
seen in mhose sections in which the 'inducements' for the ad-
vancement of the 'cause' are examinedo Here is the reality 
behind the disputes over Scripture 9 reason 9 experience and 
ecclesiastical arrangementso And it is clear that Hooker dis-
approves of what he seeso For the beliefs of the radicals are 
not merely incorrect 9 as Hooker seeks to demonstrate 9 but 9 more 
important 9 have proved politically dangerous as the Preface 
Blit:,t,E:st·s. The inducements in regard to this movement have no 
logical connection at all with the 1 truth 1 9 for 
'the methmd of winning the people's affection unto a 
general liking of ~he cause' (for so ye term it) hath 
been thiso First 9 in the hearing ofthe multitude 9 the 
faults especially of higher callings are ripped up with 
marvellous exceeding severity and sharpness of reproof 9 
which being oftentimes done begetteth a gr~at opinion of 
integrity, zeal and holiness 9 to such constant reprovers 
of sin 9 as by likelihood would never be so much offended 
at that which is evil 9 unless themselves were singularly 
good 1 o2 
And the next tactic is 'to impute all faults and corruptions, 
where with the world aboundeth 9 unto the kind of ecclesiastical 
government established 1 o 3 After such preparation the time will 
lo 'Let the vulgar sort amongst you know 9 that there is not 
the least branch of the cause wherein they are so resolute 9 
but to the ·t:r.·ial of it so great more appertaineth than their 
conceit doth reach untoo 1 Preface 9 ii 9 8o 
3e Preface 9 iii 9 7o 
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be ripe for recommending a new form of government as the necessary 
remedy for all the present discontents o For people vrho are 
'possessed with dislike and disuontent at things present' are 
mad enough 'to imagine that anything (the virtue whereof they 
hear recommended) would help them; but the most which they least 
have tried 1 o 1 But from here they proceed to an even more dan-
gerous positiono This is the persuading of people 'credulous 
and over-capable of such pleasing errors' that it is by means 
of special illuminati:om granted to them by God that they are 
able to see in the Scriptures those things which others have 
not been able to discerno 
But this claim is pernicious arroganceo Hooker argues that 
'There are but two ways whereby the Spirit leadeth men 
into all truth; the one extraordinary 9 the other common; 
the one belonging but unto some few 9 the other extending 
itself unto all that are of God; the one 9 that which we 
call by ~ special divine excellency Revelation 9 the other 
Reason 1 o 
He suggest 9 therefore 9 that either the Presbyterians are all 
Prophets or they should submittheir opinions to the judgement 
of Reason? indeed to the common judgement of all mene That 
they are all prophets is non1sense and Hooker immediately reveals 
his anti=enthusiast disposition by endeavouring to give a 
'psychological' explanation for the spread of radical ·opinionso 
'Most sure it is 9 that when men's affections do frame 
their opinions 9 they are i1defence of error more earnest 
a great deal than (for the most part) sound believers 
in the maintenance of truth apprehendeth according to 
the nature of that evidence which Scripture yieldeth: 
which being in some things plain 9 as in the principles 
of Christian doctrine; in some things 9 as in these matters 
of discipline 9 more dark and doubtful; frameth corres-
pondently that inward assent which God's most gracious 
Spirit worketh by it as by his effectual instrumento 
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It is not therefore the fervent earnestness of their 
persuasion 9 but the soundness of those reasons whereupon 
the same is buiJt 9 which must declare their opinions in 
these things to have been wrought by the Holy Ghost~ and 
not by the fraud of that evil spirit 9 which is even in 
his illusions strongotl 
We may conclude thus that the Presbyterians are generally 
victims of self-deception 1 and are thoroughly evil in their 
passionate and arrogant self-assertion. Theyare indeed ~ a 
self-chosen people 9 who 9 because they consider that they know 
the 'true' meaning of Scripture 9 are of the opinion that this 
'doth thereby seal them to be God's children' 9 and that 'as 
the state of the time now standeth 9 the most special token to 
know them that are God's children from others is an earnest 
affection that way 1 o2 
Once a situation of this character is generated 9 it is 
difficult 9 if not impossible 9 to destroy it merely by argument 9 
as Hooker realised only too well. 
'Let any man of contrary opinion open his mouth to per-
suade them 9 they close up their ears 9 his reasons then 
weigh ';not, all is answered with the rehearsal of the words 
of John: NWe are of God; he that knoweth God heareth us: 
as for the rest ye are of the world: for this world's 
pomp and vanity it is that ye speak 9 and the world 9 whose 
ye are 9 heareth you.n:P 
Hooker implicitly at least recognized the impregnable circularity 
of the Presbyterian position. Indeed, suggest to them that they 
are unable to judge in such matters, 'their answer is "God h~th 
chosen the simple"'. Attempt to show them that they are irratiom.a1 
(which is presumptuous in any case) 'they have bucklers of like 
defense: "Christ's ovm apostle was accounted mad 11 1 • 4 Point out 
to them that the authority of the present government is against 
lo Preface, iiip ll). 
2. Preface, iiip 14. 
3o Preface, iiip 14. 
4. --Pre-face , ii:i, ±Ll-- -
' 0 
. -
----
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.--(~ them9 'they fasten on the head of the Lord's vicaregentvs 
j ·; 
here on earth whatsoever they any where find uttered against 
the cruelty of blood~thirsty men'ol In short 9 the attitude 
of the 'vulgar' Presbyterian is practically beyond shaking 
by argumento For such men 9 persecution is the only answero 
In any case, the intellectual presuppositions of the move-
ment were mistaken in Hooker's viewo For him 9 at least 9 the 
general position could be deflated at its source by 'reasoned' 
argumento It was not merely a matter of juxtaposing his argument 
to their positiono His own argument was a 'demonstration' 
of the illusory nature of the radical presuppositionso The 
necessary principles enunciated by the intellectual leaders of 
the Presb~rian 'movement' were 9 in Hooker's judgement 9 in no way 
to be supported 9 least of all by the Scriptureo Nor could any 
instance be given of the adoption of this discipline by any 
church in previous experienceo 2 Ultimately the reasons offered 
for the overthrow of the present church in England and for the 
institution of 'true' discipline are in Hooker's eyes at best 
only probable and not necessaryo And only unto 'a necessary 
proof that they are not good' must those things that are es-
tablished give placea 3 It cannot be demonstrated that the Pres-
byterian principles are valid and 9 therefore 9 'for the ecclesias-
tical laws of this land 9 we are led by great reason to observe 
them 9 and ye by no necessity to impugn them' a4 
lo Preface 9 iii 9 15a 
2a 'Besides these last times which for insolency 9 pride and 
egregious contempt of all good order 9 are the worst 9 there 
are none wherein ye can truly affirm 9 that the complete form 
of your-- discipline 9 or the- substance thereof 9 - was practiced o ' 
Preface 9 iv 9 l5o 
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It was the militant fundamentalism~ r~dical disposition 
and personal exclusiveness of the Presbyterian movement that 
provoked the malice and disdain of Hookero He clearly disliked 
the excessive emphasis placed upon Calvin's writings and the 
example of the reformed churches on the Continento He refused 
to admit the Presbyterian tendency to exalt the Scriptures 
beyond 'reason' and to depress all traditions of corporate exis-
tence. To him, these notions werekrelevant to the situation 
at hand in Englando In contrast, he himself emphasised the 
traditions of the Church in England which, according to him, had 
not been radically changed by the 1Ref6rmation'.. This in no 
way implies that Booker was an obstinate op~onent of all attempts 
at gradual alteration . .and accommodation to change .. His kind of 
conservatism in fact stemmed from the assumption that man-made 
edifices could be~and 9 in many cases~were satisfactory~ while 
endeavours to reconstitute them entirely were all too frequently 
ill-conceived. The Presbyterian clamour for an irrational and 
impossible project would bring about the collapse~ the Church as 
it then waso In the course of this struggle the clergy, in 
Hooker's judgement, would fall into disrespect, factional dif-
ferences would undermine devotion to proper worship and true 
piety~ and the Presbyterian obsession would spread eventually 
to affairs of state. The Queen's prerogative would ultimately 
be destroyed, all social order, legal principles and university 
d t . ld b th . t d' 1 e uca 1on wou e rown 1n o 1sarray. The nation would be 
tumbled into civil strife and the intricate fabric of English 
society would be rent aparta 
Hooker's great political fear, therefore, was of the cala= 
mitous change that might ensue from the practice of the precept 
lo Preface, viii, 2 9 3 9 4o 
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that 'we ought to search what things are consonant to God's 
will 9 not which be most for our ovm ease v o 1 An even greater 
nightmare was that as the radicals' discipline was considered 
to be 'the absolute commandment of Almighty God 9 it must be 
received although the world by receiving it should be clean 
turned upside down 1 o2 As to where complete religious reformation 
might lead if the Presbyterians had their way 9 an historical 
example was provided 9 in Hooker's mind 9 by the Anabaptistso 
The intention behind their actions was likewise 
'That Christ might have dominion over all; that all crowns 
and sceptres might be thrown down at his feet; that no 
other reign over Christian mBn but he 9 no regiment keep 
them in awe but his discipline 9 amongst them no sword at 
all be carried besides his, the sword of spiritual excom-
municationo For this cause they laboured with all their 
might in over-turning the seats of magistracy 9 because 
Christ hath said 9 'Resist not evil'1 in forbidding oaths 9 
the necessary means of judicial trial 9 because Christ hath 
said 9 'Swear not at all'; finally 9 in bringing in community 
of goods 9 because Christ by :;his Apostles hath given the 
world such example, to the end that man might exceed one 
another not in wealth the pillar of secular authority 9 
but in virtue'o3 
It might be objected that the parallel was not exact or 
appropriate enough to the situation inEngland 9 but it was close· 
enough 9 so Hooker thought 9 to act as a warning as to where 
politics as the pursuit of 1 truth 1 9 without accommodation to 
changing circumstances might leada 4 For he considered that 
England was faced with a particularly dangerous situationo And 
if 'devolution' was the consequence of Anabaptist fundamenta~ism, 
it was because the danger was at first underestimated. 5 Likewise 
lo Preface, viii 9 5. 
3o Preface viii~ Bo 
4. 'That things doubtful are to be construed in the better part 1 
is a principle not safe to be fonowed in matters concerning 
the public state of a commonweal.' Preface, viii 9 l3o 
5o 'These men at first were only pitied i:ntheir error, and not 
--much understood- -by--any-; the gr-eat- humi-lity 9 zeal-9~and devotion 
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many in high social and political positions in the English Common-
wealth who have offered support to the Presbyterians are u:n-
fortunately not aware of the consequences that could ensu~ from 
this supporto They should~ thereforep be forced to recognize 
the character of this movemento For clearly if the radicals 
were allowed to persist in their activities 9 then the political 
consequences would 9 in Hooker's view~ be similar to the havoc 
wrought mn the Continent by the Anabaptists and other radical 
movements o 'Hi th these~ the Presbyterians share the desire that 
a uniform condition of perfection is a necessityo And so 'there 
remained after speculations 9 practice 9 whereby the whole wor ld 
thereunto ~if it were possible) might be framed 1 o 1 
These~ then 9 are the possible consequences that might ensue 
if the radicalswe.re allowed to continue as theywere doingo Of 
course 9 Hooker suggests 9 there are peaceful ways out of the 
impasseo One of these is through the learned judgement of a 
general council or assemblyo Lnd if such an assembly were to 
be gathered 9 the pronunciation of that body would have to be 
obeyedo 2 But?in the meantime,Hooker proposes an examination 
of the Presbyterian position and suggest to them that they obey 
the duly established lawso This is a reasonable request since 
1As for the orders which are established 9 sith equity and 
reason 9 the law of nature 9 God and man~ do all favour that 
which is in being~ till orderly judgement of decision be 
given against; it is but justice to exact of you 9 and per-
verseness in you it should be to deny 9 thereunto your 
willing obedi enc_e' o 3 
And this hiatus will give Richard Hooker the opportunity to 
3o(cont) which appeared to be in them 9 was in all men's oplnlon 
a pledge of their harmless meaning.' Preface 9 vii 9 9e 
1. Pr~fa6e 9 viii 9 llo 
2. 1 So full of wilfullness and self-liming is our nature 9 that 
without some definite sentence 9 which being given may stand 9 
and a necessity of silence on both sides afterward imposed 9 
small hope there is .that strifes thus far prosecuted will 
in short_ ti!Ile _qll_ietly endo 1 Preface 9 vip 3o 
~ PrP.T e. vi. Sn 
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e~ .. ai.nine from a:{l 1 ohjec~ti~e 1 point of \1:;_ew the preauppos.itions 
and conclusions. of hiso chos:e:r:n adllersa.riea.<» 
PART IV 
~-=-~
I•IETAPHOR AND REALITY 
= 63 = 
7o 
GOD AND HIS INTELLIGIBLE UNIVERSE 
(i) 
In Hooker's judgement the opponents of the Presbyterians 
'are accused as men that will not have Jesus Christ to 
rule over them, but have wilfully cast his statutes 
behind their backs 9 hating to be reformed and made sub-ject unto the sceptre of his disciple'ol 
His objections to this exclusive claim of the Presbyterians 
were based on what he considered to be true and rational premises~ 
the understanding of which was open to all who were prepared to 
listeno In general, these premises are not supported by ex-
tended argumentp and they are not examined in any objective 
faJiono But they are accepted as the necessary point of depar-
ture for rational discourseo And in regard to the present con-
troversy his intention is to show how one ought to think and 
2 
acto Disquieting opinions are fended off and intellectual 
problems disownedo In this way Hooker hopes that 
'this world will teach them wisdom that have the capacity 
to apprehend ito And Our wisdom in this case must be 
such as doth not propose to itself~o idion/ our own par-
ticular, the partial and immoderate desire whereof poisoneth 
wheresoever it taketh place; but the scope and mark which 
we are to aim at is'to koino~' the public and common good 
of all 1 o3 . 
To the radical disposition of thought of the Presbyterians 
the Ecclesiastical Polity offers an 'objective' answer on three 
levels although these are all bounded by Hooker's practical 
intentiono We have first the warning in the Preface to the 
'vulgar sort' to mend their wayso If they do not, then they 
2o Preface 9 vii 9 lo 
~ 64 = 
may expect to be punished for their persistent and irrational 
disobedience to the laws of the English CommonvJeal tho Secondly 9 
at the 1yel of absolute presuppositions 9 Hooker endeavours to 
outline a position that is a complete and thorough-going Te-
futation' of the Calvinist idiom of thoughto This leads on to 
the third level 9 an exhaustive elaboration of the ramifications 
of this point of view in regard to various particularso And 
as may be seen from the mount of space given over to details 9 
Hooker was not at all specifically interested in problems that 
his thought might raise. His first c-oncern was with the fun-
damentalism of the Calvinist position with its rigid adherence 
to a purely Scrlliptural interpretation of authority and ecclesias-
tical organizationo For such a position amounted to a complete 
denial of the rationality and efficacy of Hooker's own presup-
an 
positionso His defence of the Elizabeth1Polity 9 in short 9 was 
bound up in his judgement with his whole view of experience. 
Hooker considered Law as the norm of any activity within 
experience. Laws provided the necessary guide and enjoined the 
end of all activityo 1 They are the 'natural' principles pro-
vided by a rational and fecund God 9 and it was He 9 as appearances 
elaborately testify 9 who created every aspect of reality. The 
reasons fillr this creativity are known in their entirety only 
by Himself. But God does speak through nature 9 and the voice 
of nature is 'his instrument 1 o 2 And so knowledge of 
'every the least thing in the whole vrorld hath in it a 
second peculiar benefit unto us 9 inasmuch as it serveth 
to minister rules 9 canons 9 and laws 9 for men to direct 
their actions by which we properly term humanY.,3 
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Nature is? then 9 law-governed 9 aP.d this characteristic 
accounts for certain parallel features in each section or 'plane 
of being 1 o The most important aspect of this view of re~lity 
for Hooker in his dispute was that the hierarchical patternof 
nature as a \"!hole could be discerned also on the social 1 plane 1 o 
Society was thus held to be a natural hierarchy of degrees and 
rankso In the Ecclesiastical Polity Hooker is at pains to 
show that if social disorder is to be avoided 9 then the 'natural' 
social hierarchy would have to be maintained 9 for 'if things or 
persons be ordered 9 this doth imply that they are distinguished 
by degreeso F d . d 1 d' 't' I l 1 0r or er lS a gra ua 1spos1 10n o If attempts 
are made to change that order 9 then this must be carried out 
according to the appropriate criteriao And these were 9 in fact 9 
usually what those in authority considered the circumstances 
demandedo In short 9 the idea of a 'natural' order is employed 
to justify a particular historical arrangem:ento 2 
The Great Chain of Being was 9 however 9 a doctrine not merely 
of law but of interdependenceo All authorities in the universe 
are to hold to their station and function 9 not independently 9 
2o The natural view of reality provides the basis for a type of 
1 illustration 1 9 namely correspondenceo There appears 9 there-
fore9 in Hooker's project and in other works of the period 
frequent use of correspondences to illustrate resemblances 
in the ordered structure of natureo These illustrations 
provided 9 according to Greenleaf 9 'great intellectual and 
aesthetic satisfaction as evidence of an ordered universe 1 o 
(Wo Ho Greenleaf 9 Order 9 Empiricism and Politics 9 Oxfo.~~ 
1964P Po 26o) Whet:fier the satisfaction was great of1 not is ~ 
debatable? but to elaborate and illustrate a correspondence 
did indicate an 'argument' which was conventionally acceptedo 
Thus it was that the presupposition of a universe created 
and erdered by God was supposedly verifiedo It wou-ld 9 how-
ever? appear from such 'arguments' that the Great Chain of 
Being and its persuasiveness as a view of reality were to 
some degree independent or prior to the efforto 
It is 9 I consider? pointless to go into any more detail about 
co~:r~ondence _ _s_ince 9-r_eenlE)El.f has 9-o:r:t_~ __ it s_o well in the 
work mentioned aboveo 
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but for the good of their inferiors (who depend on them) and 
subject to their superiors (on whom they, in turn, depend)o 
Authority and obligation is by interdependence, and the force 
of obligation is that every person must keep to his own station 
and respect that of superiorso If this pattern of order were 
to be destroyed, none better would miraculously appear in its 
place~ and no=one, least of all those of inferior position 9 would 
gain in any way whatsoevero Order imposed without authority and 
moral co=operation was disliked as being 1 unnatural 1 9 and would 
in any case have been difficult to enforceo Order was necessarily 
to be accompanied by harmony, and this was a consequence of 
everyone occupying their 'natural' position and performing their 
'tr~e' functiono And this emphasis on unity as a necessary con-
dition of authority and its exerciserexisted in ecclesiastical 
as well as in civil affairso 
Ultimately~ the Presbyterians had no place in their view 
of the godly community for 'natural' arguments supporting order 
and authorityo At this level Hooker's opposition was aroused 
by their attack on natural lawp by their disparagement of reasonp 
and by their complete lack of understanding of historical ex-
perience in religious activityo 'Reformed' religion was there-
fore both an appeal to disorder, and a denial and a disrup~ion 
of the proper hierarchy of societyo And in Hooker's opinion 
the laws of God and nature may only be trampled down through 
arrogance and ignoranceo 
'There never was sin committed, wherein a less good was 
not preferred before a greater 9 and that wilfully; which 
cannot be done without the singular disgrace of Nature, 
and the utter disturbance of that diy) .. ne order, whereby 
the pre=eminence of chiefest accepta~ is by the best 
things worthily challengedo 1 l -
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The effects of transgression of God's rational precepts may 
be seen both in the corruption of lower nature itself and in 
the many specific examples of political and social disaster 
consequent upon pride and ambition of irrational individualso 
To Hooker 9 the demands of the Presbyterians for wholewale 
change in ecclesiastical organization were mistaken ideas 9 in~ 
stigated and justified by the use of the wrong criteriao They 
amounted to nothing more than arrogance and wilful ignoranceo 
If each man were to claim to be 9 in Hooker's own words 9 'his 
own commander' 9 disorder would inevitably followo So dangerous 
is this course that 
'~uch a goalJ~haketh universally the fabric of government 9 
tendeth to a~archy and mere confusion 9 dissolveth families, 
dissipateth colleges 9 corporations 9 armies 9 overthroweth 
kingdoms 9 churches and whatsoever is now through the pro~ 
v-idence of God by authority and powers upheld'ol 
Claims of extreme personal freedom for whatever reason were not, 
therefore 9 to be tolerated 9 for they were destructive of order 
in the worldo Change was by no means excluded from Hooker's world 9 
but it was to be pursued with great cautiono 
In all this 9 what Hooker is seeking is a clearer identificatio: 
of what it is to be a member of the English Commonwealtho ·He 
argues that one of the first priorities of membership is the 
hierarchical order of nature and of the traditional order of 
English societyo This means 9 however 9 that Hooker is working 
within an area set by his own presuppositionso Consequently 9 
while he and his opponents share certain assumptions with~ 
out which neither would be Christian 9 yet he considers 
them to be mistaken in their reasoningo For if 
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the existence of a divine creator is believed and accepted 9 then 
certain things must necessarily follO"Yo God 9 for instance 9 is 
by definition a perfect rational Being - that is the meaning of 
the term Godo To deny any part of his perfectinn 9 goodness and 
rationality is to deny the reality and character of God 9 and~o 
convict his creation of irrationalityo ~ ~o do this is not 
merely irrational and absurd in itself 9 it is also socially 
and politically dangerouso 
It is alleged that 9 if one proceeds in the proper manner 
from true and correct premises 9 a fuller understanding of the 
place of reason and experience within the world will followo 
From this examination we can grasp 9 Hooker suggests 9 that the 
radical position is incorrect as to its premises and wrong in 
its conclusionso And so in the face of this intellectually 
mistaken and politically disastrous movement Hooker endeavours 
to establish the correct view ofthe nature of experience 9 and 
the character of reason 9 revelation and historical existenceo 
This is his point of departure in his attempt to establish the 
validity and true authority of the church in Englando And with 
s> 
Hooke~ the 'natural' idiom 9 in most cases 9 is a form of justi-
fication and,indeed 9 self-congrat~iono Nature merely affirms 
what he considers to be the trutho And the truth happens to 
be what nature affirms. For nature itself presents 'the very 
fo1mdation and root 9 the highest well-spring and fountain of 
good law' o 1 
(ii) 
Hooker seeks to oppose radical notions of random conscience 
and 'inspiration' by an appeal to nature and ordero He is most 
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concerned to maintain the efficacy of this idea of nature in 
the face of the radical notion of an absolute distinction 
between God and his 'natural' creationo It is necessary 9 he 
contends 9 to show how this natural mode of explaining and 
justifying political actions implies how values are determined 9 
information acquired and 'correct' decisions takeno This 
involved Hooker in elaborating the 'natural' conception of 
the universe 9 and of human experience 9 within his contexto 
Now 9 this might appear to be something of a philosophical answer 
to a philosophical question 9 but in Hooker's case it is not 9 
for he is quite ready with a formula to reveal at a glance 9 
so to speak 9 how man's 'super-natural' knowledge 9 attained 
by revelation 9 is related to man's natural knowledge 9 attained 
through sense and intellecto According to Hooker 9 there is 
no discrepancy at all between nature and revelationo The~are 
both a reflection of God's activityo It would 9 therefore 9 be 
irrational and unnatural to dispute the efficacy of any part 
of God's creationo 
It is true that the controversy 9 in which the Church of 
Ehgland was involved 9 concerned 9 from one point of view 9 only 
the ceremonies and the proper rules of ecclesiastical organizatimno 
But in spite of the opinion of some modern commentators1 9 it 
was not as simple as that; and Hooker obviously considered that 
to regard the conflict in this manner was too superficial by faro 
As we have seen 9 many did wish to 'purify' the divine service 
of elements which they thought to be 1 corrupt 1 o But involved 
in this was more than a desire to eradicate the practices of 
the present o The reforms required -by- the radicals were more 
See 9 for example 9 Go Ro Elton 9 England Under the Tudors 9 
London 9 1956 9 PPo 424=425o He cons . .:Cd-ers that 'there was 
precious little between the sides'o 
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than bound up with an affection for 'improvement'. For the 
claim that they had found or rediscovered the true \'lord was a 
necessity for those to whom this was the main hope of salvationo 
It was this understanding of the character of the Scriptures 
as the only refuge from the areaof 'natural necessity' that was 
challenged by'Hooker and considered to be entirely mistakeno 
The only possible way to make that clear and understandable~ 
and thereby to 'demonstrate' their irrationality and absurdity 
was to reconsider the first ptinciples of the correct understandin1 
of experience. 
Hooker~ having chosen~his approach gives a thorough. app-
raisal of it in the Preface. 
'Wherefore seeing that the laws and ordinances in particular 
whether such as you yourselves would have established 9 .when 
the mind doth sift and examine them, it must needs have 
often recourse to a number of doubts and questions about 
the nature~ kinds~ and qualities of laws in general; whereof 
unless it must be thoroughly informed 9 there will appear 
no certainty to stay our persuasion upon. I have for that 
course set down in the first place an introduction on both 
sides needful to be considered: declaring therein what Law 
is~ how different kinds of Law there are 9 and what force 
they are of according to each kind. 11 
Here we have at the very beginning of Hooker's work a short-
hand expression of a theory of natural teleology and a theory 
of natural kinds. According to tns theory 9 each individual 
species in endowed with an essence or a natureo This it has in 
common with certain other individuals by virtue of which they 
are classifiable as belonging to a particular genus 9 and so on 
up to the highest being of the classificatory hierarchy. This 
classificatory hierarchy of kinds is natural in the sense that 
the distinction between defining attributes and accidental traits 
is considered _to be real, and not a merely_ convE;mtionc:tl distincition 
lo Preface 9 vii 9 2. 
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It is~ indeed 9 a necessary principle that must be reproduced 
in discourse instead of being itself an historically justified 
intellectual or lfunguistic achievemento The 'natural' priority 
of the traits that constitute these 'essences' generates a 
basic vocabulary for identifying individual things; and the 
manner of distinguishing particulars within experience that is 
thus imposed is a necessary aspect of reality. To ignore. it 
(as the radicals did) would result not just in departures from 
a particular system of identifying reference but in a disturtion 
of the 'true' natures of the things classified. 
The doctrine of natural teleology can be described as a 
further stipulation attached to the theory of natural kinds. 
Thus 9 the 'natural' system of classification defines a 
function or an end :(expressed here as law) that is proper to 
the bearers of any given nature. Accordinglyp it will be 
impossible to identify a particular as having any specific 
nature without thereby subscribing to a number of propositions 
in regard to the distinctive good of that thing. And right 
conduct for rational beings consists in doing what realizes 
their distinctive 'telos 1 o A 'Philosophica~ system that 
would enable one to identify a person as a human being 9 while 
leaving open all questions as to what he ought properly to 
do 9 is thus in effect excluded (at least as far as the ab-
solute end is concerned)o The reason for this may be sought 
in Hooker's conviction that what is realp independent of all 
discourse 9 is a combination of actuality wllith a special poten-
tiality for realizing certain distinctive ends 9 and that this 
fact must be reflected -.rn. ·any -viabre and· rational scheme of-
classificationo 
Hooker 9 then 9 considers it to be an obvious principle 
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reality that all things which are in being 'have some operation 
not violent or causal 11 9 and indeed 1 do work after a sort ac-
cording to law 12 o And he proceeds to argue from this regularity 
of working 9which he assumes to exist in nature~that there must 
be some author of this ordered and regular universeo This author 
is 9 of course, God~who does nothing without cause or reason~ and 
who ordains things because of his goodness and virtueo 3 In 
other words 9 Hooker first presupposes that the world or nature 
itself has some underlying principles of order '"'hich become 
apparent when the light of reason is turned on themo From this 
premise it is concluded that this order must be a reflection of 
God's rationality and goodnesso And Hooker is certain that the 
goodness of the world~ which God has created 9 points to a quality 
in God's essenceo In a similar way 9 he argues that God 9 being 
the originator of the justice -to be found in the world 9 is jus-to 
It is 9 therefore 9 a central presupposition of Hooker's thought 9 
one which he considered his experience supported and which he 
thought philosophically 1 demonstrable 1 9 that there was no complete 
alienation between God and man, and that every man is capable 
of reasono And it is reason that exhibits to the human race 
The worlu 
the existence of Godo /5-=t would be 'irrational 1 if it did nota 
In such a fashion the a QQSteriori reason for believing in the 
existence of God are combined with ~r~ori deductions as to 
his attributeso 
lo !ccJ~_Polo 9 I 9 i 9 2o 
2 o E_c c_l_"-- _l:'o]- o 9 I 9 i 9 2 o 
3o 'The general end of God's external working is the exercise 
of his most glorious and most abundant vift1le o 1 , ,Ecg_lo Polo 9 
I 9 ii 9 4 o God 1 worketh all things '<•no- "'~''\" (3o ... )"'Jv To~ \9f.A~tt"·:ro ... ~~,..o~ , not only according to his own will 9 but 
mthe Counsel of his own w:rhll'~' Ecclo Polo 9 I 9 ii 9 5o 
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Already? even in regard to God's identity 9 Hooker has 
made a distinction that is to play an important part in the 
Ecclesiastical Polity 9 that between internal and externalo Of 
God's internal workings little or nothing is knowno 1 In his 
external workings 9 however, his attributes can be observed 
from the just regularity to be seen in natureo Not only is 
the existence of God so 'proved', his attributes 9 too 9 are 
revealed as part and parcel of the fact of his existenceo 2 
This entire argument depends for its cogency on the 'natural' 
view of reality and on the plausibility of the idea of the 
Great Chain of Beingo It is this idea alone which can giv~ 
a proper acc_ount of the rationality and goodness in the worldo 
What we have in the Ecclesiastic?l Polity is a conception 
of God as Reason 9 as opposed to the doctrinB that God is 
primarily Willo For Hoo~er 9 God's Will is always prompted 
by his Reason: and it is actually this reason which is the 
lex aeterna which Qod has set down 
2 o Aquinas 1 'proofs 1 of God 1 s existence are 9 of course? 
accepted in Hooker's brief summary of God and his 
attributeso It is 9 I think 9 pointless to go into 
these arguments since Hooker merely employs their 
conclusions without argument of his own 9 and since they 
have been examined by Ao Kenny in his ~P London 
l969o Kenny merely examines the argu~i~ little 
attention to contexto Yet 9 he admits in the collection 
of essays edited by him (Aquinas 9 London 1970) that 9 
although Aquinas was 'uncommonly' aware of the dif-
ference between philosophical and theological method-
ology9 he produced much of his best work in philo-
sophy in the course of investigating theological 
problemso I venture to suggest that much of the 
intelligibility of his so-called philosophical argu-
ments is dependent upon theological premiseso 
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for Himself to followo 1 This le~ aete~na is the plan of divine 
wisdom according to which everything is guided to its proper 
endo This law is the source of all other laws 9 that is 9 of 
the law of natural agents 9 of celestial law 9 of divine law and 
of human lawo In all of these the rational nature of God mani~ 
fests itselfo 
Knowledge about God (but not of God) 2 may come from an 
objective examination of reality and its defining characteristicso 
In fuis sense God is a 'natural' person9 and the study appropriate 
to his external workings is natural theology~ 
II ;if 
God is a 'natural' 
expression which had an identifiable meaningo It is not a proper 
nameo 'God' is what may be termed a titleo To affirm of some 
individual that he is God is to affirm that the individual 
occupies some special position in the universe. His attributes 9 
perfectly rational, perfectly good 9 omnipotent and omniscient 9 
are necessary truths in regard to this persona God himself 
cannot be lacking in any of the attributes that constitute his 
essence; for if he were, he would not be what he is, and this 
is to say that the law of contradiction would have been violatedo 
This is impossible even in the case of God 9 who must therefore 
act in a manner consistent with his own natureo Thus God is 
absolutely perfect, the most perfect Being 9 because all imper= 
fection implies the presence of unactualized potentialityo 
Since a substance in act is real to the extent that the essence 
of that substance has received existence, it follilows that no 
lo This does not mean that 'the freedom of the will of God is 
any whit abated, let or hindered by means of this; because 
the imposition of this law i-S his own_free and voluntary act 1 o 
Eccl_~=~:P_c:>l,o 9 I 9 ii 9 6 o 
2o For some discussion of the distinction here see Vo Preller 9 
Divine Science and the Science of God 9 Princeton 9 1967 9 c:hal)ter- one-:-====· ==~----
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'part' of God's essence is without existenceo God is pure act 9 
the subject of his knowledge is his ovm essence o 
God is by definition the only p~rfect Beingo The rest of 
the universe is imperfect in that is has not fulfilled its full 
potentialityo 1 All creatures represent an intermediate stage 
between absolute perfection and complete actualization at one 
extreme, and, at the other~ that lack of perfection which is 
purely unactualized potentialityo This picture of reality 
Hooker sums up thus: 
'God alone excepted~ who actually and everlastingly is 
whatso~ver he may be 9 and which cannot hereafter be that 
whicht1le is not; all other things besides are somewhat 
in possibility, which as yet they are not in acto And for 
this cause there is in all things an appetite or desire 9 
whereby they incline to something which they may be; and 
when they are it 9 they shall be perfecter than now they 
areo All which perfections are contained under the general 
name of Goodnesso And because there iB not in the world 
any thing whereby another may not some way be made the 
perfecter 9 therefore all things that are 9 are good 1 o2 
Since God is good 9 exj_stence bears a ~esemblance' or 'like-
ness' to Godo God's attributes are exemplary versions of the 
attrmbutes possessed by finite things o J.'.1en reach whatever 
natural understanding they have of God's attributes 9 by removing 
'imperfections' that attend these qualities when possessed by 
finite thingso Aquinas himself writes as follows: 
'Each being is called good because of the divine goodness 9 
the first exemplar principle as well as the efficient and 
telic cause of all goodnesso Yet it is nonetheless the 
case that each being is called good because of a li~eness 
of the divine goodness by which it is denominated 1 o 
2o Ecclo Polo 9 I 9 V 9 lo 
3o Sto Thomas Aquinas 9 SurnrraTh~eq~ogica, London, 1964 9 
Part 1 9 Qo 6 9 Ao 4o 
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Again in another work he remarks: 
'Every agent is found to produce effects which resemble 
ito Hence if the first goodness is the efficient cause 
of all things 9 it must imprint its likeness upon things 
which it produceso Thus each thing is called good because 
of an intrinsic goodness 9 impressed upon it 9 and yet is 
further denominated good because of the first goodness 
which is tre exemplar and efficient cause of all created 
goodness'o 
In short~ while the creation is potentially good 9 God is 
perfectly goodo He exemplifies the concept of goodnesso Thus 
to term God good is to name him as the goal ·of all rati~nal 
desireo The criteria of goodness is essentially teleological or 
Vnatural'o For the rational man 9 without revelation~ ostensibly 
may know what is good 9 and the point of any natural principle is 
to achieve the good 9 to achieve that which alone satisfies desireo 
God 9 then 9 is the creator of the universeo From Him 
nature has received existence and essenceo Existence is t~at 
in virtue of which a substance becomes real. Just as the dis-
tinction between existence and essence can be applied to all 
substances (except God) 9 so also can the distinction between 
act and potencyo Potency may be defined as a possibility that 
can be actualized. The actualization of a.potentiality or set 
of potentialities is a process of change, a movement which 9 
when completed~ results in the substance becoming real. A sub-
stance in act is real" This process or realization or actual-
ization is also a process of perfection a 'Degrees of perfection9' 
thenprefers to the degree to which potentialities are actualized. 
Substances are not only compounded of essence and existence, 
potency and act 9 they are also compounded of matter and formo And 
yet 9 ·the distinction between -matt·er and- f·ar.rn: i'B not· applicable to 
all 
St. Thomas Aquinas 9 ~uestiones Disputatae ~e 
Taurin.j. 9 1949 9 xxi 9 4. This passag_e and the 
are quoted inN. Pike 9 God a~d.Timelessness~ 
P o· 3-o - -- --- - __ _ ___ __ _ _ ___ _ 
Veritate, 2 vols. 
previous one 
London 9 19709 
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substanceso It is in fact applicable to corporeal substances 
onlyo Thus 9 when a human being is created 9 in the moment of 
conception 9 God creates a soul~ to inform the incipient body o 1 
Human beings are numerically distinct because they have distinct 
bodieso As matter individuates 9 so fue form is the principle 
of specification 9 that is 9 it determinates the species to which 
the individual thing is to belongo The form is that which is 
common to all individuals within a spcieso It makes them the 
kind of individuals they are 9 it gives them their defining charac-
teristics 9 and it outlines the ends which they cannot but pursue~ 
being the kind of indiviaduals they areo 2 At a'philosophical' 
level a substance is intelligible insofar as it is forma 
In sum 9 'nature' is the area of rationality and goodnesso 
And the connection between reality and truth is expressed by 
Aquinas in the sentence 'E~s et verum convertuntur 1 o3 Truth 
and being are correlated aspects of tbeworldo Truth. is per-
ceived by the understandingo Being is in the worldo An intellec-
tual judgement can be true or false but is always about that 
which is or is noto There is as much possibly knowable truth 
lo 'Form in other creatures is a thing proportionable unto the 
the soul in living creatureso Sensible it is not 9 nor 
otherwise discernable then only by effectso According to 
the diversity of inward forms 9 things of the world are dis~ 
tinguishedo 1 Ecc~o Polo 9 1 9 iii 9 4 9 no 3lo 
2,; Thus non-voluntary agents 'do so necessarily observe their 
qertain laws 9 that as long as they keep those forms which 
give them their being 9 they cannot possibly be apt or in-
clinable to do otherwise than they do; seeing the kinds of 
their oper-ations are both constantly and exactly framed 
according to the several ends for which they serve 9 they 
themselves in the meanv1hile 9 though doing that which is fi tp 
yet knowing neither what they do 9 nor why: it followeth that 
all which they do in this sort proceedeth originally from, 
some agent 9 as knoweth 9 appointeth 9 hoideth up 9 and even 
actually frometh the same 1 o Ecclo Polo 9 I 9 iii 9 4o 
3 o St o Thomas Aquinas 9 §:.d.mmc:tcc~TJl~~oJ_ogi_~~ 9 London 9 1964 9 ia 9 16 9 1 o 
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in the world as there is of actual being in it. A judgement is~ 
therefore~ true if there is something real which corresponds 
to the reality assumed in the judgement. Consequently 9 the 
natural principles of reality must be taken into account in any 
argument that is above the level of substantive lawo To ignore 
these principles is to be convicted necessarily of irrationalismo 
To consider something as natural is to recommend it as valuable 0 
In this way the doctrine of natural ends finds its way into 
practical argtunento By its very being it must? for the character 
of nature 9 insofar as it prescribes what to do 9 is practicalo 
(iii) 
God understands reality as the product of his Reason. But 
for man 
1 only thus much is discerned 9 that the natural generation 
and process of all things receiveth order of proceeding 
from the settled stability of divine understandingo This 
appointeth unto them their kinds of workingvol 
Ideas 9 however 9 may be derived by abstraction 9 and tfue intellect 
may proceed to certain acts of understanding. It will be able to 
discern that there are firm decrees of God as regards the conduct 
of l~o It will be able to understand that man himself is the 
creation of a God who speaks to him through law 9 and that this 
system of law is readily discernible. In short 9 mind is the 
passive receiver of God's precepts and principleso To use Orr's 
phrase 9 Hooker's rationalism is 'passive•o
2 
To be rational is to recognize the structure of reality as it 
It is the divine in man 9 recognizing God's divinity 9 reason in 
him 
Ro Ro Orr 9 Reason and A~thority: the Thought of William Chillingworth 9 Oxford 9 1967 9 Po 180o 
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recognizing rationalityo Since mind is the~assive receptacle of 
divine truth 9 Hooker has little to say on the actual operation 
in attaining to knowledge of the principles and their applicationo 
However, one basic distinction he does make follows from his 
previous distinction between matter and formo Matter itself gives 
rise to sensible knowledge which man shares with all natural 
agentso About sense recognition in general Hooker is vague 9 but 
it appears to be knowledge of 9 or acquaintance with 9 individual 
material objectso It is prior to the intellect and is the first 
experience of a mind which is 'at first as a book 9 wherein nothing 
is and yet all' things may be imprinted 1 o1 And the intellect it-
self is in some sense dependent on sensory experience 9 for 
'till we grow to some ripeness of years 9 the soul of man 
doth only store itself with conceits of things of itiferior 
and more open quality 9 which afterwards do serve as instru-
ments unto that \AJ"hich is greater; in the meantime above 
the reach of meaner creatures it ascendeth not'o2 
The use o~ the faculty of reason is the product of maturity 
for any judgement concerning sensory experiences and the objects 
of those experiences belongs to the intellect, not to the senseso 
For instance 9 differences of time 9 affirmations and negations 9 
and the law of contradiction, can only be recognized by natural 
reasono 3 So intellect 9 while not innate 9 cannot but appear in 
any normal being ~t some point 9 since the r~tional soul is the 
form of man's bodyo But this growth is, however 9 at the first 
merely potential, and it is only with the aid of education and 
of practice that one may come to maturity of judgemento 
lo 
2o 
3o 
4o 
'Education and instruction are the means 9 the one by use 9 
the other by precept 9 to make our natural faculty of 
reason both the better and sooner able to judge rightly 
between truth and error 9 good and evilo '4 
Ecclo Polo 9 I9 Vi 9 lo 
Ecclo Polo p I9 Vip 3o 
Ecclo Polop Ip Vi 9 5o 
------ ~----- 5: - -- -kQ)_Jl Polo 9 Ip vi 9 
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Conse~uently every adult may (with the exception of those who 
are innocent or insane1) grasp certain truths. And with respect 
to these truths 9 Hooker sometimes speaks of axioms in the meaning 
of necessarily true propositions 9 the contrary of which are 
. . bl 2 ~nconce~va eo They function as necessary points of departure 
for further argument. 
Now it is a characteristic of the tradition of thought 
within which Hooker worked 9 to refer to pagan authors to sub-
stantiate their claim that man 9 by use of his natural reason 
may attain to an understanding of some structural principles of 
reality. Hooker quotes 9 for example 9 a phrase from Plato's 
Theaetetus 9 and he refers 1 to that known relation which God 
hath unto us His children 1 o Aristotle 1 s judgement about a first 
cause is drawn into the argument also 9 and he utilizes Sophoclesg 
'the law of reason is no child of today•s or yesterday's birth 9 
both hath been no man knoweth how long sithence' o From this 
sprint through classical literature Hooker himself concludes 9 
1 the axioms are in such sort investigable that the knowledge 
of them is general' .3 He finally turns to the authority of Sto 
Augustine to support this conclusiong 
'This was (it seemeth) Saint Augustine's judgement~ namely 
that there are in it-. the law of reason - some things 
which stand as principles universally agreed upon; and 
that out of these principles, which are in themselves 
evident 9 the greatest moral duties we owe 4 towards God or man without any difficulty be concluded'. 
2. 'The main principles of Reason are in themselves apparento. 
For to make nothing evident of itself unto man's under-
standing were to take away all possibility of knowing any-
thing.' §colo Pol. 9 I, viii 9 5. 
4. Eccl. Pol. 9 I, viii 9 IOo 
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It was in such an eclectic fashion that the world was 
made one. Natural laws are timelessly true ancl the fact that 
they have been recognized by pagan intellectuals confirms thiso 
The natural view of reality was thus supported and subscribed 
to by the most intelligent men that have had occasion to con-
sider the character and order of experience. It was only those 
who were directly opposed to the general conclusions of this 
manner of thought that could not find their way into this traditioJ 
Quotations from,and references to,their work were specifically 
selected to verify or confirm what was already knovm to be true. 
Works that were not readily fitted into this framework were 
not deliberately destroyed; they were merely forgotten and their 
tradition allowed to decay. 
There was 9 however 9 one event which the pagan authors 
could not confirm~and that was the Revelation of God in his 
Son Jesus Christ. Depsite all that can be stated about reason 
and the principles it is apparently able to recognize~ reason 
and rational examination cannot unaided dis-g-over vrhat they 
appear to promise. For man's natural inclination to the good 
and the rational cannot be satisfied without supernatural giftso 
'Nature is no sufficient teacher of what we should do that we 
may attain unto life everlasting.' 1 And this idea must affect 
any '~hilosophy' adopted by the Christian who considers that 
rational examination may reveal something of God's existence 
and attr:Lbuteso 
Revelation gives rise to faith. Religious faith is in no 
way a special kind of knowledge 9 that is the work offa special 
mental faculty. The difference between fed. th and reason is 
= 82 -
that faith gives assent to something not because sufficiently 
moved to do so by the object itself (as it does with reason) 9 
but 9 be.cause moved by some act of will which inclines the in~ 
tellect more in one direction than in anothero The soul thus 
assents to propositions about an object of faith not because 
sufficiently determined to do so by the object itself 9 but because 
it also inclines to give its assent when told by the Will to do so, 
The will 9 in its turn 9 can then be subject 9 for example 9 to the 
will of God o For natural knowledge 9 h ov.ever 9 no such additional 
condition is requiredo It is the known object which alone suf-
fices to determine the intellectual assent to a given proposition 0 
Yet faith does presuppose natural cognitiono An unprepared 
intellect cannot even pegin to understand the Word of God (for 
this Word is essentially an intelligible Word) and~ consequently 9 
it has :ho grounds for accepting or rejecting the message con-
veyed in revelationo Thus 'all kinds of knowledge have their 
certain bounds and limits'ol Not even the knowledge provided 
by direct revelation suffices for all the needs of mano To be 
sure 9 there is 'in Scripture no defect' (whatever 'defect' might 
mean in these circumstances2 )o From one point of view it is· 
certainly quite correct to make the statement that Scripture 
possesses sufficiency 9 as it was later claimed by orthodox 
theologianso 3 However 9 the sufficiency of Scripture has its 
proper limitso It is necessary to remember that it is sufficient 
merely 'unto the end for which it was instituted'o And there 
can be no doubt concerning that purpose at leasto 'The principle 
intent of Scripture is to deliver the laws of duties supernaturaloa 
lo Ecclo Polo 9 Ip xiv 9 lo 
2o Ecclo Polo 9 Ip xiv 9 5o 
3o Eccl.o Polo 9 Ip xiii 9 3o 
---Eill::L 
-poJ: ~-9-r;- xiii 9 Yo. -· ------- -· ---------- . -4. 
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Despite the fact 9 as Norman Malcolm has it 9 'Nothing is 
put forward in the Old or New Testament as evidence for the 
existence of God' 1 9 on Hooker's terms,the Scriptures presuppose 
that one takesc.:certain things for granted. He considered that 
they presuppose that the universe is orderedpand that man is 
tiw:c ~1e 
entrusted with the natural light of reason andlattempts to 
utilize his potentialitieso They presuppose that men actually 
possess other kinds of knowledge 9 of the truth of which he is 
already convinced. If it is realized that this is the case 9 
if the presuppositions of Hooker's thought are accepted 9 then 
it must necessarily be understood that Revelation in the main 
adds new knowledge (not necessarily a new kllind of knowledge) 
to that which is already knowno Revelation 9 in short 9 presupposes 
the faculty of reason and its achievement 9 and one of its achieve-
ments is 'proofs' of God's existence. 
What we have here 9 then, is a work of natural theology as 
opposed to 'non-natural theology 1 • 2 Not only does natural theology 
discuss the concept of God and his attributes 9 but the arguments 
propounded prove his existence~ The God of natural theology and 
Revelation are thus considered in some way to be identical. 
Knowledge §:!?out God is a presupposition of knovTledge of God. Thus 
statements made about God are nmt merely theological 9 they are 
natural in that God-statements may be verified by an appeal to 
nature. And it is 'nature'which gives reality to philosophical 
arguments. Philosophical arguments are not merely self-supporting 
(i.e. coherent) they correspond to reality. God's existence is 
1. N. JV1alcolm 9 'Is it a Religious Belief ~tha-t~ God Exists?' in 
John Hick Fatth_~P1-.t~~~Philosophers 9 London 9 1966. 
2o A term appropriated from Gareth B. Mathews 9 'Theology and 
Natural Theology' 9 Jourilal _ _E_f PhJ-l2J?S!J2h_;z 9 vol. LXI 9 1964. 
a 'hard' fact of experienceo 1 Such a mode of argumentation is 
opposed by non-natural theologyo This style of thought has 
no use at all for 'natural' argument to justify religious ex-
perienceo To employ an example quoted by Matthews 9 Luther in 
his Small Catechism writes: 'I believe that by my own reason 
or strength I cannot believe in Jesus Christ~ my Lord 9 or come 
to him 1 o This is similar to the position of Calvino Or at least 9 
such a presupposition constitutes the beginning of Calvin's thin~ 
0 
Theological statements are legitimate statements which may be 
justified by the appropriate criteriao And these are not 'natural~ 
Hooker's quarrel with the Calvinist/Presbyterian position stems 
from a difference of opinion as to the proper justification for 
theological statements in general 9 and what appropriate criteria 
are in regard to the present dispute in particularo 
While reality 9 for Hooker 9 is one 9 because of God's ±attanality 
and goodness 9 distinctions of kind may be 'discerned' in ito And 
for his argument these distinctions are importanto His op-
ponents' chief failure 9 from his point o£ view 9 was that they did 
not achieve a distinction between 9 nor state the complementary 
relationship of 9 nature and supernature 9 reason and faitho The 
exclusive appeal of the Presbyterians was a negation of reason 
and natural law (and therefore of God's rationality and goodness) 
as was not permitted according to Hooker's picture of the order of 
creationo According to him 9 the Presbyterians' confusion of the 
orders of nature and supernature had no basis in realityo Calvinism 
was based upon a great error of judgemento Nothing in experience 
corresponded to its beliefso This was the root mistake from 
whi-ch all manner of dangerous occurrences have- ensued- in the 
past and might do so in the futureo 
lo A term employed by Marilyn McCord Adams 9 'Is the Existence of 
God a "Ha:rd" FaQt1' 9_ fhiloso;QQ_~~<iJ.-. ~Rg~_iew 9 yo1.o Ii.XJC_YI? 1967 a 
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REASON AND COi,TDTJCrr 
rrhc idiom of thoEght norm8J_ly cm:[)loyed b::,r HoolzeJ:> nay be 
characterized as a system of description. Dithin this system 
mor~l judgements appear as a sub-class of statements of facta 
Such an ascription of certainty to moral judgements follows 
from the fact that Hooker relates man 1 s action to a. revealed 
objective which overrj_des the 1mcertainties of his h:i.r~torica.l 
ex5_stence o The absolute prjnciples of nature give dire~tion 
to human judgement where other'r!ise there 1·rould be un.mi tic;2,ted 
doubt o In short 9 vrhat ,_,e have in Hooker 1 s vrork is a body of 
prescriptions posinf as a system of description. 
It would be out of place in this thesis to enter into 
the incoherence of the attempt to derive moral princi~les 
from so-called natural facts o 1:Jha t j_s to be ests;bJj_ohed 
is the j_mportant position that this idiom of thought a.ttains 
in Hooker's ar:'?:ume;-•to For 9 if one accepts the.t there Hre 
moral principles governing conduct 9 uhj_ch ha.ve a 1r.e.tural' 
force 9 it fol:ows that in u dispute of the character of that 
in 'Hhicb. Hooker and the Presbyterians 1_,_rere involved, only one 9 
or none 9 of the participants could be correct ir1 his judc;e-
mento For Hooker, genuine moral disagreement between honeAt 
and intelligent people, in vrhich there is no certain point 
of reference which may finally settle the dispute 9 appears 
an impossi bili.tyo I'1oraili cUsagreement is s. consoouence of 
miscalculB.tion and ignorance on one or both sides, and ig-
nor.ance o.f the proper JlJ:'j_:ncj_:!'les govel'.:'n5.:nc: cond11ct j_,g 
precisely v-.rhat Booh:er accused t'IJ.e :r?resbyterj_ans of being 
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guilty Ofo 
In the first part of the present c~~,ter the governin~ 
chare.cteri-stj_c of Hoo 1.re:;_~' s ar,zn:r:P..ent 1·:ill gvj_de 011.r irr-.::e:Jti,o~e.tio:i1 
of his idea of IPan' s essence a In the latter }lp.lf of tJ..,c c:1£1.nter 
we proco:sd to c=m exa.mination of the relationsn.ip of Pl.an.'s 
supreme end to his relationships ~ith his fellow creatures, 
and consider to '"-rhat extent Hooker believed man may attain 
unto his 'tr.ct·e 1 nature in his impe:t:>fect state o 
According to Hooker, man's teleological end drj.ves or 
p11.lls him into actiono MaE's Tw.tural desires leacl. hi:rn. to 
I. 
ful:filme:t:'Jt" Al thm1g}J. man. ·has been corrur)t ed b'~,. tho Fall~ his 
capacity to recognize that such fulfi~ment may be attained 
has been diminished bnt slightlyo For despite his remarks 
on the catastl(')_phic effects of the Fall (on 1,~.rhich he j_s 9 of 
course 9 necessarily vaGue) t~e im~ression is conveyed by 
Hooker that man, by uoe of h.is reason, mo.y achieve a rne.':l.surc 
of ha~piness and fulfilmento Those very principles ordained 
by God 9 that illuminate the universe in its regl;;_le.r rnot i_ cn 9 
have not at all been ov2rthrovm by SFC11 8, loc!'!.l event 8.S the 
Fall of iVIan o 2 
1 that Fherein the hic;hest degree of our ~oerfectio:r.. corwis::b 9 
that which being once attained unto t~•ere can rest nothing 
lo 1 Ji;verytbing nat1J-rally nece.ssarn_y t1.oth defdre the utmost 
good and greatesf J:Jerfection 1;'!hereof Natur8 118.th made it 
capable, even so mana Our felicity therefore being the 
object and accOTnplishment of our desire 9 v.re cc:mnot ·choose 
hu_t ,_,Jj_sh EJ .. :ncl covet ito 1 ~c.:.cl.o_ )?_oJ-.o. 9 I, viii, lo 
2a Ao Hooker complained to his opponents in a note on 'A 
Christian Letter': 'You have h~ard that mEn's nature 
j_ s e orrnpt 9 ·his reason 0l::Lnd 9 his ,_,_rill 1)C~'.':'i.r-eroo" I:Jh ere~, 
upon under colour of con.:: em:ninc; oorrl1.pt -,,Tature 9 ~rou 
co:':lder'l_n ]\Te>tnre, anc'. so the rest'" ,:r;;8c.J-.,, y_o]=., ~ App. I. 
~ P7 
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further to be desi~ed; 8~~ therefo~e with it o~r 
sovls 8.:re fully content and sc>.tisfied~ j_:n t 1:o8t t:h.e~r 
flcl.VB the~;- rejoice ::=md t}~i:::'Ct for ~'J.O I:'.OJ:'O 1 ol 
All other ends are derived from this one en~, ~,j~~ j_~ t~c 
fino.J_ cr-:mse of 2.ll_ activity e.nc1 l;c:i_i'l(So 13oth effj_cient <:no. 
final causes Rre, howeve~, necessary links in tbn ch8tn of 
experience. Vithout efficient causes man would not e~~st 
in a world of ~ossibilit±es. ~ithout a final en~ t~ere 
l "' d' t' . t' •t .2 ''!OU __ o_ oe no _J_rec J_on :tn ac J.V:J. y. Hooker concludes, 
fi:t_'stly, thgt j_f the::t:>c ue::'e no final cause 9 Sl~Ch a lo n~r 
vain gesture.3 SoconcJly 9 rnan I fJ defiirc for his cood j_:<1 
an(l for j_-:~f3elf is infJni te. Nm-r, siFce God is tbe OXJ.ly in·~ 
finite c;ood to ''.'hich man c;:u)_ snbscribe, e.nd since 1 c'ler,ire 
tendeth unto lmion vii th the.t vvldch it desLceth 1 4, m1ion 
ui th G-od is man 1 s final e11..d 9 even thou.::;h he cannot e.ttain 
to :i. t 011 earth" 
1H8.p::J:i.DC8S o o. o is t!lo.t 08_t::-.te vrho:r:eby 1_-r,::; 2.ttain 9 
so far as possibly may be attained, the full 
poAsession of that vfuich simply for itself is to 
be desired, and. containeth in it after e.n emine:r1t 
sort the contention of our desires, tho hi~hest 
degree of eJ.J_ our perfection o 1 5 
2. 'If everything ~ere to be desired for some other 
without any stint, there could be no certain end 
propos eel unto our actj_ons? vre should p;o ;_:.re know 
not •;rhi ther. 1 ;B,~,c_lo. :n.9},. 9 I, x:i., 1. 
3 0 Bccl 0 Pol 0 , I 9 JCi 9 1 0 ··~----:=~--= -=-=-=--~............., 
4 0 Bcccl 0 ::)ol 0 9 J 9 xi 9 1 0 ~-~= _;_ - "- ~ 
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~he desire for God 9 Honker assures hiR ~ea~ers~ is 
:perf8ct~ly natural o It is part of man 1 s eYJd, e1.ren j_n the 
condition of impe~d'ection 9 to seek to retl).r!l to G-oo.o ' 1\.:n.r. 
is :i_ t probab:!.e 1 9 Hooker e.sks 9 1 that God sl.1o11ld :i-'Y"8.Il'_e tl1.e 
he::.rts of CJ.:lJ. rnc::m so desirous of th21.t tihich DO mp"!J. r.,8Y o1:l~ 
tain?' 'rhe Cll~cstion is merely rheto:cicRl 9 for it 5.s an 8:-:dom 
l 
of JI1P.tnre that n.Gtural des:i.re cannot utterl3r be fn,Rtr;-l.tt>d.o --
That nature C8D. be frustrated is c:m e1.rent the.t co,,1d not 
least, ce.nnot be entertF.Lined for long 9 if th.c presul)J)Osi tions 
of Hool<:er 1 s ar{-:l:llm.ent are acce:ptNL Indeed~ the whole point 
of enclosjng one's presuppositions in a circular ar~1mont 
is loat 9 if th~ other positions Rre considered at their face 
valu.eo 
In general, then, f118J:l see1.cs e. trj.ple perfection., 2 
Three e~ds compose 1 • l'llS he>.rF\Or:ti Ol''.S t:o::ic.".d o It is true that 
~Rtural path to sal~ationo Man 9 thereforeD has had reveal.ed 
to him a SU}le:rn8 tura1 way to salvation o ~~hj_s plnces on mem 
the superne.tural du:bics of fed th 9 hope and chari t~r o 3 But 
Jr:i 9 4 0 
3o 'Lmvs therefor concerning these thin~s are ::.mpernc<.tural 
both in respect of the manner of delivcrinc the~ '~ich 
is divine 9 8.ncl a.Jso in regard of the thinc;s Cl.elivcrecl 9 
wl1icb_ ;l.re such as have not i11 n2.ture any cal-'-Ge from 
which they flow~ but were by voluntary a~o;ooint:nJGnt of G-od 
orda:i_ned besiCl.es the course of nHt'l'-re 9 to rectify n?tl1J~e 1 s 
obliql]j_ty vr1tha.1. 1 }~_clo. ~21· 9 I 9 xi 9 6, 
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duties gre not rejected as mco.n5_nr:locJS 1 o 1 
is directly contrary to the Calvinist position ~~ich 9 in 
Hooker's view, tended to ne~lect the ~oral aBpects of 
natural activity. In his mind, however, nature ~2.s not 
corrupt in its entirety. It still retaino~ its ahilitv to 
._, 
convey truth. 
Hoo}:e:r smnmarizes his ·mrm argument fo:L the t"h.:ree:CoJ..(I_ 
cUvis:i.on o:f r1an in th~ follovring :marmer: 
'~Ie see~ therefore~ thP~t our sovereign gooc'l_ is der:i_ved 
naturally; that G-od tho. cm.thor of that natural desire 
h8.d a:sr:Jointed :nai;-ural 1n.eans •,·,rhwt·eby to f1.1.lfil it~ -~h8.t 
m.Em havh1.e; utterl;;r Cl.isabled his nature un.to tl"JOse 
means hath others revealed from God~ 2J'1.d hRth recebred 
from He:=1ven 2. le:vr to teach him hov1 that 1:!~1ich j_s 2 desired :n.o.turally rn.ust now supernaturally 11e attc,ined o ' 
'rhe.t there is no rie;id division betv.reen rPv8lati.on and nature 
is sup~orted by Scripture itself 9 for many natural princi.nles 
are there included v~jch 'teacheth such n2tural Guties 
could not by lieht of nature easily hP~.ve been knovm. 13 
Ul timetel;r 9 to go to tl...,c Scrj_,Jtures to clarify C'J!'tain n::o.t1,:re.l 
principles is an indication of how Christians determine t~c 
stetus of even the most general p!'inciples of ex~erience. Sue~ 
principles may~ indeed 9 be subs~ri.bed to by upholders of 
different creeds, by men of faith and by men of no faith at 
ciples are acce:ntable only j_f they do ncnt conflict v.Jith the 
central tenets of Ohr:i_stian:i_ty (snch as Hooker :rc:;ga:ccl.eC!. theiD.) o 
The world, consequently, may be viewed as a reflection of 
lo F.ccl 0 }?glo 9 I 9 xi]_ 9 lo 
2 0 P,ccl 0 ~l?ol o 9 I 9 ;~iii 9 3 0 . -· 
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natural 9 necessary and realo To ignore them is to declare o~c-
self ~gainst the sacrnd and rational identity of cx~crianceo By 
such an action a breach between man's understandin~ of the world 
and the 'true' rrincip1es of rea1i ty 1·rou1o. be openec1 9 BJ1d thronr;h 
it the worM.would inevitably sink into uncertainty. 
The not:i on thf1.t man 1 s true end is to be with G:-od j_.s an axiom 
good for e. r;roup or comm.unity. 'Jlhere :i_fl, ho1.·r8ver, no absolute 
distinction beti·Jecn man 1 s fi:nf1J_ e1!d and h:i.s cond1.1 C-;~ 8.--·•.on~ his 
felJm·rs o 1!Jhat is morally desirable may be 1 dech1.ced 1 from PJan 1 s 
for relationships between men. Men know, therefore, that they 
mu.st love others as the3r thei'Jsr::1 ves. In nc.tnre 9 that is before 
Go~, they are ~11 equalo This desire tn be esteemed and loved by 
his e~uals imposes upon man 'a natural duty of bearing to them-
\vard fully the like affection o ,l 'J!he pri:o.ciples p,overnin::; this 
Hoo1<:er does :not describe that '.'rh ich is in 8. naturB.l con-
di tion as beinp.; in. a st2.te of nature 9 hut he mi;~ht '.·rell ht-:t.,re done 
so o His aim was to fj_nc1 a criterion outs:i_o e chang:i_nn.: hi staTical 
circu;;1stances ~ against which to judge t11e 1 nr\turo.1 1 st8.t1.1.s of 
polit:i.cal orders and moral relationships. 'Jlhis atemporal con-
dition he ta~(es RJ'i co-existent '.vi th man in hislblbry so tbat there 
2 o Among others ( vrhich Hooker does •1 ot R;o on to nr,rr,e 9 are 
these: 1 T:h:-:~.t because Hr:; ~!.TOP let t<.l.~::e :no hC1.rm 9 •·.rc JD.lJ.Rt there-
fore do non.e·1:; rt:re.i~ FJ:i.th •.·.re uo,·ld not be in en:rtlJi:r.p, e}::-
trernely cleG.lt i·.r:i.th, •.·.re rouot Ol.:'_rcelveFJ avoid 2.11 extremity in 
our clealiJV:;s 1 ; 1 tb;:::l.i~ f-rom all violence Hnc1 i.·rroiJ.g VJfJ are 
t ·t - 1 - t · b t · ' 1·' l r l I · -l • 8 r·lh e" e 11 ,er. y ,o 2. s aln o . .C/:!_.-n_ = o'l.;,.:.o 9 9 Vl_J_ 9 ) o J ____ ·•: . 
- 1 7)-Fi:n_c-i ·Dle s ,- i\re ·ta~ce::: fl :i.Te-c t'l._ · f·r:-om -t;J;,::; --r;·oo e Jl.xst.\_!lJJ=•no 
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io a 8t:rncttn'e of 'facts 1 -~h:<.t co1:1ld be :t:'efer!:'eo. to in. 0J1~r dis·-
pute t~Bt involved first ~rinciplesa Yet the wo!:'~l princ~~l~s 
often enunciated (such as those mentioned in footnote 2 on the 
prev:touFl :?e.ge) :tmpose themselves 9 if' at all 9 only hecal)J::le t,1ey 
are 9 either now or at the time of Hooker's writing, very con-
troversialo Only at an elementary level can moral (lj_s::.c;:reemcmt 
be expl;:dnecl. 1l3r say:i.ng that one person 8.-tlp:!'ehends the ~o oo. ano_ 
its concomitant truths 9 and another does nato J)espite the 
formal character of his argurnoJ-Jt, hovrever, HooJce~c is tl.ot con-
cerned to explaj_n mo:ral and polj_tical cUsagreenen_t but to settle 
it s,s best he knm·!s how. Such a task, ·i_·,, hio rn.i.nd, involved 
h:i_s point:i T!.[': to mo:ral f8.cts ev:i Cl ent in nature 0 T':tese facts must 
be apprehended by reason and vrhat reason apprehends are indeed 
these va:ry factso Reason is? in ef?ect, a beam that ap~ears to 
1 illumine:(;~; 1 the moral facts, bvt does not explain them ex~ept in 
the simplest terms. It is, in this sense, dumb, but not blind. 
So 1 .a:ooc3.ness is seen 1:ri th t:h.e eye <Df the un6.ersta:t1ding o And the 
lj,C;ht of that eye is reason'. 1 It is this metaphor of sieht th8,t 
appearo to ha.ve the great capacity to 81!gf;e.st the ostcnsi_ble 
objectivity of what is lmo•~mo 2 
Hooker, therefore, working in the tradition he does~ finds it 
no difficult matter to speak of 'discovering goodness' and of 'the 
natural way to goodneRs 1 o Such remarks as these indicate that 
Hooker considered that his investigation ha~ @ome 'philosophical' 
force o Since e~~perience is guj_ded by reason, this mn:::t necessariJy 
be of great im]lortance to religious, moral and poJ.j_ tical belief o It 
is easy to see the ap:oarent polemica.l force of ih:i..s e.:r:gument vis-a~vj_s 
2 o r:r.rb.e metap:hor ','!oulCI seen to c;o bP,C 1<: at lenst ::\;3 f.::tr 8.8 })Jato. 
See 1.rTo H. 1.'!8,lsh, T'e:c_c,·,}1'l_~rnic.,:s, 9 I,ondon_ 1966, P!l• 27-33o 
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.the OB.lvinist/Presbyterian posi tiono He::u=wn, beca.Fse it is the 
imprint of the rlrivine on men, can flncl ou~ht to be consulted 
bot;, in theory and in practice during man's historical existence. 
It is the proper e;uide to the cUscovery of that lmv according 
to which man must regulate the conduct of his natural life if 
he wishes to avoid sin. Thus the necessary presuppositions of 
Hooker's notion of moral conduct compriae those duties encom-
passed in the prescriptions of the 1 law of reason 1 • 1 
The principles governing conduct, or 'the laws of uell-
doing' are the 'dictates of rie;ht reason 1 a 2 These principles 
of moral conduct are, according to Hooker 9 either knovm., or 
found out 9 because they refer to different ~odes of approaching 
the laws of reason. It is in history that man cornes to know 
these lavrs 9 although in fact he cannot fail to reach a minimum 
knowledge of them. If this were not so, the teleoloEical ex-
planation of man's conduct that Hooker gives would be entirely 
irrelevant and completely nonsensj_cal. r-1oreover, because moral 
principles are that '-'Thich reason discloses 9 they are not only 
tational but also capable of attainmento For the will does not 
seek merely that which is good but a,lso that vrhich is possible. 3 
Reason, then, apprehends, both the good and the poooible. 
The will itself 'inclines' (to use Hooker's term) to these things. 
Just as the will does not seek that '·'rhich is unattainable 9 so 
reason 'dictates' that which may be desired. For'evil as evil 
lo Hooker's definition of this moral law is succinct and 
circular. 'The nature of Goodness o. o being ample 9 a lav-r 
is properly that which Reason in such sort defineth to be 
good that it must be done.' ;1f!_<;~c)-_._yo..:l•P I, vij_, 8. 
'Let Reason teacheth impossibility in any thing, and the 
Fill of Man doth let it go; c:t tldng imposs~.ble it doth not 
affect, the impossibility thereof boin~ msnifest. 1 
H'] TilT- .. ~-~_:_9C_;,o~J~oz-~I. ____ 9 Vll 9 :J o 
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cannot be desired'. If it should hap~an or become apparent 
that that ·vrhich once was souebt was real+y evi.l, the cBuse 
could have been nothing but 'the goodness which is ox- seemeth 
to be joined with it'. 1 In conditions of imperfection and 
in.determinacy this is a :f:requent occux-rence 9 .fox- 1hir;her x-ea.sm,_ 1 
does not (indeed need not) always enter into the nuances of 
moral conduct. Hence it may occux- that 
'custom inurine; the· mind by lonr: pra.ctiCA 9 and so leavine; 
there a sensible impression 9 prevaileth more than reason-
able pArsuaslon wha.t may so evex-o Reason therefore may 
rightly discern the thing which io good 9 a::1d yet the vrill 
of man not incline itself there11_nto, as oft as the 
prejudice of sensible experience doth oversway 1 o2 
This, however 9 is not a matter for excuse" It is mex-e laziness 
that we may prefer e. less e;ood to a e;reatero 3 It is true, 
Hooker affirms 9 that the path to truth is full of pitfallso 
Yet despite the corruption inherent in man's nature the diligent 
seax-ch for the good must continueo It has always been a fact, as 
Hooker's frequent citations from pagan philosophers attempt to 
prove 9 that man's felicity 'being the object and accomplishment 
of Liii~7 desire 9 {fi~7 cannot choose but vrish e.nd covet it 1 " 4 
Apart from revolation 9 the t"~:ro ways of attaining to knm:!= · 
ledge of the dictates governing conduct are by use of higher 
reason and by engaging in ox-dinary moral conduct itself. The 
first is the less .f~llible; indee~ it may be considered to 
be 'infallible' in. its own sphere since it may penetrate to 
knowledge of the 'causes' of the goodness" To penetrate to 
'causes' is to disclose how determinate reality iso The 
character of reality is best described by the natural idiom of 
l. AQSJ_. ])oJ..o Is v.:i ip ,.. 9 Do 
2 0 E~c}~J2};• 9 I 9 vLi 9 6. 
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thought a The la.tter is uniq_nely appropriate to the ne.ture of 
ex:pe;:-ie:n.ceo The second~ which proceeds by obnervation of 
1 signs 1 or 'tokens 1 of goodness~ is by fa.r the most common 
form of knowledgeo Here the most certain sign of evident 
goodness is 'if the general persuasion of all ~fuo so acnount 
. t' l l 0 But tra.r'litions of conduct in a 1n8.tural 1 vJorld are not 
self justifying 9 and in these conditions 
'a common received error is never utterly overthrovm 9 till 
such time as we go from signs to causes 9 and shew sorre 
mR.nifest root or fountain t1Jereof common u .. n..to all, vrhereby 
it may clearly appear how it hath come to pass that so 
many have been overseen o In which case surmiF>es a-'10. slight 
probabilities 1.'rill not serve 9 because t11 e u_ni verflal consent 
of men j_s the perfectest and strongest in this kind, which 
comprehended only the signs and tokens of goodness 1 o2 
This must be the case for, while all men do not actually attain 
to clear knowledge of the causes of goodness 9 they are commonly 
capable of an a.clequate understanding of moral conduct o Th8y are 
capable of judgin.g what to do and of giving reasons for their 
actionsa In Hooker's jud&em.ent, indeed 9 1vJhensoever the judge-
ments of all men generally or for the most part run one and the 
same '1.\ray' 9 there must be an underlying reason for this te:ndencyo 3 
The justification for this tendency is provided by 'nature', by 
the principleF> inhe~ent in a rationally ordered universeo 
Since he had earlier characterized his aee as 'full of 
tongue and vreak of brain 1 , Hooker is under so!lle compu...n.ct:i.on to 
investigate the actlvity of the higher understanding in ord~r 
to counteract the drift of his previous remarks, the emph0sis 
of which was on the reasonableness of ordinary moral conducto 
l. Ecclo ~~~C? .. l 0 p I, viii 9 3o 
.. 
Ecc}o!C, ... "'H"ol o 9 Ip viii, 3o 
3o Indeed, 'the general and perpetual voice of roan is as the 
sentence of God him.selfo Ji'or that which eJ.l men have at all 
times lea.rnecl 9 }\Tature hc:r8t:>lf must needs hrwe tm:t..Ght' o 
~~.9)-~~~:!?.c~):.o 9 J, viii~ 3 o 
Hooker by trlis ID.anoettvre attempts to show tbat 'philosophy' is 
a viable acti v:i_ ty and ma.y have fTu i tful conclusions o Such a 
move he must make, for, on his m·m terms, Book One of. the 
Jilc};:_lflE?Ic<?-~f?!;Jcal Polity: may be considered to be a 'ph:i.losophical' 
Norko This investigeJtion is impelled by his paTt5 r::ul2.J:' inte:nt:i.on. 
and the conclusion he hopes to draw is that ce:rta.tn tJ:'adi t:i.ons 
of activity are not contrary to, and indeed epitomize, natural 
conduct a 
Knovrledgo of cat~ses, then, io certain c:md infalJ.:i.bleo Th...i.s 
knmqledge is attained by the 'understanding' whose manner and 
method Hooker is investigatingo The understanding may be taken 
to mean that ;t}a:t't of man that is capable of discovering as faT 
as it may in man's fallen state the truths of natEreo 1 Amidst 
the diversity of the vrorld the unde:t:>standing me.y attatn to a 
knowledge of the natural moral condition of man in the setting of 
his divine purposeo In consequence of observations that the best 
things, unhinde:t'ed, p:t'oduce t~best operations 9 reason recognizes 
itself as the best part of mano From this discovery various 
2 
axioms, as Hooker frequently affirms, may he deducedo 
There is, then, a sense in which highe:t' reason may verify 
the precepts of common moralities for traditions of conduct a.re 
Hooker, to my mind, is not at all consistent in the use of 
the term 'the understanding'o At some points he equates it 
(as noted) with higher reasono At other times he employs it 
generally to cover the whole of man's rational faculties that 
is, including moral conducto 'Jlhis confu .. sion, however, has a 
context, for it will be recalled that man seekA a triple per-
fection, spiritual, senstw.l and intellectual o 'Philosophy' 
and moral conduct are in fact a subdivision of the intellec-
tual area. of man's natureo And since 1 higher':t:>eason' merely 
recognizes the true ends of man, it i8 hardly to be expected 
that Hooker can mEJintain eJJ.fl. subB.cx:i.bP. to a rie;id divi~ion 
between the different aspects of the understandingo 
fi:Ji thin the compass of v1hich lavJS (of Reason) HEJ do not only 
comprehend whatsoever may be easily knovm to belong to the 
d1.1.ty of all men, but even vfhatsoever Tnay possibly be kno·wn to 
be of tb.at ~uali ty, so that thG same be by necessa;:>y con= 
se.guence cle.CfrLc_eit ont_Qf_c.lear_and_TDEJlifest :orinci:9.l.fl_Sp 1 
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not entirely self-justifyingo According to Booker 9 hi::_;her reason 
can and does act in the ma:nner of a docto:r:- exa.m.i.11inc; a R5.ck 
~atiento ~eason by a process of 'deduction' may recognize 
whether certain vmys of acting are good or bad o In this vmy it 
d . ~ 1 fd' I ]_ may .1agnose ann cure mora 1seases o This process is difficul· 
and Hooker excu.ses himself from too deep an examination because 
of the character of the present agea Nonetheless some inves-
tigation is necessary for his present purpose, vJhich is ostensibly 
a critical exanination of the condition of E'nglando 2 He 9 however, 
again reiterates his opinion that care is necessary ~ilien scruti-
nizing existing law and asking reasons for tl:lat vJhich is in 
beingo 3 
In discussing the ways in which the precepts of nature are kno\•m 
or found out 9 Hooker is vagueo He appears to be moving con-
tinuously from man in his natural condition to man in the 
present conditions of imperfectiona This move confuses or 
la Medical analogies here may possibly owe something to 
Aristotleo For their j_mportance in Aristotle see GoEoRa Lloyi? 
'The Role of Medical and Biologlcal Analoe;:Les in Aristotle's 
Ethics' 9 _P}'ll'_.2P~~s};~. 9 vol o XIIJ 9 1968 o 
2o The most infallible way to reason's Laws is 'so hard that 
all shun it and had rather walk as men do in the dark by 
haphazard 9 than tread so long and intricate mazes for know-
ledge's sake o As therefore physicians are many t]_mes fo:cced 
to leave such methods of curing as themselves know to be 
fittest, and being overruled by their patient's ±mpatiency 
are fain to try the best they can 9 in takinc; that we..y of cure 
which the cured will yield unto; in like sort 9 conRidering 
hmq the case doth stand with this present ac;e full of tongue 
and weak of brain, behold me yield. unto the stream tbereof; 
into the causes of goodness we will not any curious or deep 
inquiry; to touch them now and then it shall be sufficient, 
when they so nea.r at hand that easily they may be conceived 
without any far-removed discourse: that way we are contended 
to prove 9 v.Jhich being the worse in itself~ is not\·Ji thsta:nding 
now by reason of common imbec-ility the fitter and likelier 
to be brooked o ' ~9~cJ.?~Jol o 9 I 9 viii 9 2 o 
3 o 1 Ancl herein that of Theophrastns is true? 11 The~r th8,t seek a 
reason of all thinRS do utterly overthrow reason 11 o 1 
E9Sl,o_~J?.ol,,o 9 1 9 viii 9 5o 
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tends to confuse Plan 1 s potential capacities uj_ th his actual 
acti vi tyo It 9 in consequeD.ce 9 becomes difficult to clisce:rn 
when Hooker is discussing whicho l\1oreover 9 the distinction 
between 1 signs 1 and 1 causes 1 is not clearly explained 9 ino.eed 
it is hardly explained at all but merely statedo Vrom Hooke~ 1 s 
previous rema:rks in regard to man seeking a three-f'old perfection, 
one might have expected this distinction betv.reen signs and 
causes to be elaborated in conjunction with the division wit~in 
intellectual acti vi tyo But such a distinction is h::-.rdly inves-
tigated at all, and it is often blurred by Hooker's use of the 
term 1 understanding 1 o In the end, it is difficult to sustain an 
absolute distinction, on Hooker 1 s premises 9 between 1 specula.tion 1 
a.nd moral conduct o For '!li thin nature there is not (nor can there 
be) any absolute cavision into modes of act5.vi ty o In experience 
rational and moral facts can hardly be distinguished into their 
modal componentso For Hooker, philosophy or speculative reason 
leads not merely to the truth for its O\'m sake but also to moral 
perfectiono Philosophy and morality, conseguen.tly 9 slide almost 
l imperceptibly into each othero 
Although the Fall has dimmed his capabilities, "iJJTe mc:w con-
elude that the moral and speculative capacities are co-existent 
in man both naturally and historicallyo By the exercj_se of th.ese 
capacities man has discovered his natural duties. These fu1ties 
are all means of bringinej man into closer relationship with Godo 
Even in history the duties of conduct are in good part, if by 
no means solehJ 9 means to happiness in eternity o nve labour to 
l o Locke 9 too, arm ears to have had difficulty 9 clespi te formal 
separation, betv.reen 'knm·rJede;e 1 and 1 opinion' 9 in lf:8epine; to 
this demarcationo See the remarks of &ichard Aschcraft, 
1 Faith and Knovtledge in JJocke 1 s Philosophy' , in Jo]1p_}Lo_c}Se ~ 
Problems 8.no. Perspectives, eeL .L~~Jo Yolton, CPrnbride.;e, 196'9, PP-o -iN1~2~1_4'o~ c~-~-=~ , __ , -~- ~ 
eat 9 c:tnd we ee.t to live 9 8.nd the e;ood vJe do is as seed sovm 
l 
with reference to a future harvestor- Such is the finite 
character of experience that divine happiness issues in part 
as a reward fo:r 1 such duties performed as nre re1·.rardable 1 o 2 
This does not mean the.t moral conduct is cl~_rectly a.opc:mclont 
bn speculative reason for its implementationo Potentially, of 
course 9 man does have complete knoHledge of the moral IF'i:r:.ciplos 
that constitute his endo Indeed 9 some of these, as we have 
seen, are and have been long kno\mo Hooker sug[;ests the 
following marks by 1,vhich they are knovm ~ 
'"Such as keep them resemble most lj_vely in their voluntary 
actions that ver~r manner of Nor1dng 1:.rbich JIT:=tture herself 
doth necessarily observe in tfue course of the vrhole world o 
The works of Nature are all behoveful 9 beautiful, without 
superfluity or defect; even so theirs, if they be .framed 
according to that which the le.\'1 of Reason teachetho 
Secondly 9 those laws a.re investiGe.ble by Reason, vri thout 
the help of Revelation 9 supo:r:-nc:t tural :=tncl divine o Fi-Jutlly 9 
in such sort they are investieable 9 that tho knovrloci.r_::e of 
tl1em is genere.l 9 the world he.th eJ_,:JE\Y8 been acqne irlted 
with them9 according to that which on.e in Sophocles ob-
serveth concerning a branch of this law, 11 It is n.o child 
of today's or yesterday's birth, but hath been no man 
knowekh.~1how lone; si thence" o It is not agreed upon by one 9 
or two or few, but by all 1 o3 
He 9 however, proceeds to warn that we should not understand 
such statements 9 'as if every :particular man in the whole vrorld 
did kno"~;J and confess whatso·ever the law of Reason cloth cont8.in' o 4 
Rather we are to understand them ideally (or, as Hooker would 
have it 9 naturally) as that 1 t'~ is law is such that beine; pro-
posed no man can reject it as unreasonable and unjust 1 o 5 It 
is thus not necessary to know it 'infallibly' before beine able 
to act correctlyo But the effort to bring into closer contact 
l o ~ie~c_l <e~ _J?_oJ~ o I~ xi, 1 o 
2 o ]c.c.l...)'~?~o):.o 9 I 9 xi 9 5o 
3 0 !l92)~o~ ]Lo]_;o 9 I 9 viij_? 9 0 
4- o ~c_c_l=-"-~~()_1 o 9 I 9 viii? 9 o 
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what he has to say about 'causes 1 \-Ji th his remarks on 'si&;ns 1 
is indicative Of tho fact that even the reasonableness of 
ordinary moral conduct depends ultimately upon the natural 
setting of experiencea In any dispute t~e ultimate court of a~pea 
are the na:Vura.l principles of realityo They do 9 or shovld 9 give 
certain judgementa 
VJh.ile 9 then 9 so much depends upon the implicit reGJJo:o.a.bleness 
of ordinary morality (as we shall see) 9 Hooker is not willing 
to forgo the apparent usefulness of natural principles in his 
present disputeo Clearly it was of great tactical use for him 
to state that the Calvinists have not apprehended the truth 
while he has o Hmqever 9 Hooker would demand more from his prin-
ciples than tb.a t 9 and this is implied by the use of such words 
as 1 proof' 9 'demlbnstration 1 9 and 'axiom 1 o Thus j_t coEld be 
the case, for instance 9 that both parties to a moral and political 
d:Ls:pute cm..J.ld accept the principles of reason iil. c-:ood faith and 
yet differ in the way they 'judge' particular goods and in the 
manner in which they identify good things or ri:::;ht actionsc 
Even here in theory it is still possible to arrive at the 
1 correct' ansv·rero However 9 it would appear to be necessary t!l.at 
in order to make out a convincine case for the compelling moral 
authority of natural law, it would have to be shown that some 
ways of choosing particular goods are self-contradictory or in-
valid in some sense. There is no indication of how a 'demon-
stration' of a philosophical character would show thisa In 
any case 9 v.ri th his distinction between necessity and indifference 9 
and wi tb his emphasis on institutional all.thori ty 9 such an 
occasion neod hardly have been considered by~ooker. It would 
h8.ve been confusing to his purpose. 
Boo:ker, then 9 boginnine; from a sketch of his natural 
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pos:i_ tion ( vrhich .i_n fact does not have the 1n2.tural 1 force he 
claims for j_ t) proceeds to cast:i_gate the I.Jresbyteric:ms as 
irrational and arrogant" 1:Ie rn.2.y regard this measure as a tact:i_c 
in practical argument 9 although Booker vrou.ld 8C8,rcely subscribe 
to such an interpretationo It is becruJse we are at the level 
of practical argument that it does not matter too much 1:rhether 
or not it may be 'demonstrated' that particular actions may be 
deduced from first principleso It is enough that the8e !,Jrinciples 
are acted upon in tbe 1 correct 1 rnannero It j_s st:i.ll nAcessary 
to know what the correct manner is 9 but this is a question 
that is settled in Hooker's judgement not merely by personal 
choice but by various institutional authoritieso The implications 
of such a judgement in particular areas of experience Hooker 
attempts to point out in the bulk of his worko 
Finally 9 it may be sur;Gested that 9 •:Jhen he considers 
moral conduct and not merely the moral duties e~joined by the 
law of Reason 9 Hooker is vrri ting in that idiom of tl!.ov.ght 
referred to by Oakeshott as the morality of communal tieso 
Hooker emphasises in the main body of his vrork that human 
beings 9 in regard to external particulars 9 are each riothing 
but members of a community 9 either of Christendom itself 9 or 
more specifically of the realm of R.r1gland. Though tbere may 
be perhaps only a limited opportunity for individuals to reveal 
themselves as different in social mores or in the search for 
t~uth, this restriction may be considered no bad state of affairso 
For in less l:i_mi ted conditions it may become dane;erous when 
individuals of little intelligence but of large ideas take it 
upon themselves to interpret the Scriptures in tbeir particnl8.r 
fashinno Hooker warns ae;ainst 
'relying upon the bare conceit of eternal election •. o 
to bnild UIJOn Crod 1 s election if tre keeD not on:rflelves 
to_ tr1n wa_y:._he hath aY1D-Ointed fm:' __ rue_n __ to •:rq_lk, is but a 
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self-deceJvlng vanlty' o--
Good conduct in Hooker's view is to be understood aG ~roper 
participation in the slm1ly che.ngi_n::s 9 but nonetheleBEl -n.at1_1_ral 
activities of a society. So wlmt arn:r.dlxj_mates r10st to 'ne.ture 1 
l'P.USt be done 9 and in the end 1l!Jhat Otl.(';ht tn bP. C.O:n 8 5.8 j l'l.ci is-
2 tinguJshable from what is done; art a~pears as ~ature 1 • 
Rashly to repu~j.ate the achievements of time (as, in ~0o~er 1 s 
judgement, the Presh;rterians YTere doing) inevitably introduces 
increasing uncertainty into the world. This 9 indi:r.cctly 9 has 
the effect of seemingly undermining the ~rinciples of nature 
which~ 1.rrhile doing no such thing 9 ha.d the effect of e:ncouroe;i:n.g 
political disorder. 
1. Jl~CLo_.-.;1?.,9l,a 9 V 9 lX 9 3. 
2 o M. Oakeshott 9 R_~_:ti=O;:l§t}.j.~S}Q in Jo}:;..iJ;_ic~s. 9 I,ondon 1962, p o 249 a 
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In this chapter I propose to exp;rn.:i_ne Booker's not:i.on of 
political society in ter~s of its origins and purported role 
in experience. Again we find Hooker movine frequently from the 
general to the historical level in an effort to justify the 
anthori ty of the Elizabethan regime o 'J'his po.rticular regii'le 
is seen against a background of rational law and 'natural' 
political societyo For political society itself is an aspect 
of the natural setting of experience? ancl man is 9 therefore 9 
a political be:i.ng o It :is rat:i_onal to recog:ni~e the necessity 
of political a,ction e.nd consent to iiB a.pplicationo 1 
ambivalence to the natural status of political societya For 
the necessity of political authority is a direct result of evilo 
rJian in his fallen state finds it difficult to keep to the direct 
path leading to goodness" He is slothful in the pursuit of 
the good o..nd not disposed to recognize it \11Jhere it reveals 
itself" Rewards and punishments 9 consequently 9 are n.8cesso,ry 
to quicken man's pursuit of the good and to lessen wilful evil. 
And 'rewards and punishments do always presuppose something 
willing done ·well or evill 1 • 2 \llhile 9 then 9 it is the notion 
of the 'naturalness' of political society that preserves an 
essential continuity between natural and political man 9 Hooker 
1. 1 Forasmuch as ;,·.re are not ourselves suffic:i_ent to :fnrnish 
ourselves with competent store of things needful for such 
a life as our nature doth desire 9 a life fit for the dignity 
of· rnan; therefore to supply these defects--and imperfectjons 
vrhich in us living single and solely 'by ourFJelves 9 we are 
naturally induced to seek comTPotLnion 8Xl.('l. fello\~rsh:i.p with 
others" ' ;~9 cl_·~~r.9J." 9 I 9 x 9 l. 
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finds it necessar~,. to postule_te an orig:i_n8l hi,storicc.l coD.di tion 
to take into a.cconnt tlrle notion of tbe orie;iYl of politics in 
evil. This original historical condition shows man at one 
ste.se to he.ve been vrj_ tn out poli t:i.c8.l or~e-11ization o Jrui.eed 9 
man's mundane history may be divided into ti·JO periodso F'irst 9 
there is the stage from the Fall to the settine up of civil 
societies~ and soc ondly, the period from this time om•rard o 
The origin of political society is to be explained both 'nnturall~ 
and historicallyo 
J\Tatu.ral human wants induce men: to seek and enter j_nto 
political society o It is this le.tter arrangement vrhich enables 
them to pursue their happiness with fewer impediments, and in 
a divine universe the most j_mportant actions in a man's experience 
are those that concern the exercise of religious choice. Never-
theless, 'inasmuch as religious life presupposeth life; inasmuch 
t l . . t l • t . . . bl t l . I l . t ' as o 1ve v1r uous_y 1 lS 1mposs1 e excep we _lve , 1 lS 
necessary to remove penury and to supply the implements of life. 
For this, of course, political society is not strictly necessary. 
Tb e tirn.e betvJeen the Ji'all and the stage of political society, 
however, was characterized not only by sociableness and inventive-
ness 9 but also by malice, sin and violence o Anfl. if 
'when there was bu.t as yet one only family i•1. th.e 1.vorlcl~ 
no means of instruction human or divine could prevent 
effusion' 9 2 
multiplication of the human species likewise increased the 
fighting and the bloodshed. In general it was such a time 
'wherein there were not above eight persons righteous living 
~ 
upon the face of the earth'o/ 
1 0 Ec~c]-=" ~-__ }_?_s>]: 0 9 I 9 x, 2 0 
2 0 .f,_Q~)-3~l~92-. 0 9 J 9 x, 3 0 
...,. ~c_c_l_ • ~P.o)-.o I, x, 3 :J 0 
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In SlJCh 8.n uncertG.in state f'.l.el:1. necesRG.ril~r hP.d to defend 
themselves by any ll'.eans at their disposal a S1.1ch :i_!J.c1.:i_vj_(l_ueJ. 
efforts 9 ho1.vever 9 were destructive of their purpose 9 and it 
da>:med upon them that 
1Hmmoever men may seek their ovm commodity 9 yet if th.is 
were done with injury unto others it was not to be suffered, 
but by all men and bJ all good means v1i thstooCl.; f:i:no.lly 
they knew that no man might in reason ta.ke upon him to 
determine his 0\'m. right 9 according to his ovm determi:r.ntion 
:nroceecl in rnainten2.nce thereof, inasmuch as eve::y D'[-1.11 is 
tm·.mrds himself a.nd them 1vhom he ereatly affected pm:-t:i_al;; 
and therefore that strifes and troubles WOl1lc1 be endless 9 
except they e;ave their common consent a.ll to be o:rclAre<'l. 
by sowe per8on whom they should 2.gree upon'ol 
In spite of man's natural rat:i.onali ty and sociablen.ess 9 Hooker 
at this point postulates a growth of rationality as man is driven 
by external circumstances so acute that reason eventually comes 
to recognize what nature discloses o 1:Ji th the foundation of 
political societies a new stage of history beginsa 
The actual foundation of political society Hooker charac~ 
terizes in a vrell-knovm passage~ 
1 Two foundat:i_ons the:ee are 1:Jhich bear up all public societies 
the one, a natural inclination whereby all men desire 
sociable life and fellowship; the other an order eKpressly 
or secretly agreed unon touching the manner of their union 
in living together 1 o2 
To term 9 as some have done, the notion contained in these re-
marks a social contract is hardly helpful at all except to those 
who deal in labels o JVforeover, to elevate the nu<:mces of this 
notion into a doctrine and then transfer the mean:i_:n.g of th:i_s 
doctrine to other statements that appear to be similai to it 
is positively misleading and is a product of unhistoric2.l thinkinB 
Such doctrines provide the occasion for extended argument poe~ ~ 
tulated upon historical mistakes, bvt it io 2. minor merit of a 
book or a doctrine that it is subject to interesting misinter-
pretations o Hm:Jever, tl1e irnporta:nt point to notice in reeard 
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to Hooker's statements is their context. ~his context is both 
'natural t aJJ.d historical" The first statement of ths :previous 
quotation takes as its context the natural arrane.;ement of human 
capa.ci ties t=J.nd chaJ:'actero The second statement is a historica,l 
comDleroent to thiA natural setting of man. The actnal choice 
of a particular society becomes not merely a capricious or 
strictly historical event, but depends upon the natural context. 
And 
1 The latter /referring to tl~e act11al FJ.c-rree.ment to form a 
political Rociety7 j_s that 1vhich 'de call the law of a 
Commonwealth~ ti-1 e very soul of a politic .body, the parts 
whereof are by law animated, held together, an.cl set on 
work in such actions 9 as the common good :requj_reth' .1 
On the question of how the general desiJ:'e foJ:' political society 
aids one to choose a particulaJ:' political arra.ngement 9 Hooker is 
silenta Moreover, he modifies the teleological and space-bound 
'constitutionalism' embedded in the previous remarks quite 
significantly in Book Ei:a:ht of his work. The actual foundation 
of political society a}J}lears to refer to one time and place 
and cannot be repeatecL Thus this natural and trans-historical 
setting fo~ the origin of political activity is pushed farther 
in to th 8 1Je..cke;ro11n<'l. in the tar.tici-'1.1 pu:rsu:i_ t of his :rracti cal 
ends a 
The 'natural' status of political societies derives from 
their capa.city to serve as in:Btruments for men 1 s efforts to 
their end for which God created them. All governments are 
potentially capable of generating desirable conditions for 
this pursuit. Consequently, there are various types of govern-
ment fro!!l. 1.vhich a collection of individua.ls or families may 
1 choose t for there is no theoretio.ally S1l_rre ,--ior form of f-30vern-
ment. It is probable, Hooker sug~ests 9 that pe..t~iarchial 
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e;overnmcnt H·i th rule by f0.ther~kinGS was the first to be insti~· 
tuted sLo.ce political societies vJhen first fo:r:med ·uere collectio:2s 
of households and the title of father/king transferred to the 
head of a group of householdso This is notv however:, the only 
type of government and the 'inconveniences of one kind have 
d d t h t h d . d' 1 cause su.n .ry o .... ers o .. e evJ.se o Agej_ n? after t:he 'cliscover~l, 
of politi~al society as a rational aspect of experience, Hooker 
modifies this natu.ral context and assumes a ve.riety of political 
achi·evement .i.n ti.me o This achievement in e:ovcrnmcn.t, however? 
Hooker still concludes to be a matter of deliberate'choice' for 
'all public regiment of what kirid soever seemeth evidently 
to have risen from deliberate 8ilvice, consul te.tion, and 
composition hetween men, judginG it convenient at1d 
behoveful 1 o2 
In short, any decision as to political arran:?;ement is dependent 
on the recognition ~hat political society is a necessa:r:y aspect 
of existing in conditions of imperfection. Political achieve-
ment is not merely of ca:p:r:>icious character. On the n.atural 
level it is a matter of rational choiceo Government is necessary 
because of the corruption of man's nature and 
'to bring things into the first cause they were in, a:nd 
utterly to ta1.<:e 8.'.:cray 811 kind of publ i.e f;Overnmnnt in the 
world, were apparently to overturn the i!Jhole world' u 3 
From the foregoing examination "~:!e may crmclude that what 
we have in Book One of the Ecclesiastical Polity in regard to 
---~-~. "-.J'"'-- :- ' '- ' • ~ ~=·o;-___d__~ 
an explanation of the origin of political E3ociety is c:m attempt 
to fuse two contradictory views about politics and the origin 
of political activityo On the one hand, we have the ~picurean 
doctrine t"at the origin of government may be seen as a response 
to the pressures of man's external circumstances~ man as a 
lo Ecclo Polo 9 I 9 x, 4o 
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solitary ind.i. vidual j_s too vreak to cope ''ri th bis environment 
and needs physical protection 0 On the other b.271.::1 9 the AJ:>is-
totelian and Stoic mr.planation points to man's natural sociahlenes: 
as the reason for political societyo CombbJed, of course 9 ~vJth 
these cla .. ss:i.ca.l explanations is the idea of the Fall 1,Jl,j_ch is. 
in lJne 1.r.ri th the Epicurean emphasis on external circumstances o 
rvran's need to be drivAn j_:n such fa.shion becomes a A:i-~n of 
deparavi ty and hn.perfectiono 
Booker would seem to regard the Aristotelian or 1natur2l 1 
idea of the socic:tb:i.li ty of man as 2 necessa.ry but not fl. suffic:i_ent 
condition of man 1 s Reckin.g to forTJl some kind of society. 1:Jhgt 
makes politic~l society a hiotorj_cRl re2llty is the Fall of 
Man ancl the corruption of his natnre o In a sense 9 Y,he mediatj_ng 
concept betvreen the necessary and sufficient conditions is tb.lat 
of consent 9 for 'impossible j_ t is that any should have complete 
lmv:ful pOl;.rer 9 but 'by cons e:nt of men 9 or irnTflecUPte ap?:Joi:n tmen t of 
1 God 1 o It is noticeable that 9 v~ile it may he realized that 
political society is necessary, consent is still :required for the 
actual settinG up of particular societieso Hooker's concept of 
consent (if it mRy so be called, though it is hardly elaborated) 
is an idea of hov.r individuals become subject to pol:i_ tical obli-
ga tion and ho':! lee)- time_ te political societies 8.rise o It is not 
in any sense whatsoever (and we have Sl=;en this already) a notion 
of hm'! government ought to be org21nized, nor iloes it describe or 
identify a particular type of political arrangemento Consent is 
a rational aspect of the order of nature, it is a rational assent 
to the principles embedded in naturea Man is thus placed in a 
position \rJhere he cannot dEmy 'but that the la1.rJ of No.ture doth 
require of neces.si ty some k:i_nrlr of ree;iment' o 2 :Poli tice>l obJJ.gat:i.o:n 
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is 9 consequently 9 a rational de~uction based on the necess8~Y 
princip1 es of human exist.encA ~ it i,s c=m element of the human 
conditiono 
that merely purports to seek to display the truth about ex-
perienne in general 9 a specifically directed ~o~ko It is 
netther a set of instruct:i_ons nor a c:r:-i b on how to inflti tute 
legal political societies ox- preserve them fromfueir inceptiono 
Rathor 9 it is GJ'l. abridGement of a partj_cul2-r relic;-i0us ancl 
political tradi timlo It was intended to brine- out the im.pli-
cations of an existing religious anCl. poli tice,l societyo It 
thereby acted as a conclemna tion of other vie•Hs 9 and vJhat Hooker 
was attacking in particula:r:- was a mistaken assault by a ~inoTii~y 
on the accepted conception of English societyo This appears 
to be implicit in his discussion of consento For he passes 
over quickly from talking about the notion of consent in 
initie,ting political societies to an examination of how this 
notion is relevant to existing eommu:nitieso 
All lav1s, Hooker s_uggests 9 are made by public approbation 
or consent o The:r:-e are a number of "~Hays in which this ce.n be 
doneo It cc=m be done in person by 'voice, sign or act or by 
a representative as in parliaments 1 councils and the l.ike 
l 
assemblies although we be not personally ourselves present'o 
This is just as binding as consent in person. There are other 
ways, too, vrhich are not so apparento For instance, 'tl,at 
v1hich hath been received long si thence c:md is custom now 
t b l . h d k l h . h t t t 2 es a _J_s e .9 we _ eep as a __ avr ,,,_lc . we may no ransgress • 
On how this idea of the value of traditional and 'tacit' 
accept8nce is reJ.c.ted to th::; notion of consent to form a 
l • t • 1 • t • 1 H k d • t l • ' t'"hr po __ l lca socle y ln genera 9 __ oo ___ er _rnes no exp __ lCl ~<r connento 
Ho1.·1 it can be so is difficult to sayo Yet Hooker a·opears to 
equateconsent in gene~al with acceptance in particular. It 
would seem that because politiual society is necessa:r:y to 
human existence a:nJl_ :man in his full rationoJ_i ty recognizes 
this, consent to being a member of a partic~lar society may 
be considered as entailed in living in it. 
Assent in particular, however, need not consciously be 
a 'deduction' from such first principles until it seems that 
a necessary norm of political association has been violatedo 
Jt is then that the notion of consent in eeneral may be·seen 
to take its proper place as an aspect of t:h_e considerc.,tion of 
necessary principles. When Hooker remarks thcd the Presh~terians 
have not received general consent for their radical projects, 
he means, in effect, tha.t no necessar~r principle governing 
political association has been broken. The-b:' radical arc;uments 
are, therefore, inappropriate. 
Ene;lish society is a legitimate political socj_ety anc:'t the 
authority vested in the Cro1om has not be: en misused at all. 
That is the are;ument directed against the Presbyterians. Jn 
the light of eJ&:perience's 'natural' context they do not have 
ratjonal assent to their programme. 
The idea of general assent to political society and t~e 
historical growth of authority and o.b1igation in a particular 
society are tvw different notions and operate at different 
levelsa Yet Hooker endeavours to combine them in the followine; 
manneJ:'~ 
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•• o. si th men naturally have no full Gn0. ':H~rfoct ~0ov.rer 
to command whole politic multitudes of men 9 therefore 
utterly without our consent we could in such sort be at 
no man's com_mandment living o Aml. to be co:mme;nded 1!Je do 
consent 9 when that soc:Lety vrhereof we are part hath at 
any timo before conocntod 9 ·vJi thout revoki:Jg thn san1e 
after by the like universal agreement o TJherefore as any 
man's deed past is good as long as he himself continueth 9 
so the act of a public society of roen done five hun~rod 
si thence standeth as theirs vrho presently are of the same 
societies 9 because corporations are immortal; Ne were then 
alive in our pr:rdecesso:rs 9 and they i:n their successors 
do live still 1 o 
These remarks are clearly directed tmtJards the Preshyterians 
VJho ·were a minorj_ ty p;roup o It is implied that ei theT they 
had consented already to much of the present structure of the 
English Commonwealth (since they had passed part of their 
existence there) 9 or they \•Jould require general assent to the 
fundamental changes they \•Jished to make o Tn mort 9 the idea 
of general assent comes into operation or Rhould appear in 
argument only when the principles of political society are 
challenged 9 and the duty imposed upon the ruler hy general 
consent has been ignored by himo The particular arrangements 
of the English Oommonwealth 9 in Hooker's opinion 9 do not in 
any way contradict those principles o Pr8S1.1mably the :Pres-
byterians would have d.eni ed t:h e fcn::mer; th::3.t is~ insofa-r as 
tbey were engaged in political activity~ they coFld deny that 
they had assented in particular to those things they considered 
a 
corrupt o l_ifuile on a practical level this would have bee:n/good 
enough reason 9 they had yet claimed more than that particular 
things displeased themo Their arguments vrere fundamenta,l_j_st 
and this allowed Hooker to use more general arguments aeainst 
them in turho They 9 the Presbyterians 9 could only deny that 
the notion of consent had any relevance to the occas:i.on for 
they 9 of course 9 had not received consent for their ~rojects 9 
either in general or in particular. 
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However, if the Presbyterians hail. received assent to their 
'reforms' then it could have been argued, usine; Hooker's orm 
premises, that thiA particular instance could be construed as 
a legitimate operationa Such 'reforms' would then be binding 
on the body politic~ and, if t~, e Presbyterians had :not us eel 
such extreme arguments, this could have been feasible. Such 
a construction is, however, someviliat academic. For Hooker 
not only accused the Presrr~erians of irrationally trr:tnsgressing 
the n8.tural principles of experience but also condePmed them for 
ignoring the c:haracter of English societyo We are led to con-
clude that the Pr· sbyterians are cra,zed in their endeavour to 
cut out part of the corporate identity as diseased. Were it 
not for the fa,ct that 1 corporations are iiwrrortal' they vro11ld 
appear to be attempting suicid~n(it cannot be oo1rder for, one 
assumes, they were despite themselves part of the corporate 
body). In an3r caf:~e the remedy is too drastic, especj_ally as 
the corporate pe~son is not ailingo It is, indeed, those 
ready vJi th the razor who are sick with unreason c:md injuring 
the body politic a They have mistal~en their O'tln identity and 
that of English society. 
It is the business of governments so established by con-
sent to interpret \'rhere necessar:y the laws of nature e,nd to 
devise where approprj_ate laws for the sal<:e of particular 
convenie:ihce. Such enacted laws enable the citizen body to 
know in detail what their duties are and the penalties for 
failing to fulfil such duties. Of course, if good and evil 
in all their ramifications were recognized, then no enacted 
lavw would be Ylecessary. Rut in. condi.t;J_ons of imperfection 
authorr;otty and law are necessary for existence, and even 
'the fir~t kind therefore of things appointed by laws 
- Jl3 -
hum~,n containeth whatsoever being in itself nG.turally 
good or evil, in notwithstandine more secret than that it 
can be discerned by every man 1 s prese:rt conceit, vri thout 
some deeper discourse and judgement'a 
In this discourse such is the great difficulty in reaching 
'correct' conclusions and so great is the possibility that 
mistakes may be made, that 
'unless such things were set down by lav-.rs 9 many ·vrould 
be ig.r10rant of their duties which now are not, and many 
that know what they shouilid do would dissemble it, and 
to excuse themselves pretend ignorance and simplicity, 
which now they cannot 1 o2 
The political world, in this way, finds its sienificance 
by being placed in a hierarchy or order and law created by 
God o Pol5_ tical authorities do not only propagate these laws 
or propose particular punishments for transgression of these 
laws 7 they also execute them. There is a sufficient e;ap 
between obligation and motivation for this to be very necessar~r. 
And ''-'Therein as the generality is natural, virtue revmrdable 
and vice punishable', it is the particular business of ~overnment 
to determine the rewards and punishments appropriate to each 
law. 3 For instance, in Hooker's judgement, theft is 'naturally' 
punishable, but the kind of punishment appropriate to pe,rlbicular 
thieving is dete:r:mj_ned by the executive of each particular 
political association. 
It is particular ends and particular occasions that account 
for the variety of law j_n existence o End and convenience are 
the two necessary considerations when framing lawo It is 
the emphasis given to one or the other of these considerations 
that determines Hooker's distinction in regard to enacted law. 
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'Nerely' human la1'f8 vJere and arc e:n.fl cted. for reasons 'fi:b and 
conven:Lent' and binds only thooe v1ho are memhers of the 
particular society that pass such laws. 1 Mixedly 1 human lm·rs, 
because of the corruption that is now displayed in history, 
establ:i_sh or rati:fy a duty to wrdch by the lavr of l:l.B~tn:re rn<:cn 
are bound in any case. For exa~mple 7 if corrupt practices :i.n 
regard to marriage spread throughout a society, or men pay 
more §dtemt±on to pleasure than duty 9 
'so that no way is left to rectify such foul disorder 
vri thout prescribing by law the same things \·rhich reason 
necess~rily doth enforce but is not perceived that so it 
doth 1 , 
then the duty of the executive in its w:Lsdor1 must be to pres~ 
cribe even in human law what the law of nature has already 
to be the trutho 
~~he propagation and execution of law is thus not at all 
an arbitrary historical consideration. J£1 ':!, any la1:r, shovld. 
not only teach ·what is good_ 9 it should also e:n.j oin it. The 
constraining force of law itself comes, as we have seen 9 from 
God and from the consent of man. This, however, does not 
constitute the whole basis of political c'luty. l"i'oT' th~"=; fl.nty 
of the ruler is not merely to e:llrecute any convenient lcJ:J 
but 1 c;ood' law. And the devising of (-l;OOd lavr is dependent 
upon the principles of natute as well as on historical circum-
stances. These do not appear to conflict in Hooker 1 s jw:lge-
ment 9 for 1 to constra:i.n men unto anythinr; inconvenient cl.oth 
seem unreasonable 1 • 2 In practice, however, it is the s~ill 
of the 1 . vise which ensures that generally the~r do not clasho 
~~his is most important for 
'lav.rs are matters of principBJ_ consen_uence; men of common 
~ lJ5 -
capecity and but ordinary judeement are not able (for how 
sho' ld they?) to (1j_ scern "\Hhat thingR aJ:'e fittest for each 
kind and state of rcg5.:r!.e.nt 1 o l 
Hooker vrarns how much obecU ence depends on this fact. Most 
ment think it quite reasonable that, once they have been 
informed by lavr (::m.d not by a person) trhat their duty j_s 9 
they ought to carry it out o This i,s a conseqll.ence of the 
belief the,t lavr is impartia.l anc'l 'as it vreJ:'e e.:n: oracle pro-
ceeded froEl wisdom 8J1d understanding 1 • 2 
II 
This is ·what Hooker has to say about political soc5.ety ~ 
consent and enacted law, and it is not very much. Indeed, it 
is so compressed that it is difficult to understan.d in detail. 
The eeneral drift of the ar~ument we may ~at~er, but it is 
incohere:nt for all that 0 ~his incoherence is seen especially 
2.t the point a:t ':!h5_ch Hoolcer moveB from the c;cneral to the 
particular, from necessity to indifference. Hooker himself 
sees a hierarchy from the s~ecific if ~eneral principles of 
reason to the merely particular lavJ rl:r:;ropriG.te to the occa.s5_on. 
Between these poles there is the category of the 'mixedly' 
human la:vr vrhere a ratiOJ.J.8.l principle is involved, but F:h.:i_ch 
(the enacted law) 1 differeth in the ma,nner of hLnding 1 "-3 Hu!llan 
law may thus be a direct enforcement of a principle of nature 
or a cu.stomc;.ry lavr •. ThPy both mB.3r be enacted 18.\\1' but their 
force does not merely follow fro~ their being imposed by a 
particular political authority. This applies even to :those 
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1merel.y 1 hnman lavm ~ fo:r:- they mu At not con:::~ 5.ct H~- t1• ttre 
natu.r2l princ:i.:ples of e)qle:rience" IdRB,lly, t1•0'y Oll[:lJ.t to 
be 'deduced' from these n~tural principles. 
~4~nacted laws ira:9osed by political ~:w.thori ty ( .;_-n. this CE\'Je 
a traditional, not a 'natural' authority) are~ ~hen, swept 
into the ngtural context and made to depend, morally and 
'philos~phically 1 , on that context o Hooker recogn:i.zes no 
objection to this, H~ feels free to glide irnperce~tibly 
froro1 t 110 laue o:f' !'l.atnr8 to th2 enacted lo..v:c o:P h:i_s-l:;C):r:i.c::::.l 
.societies. Yet this movement is quite illegitimate for those 
for vrhom law i.s composed of vBrious strands 9 eB.ch referring 
to different levels of experience. 
Hooker's notion of law may be considered under four 
headings. These are its general nature, its rationality, 
its rrwral essence and its tradi t:i_o::o_al traits. _t\s 1·Je hG.ve 
seen, these aspects are a comnonncl of moral 'rRscriptions 
philosonhice.l explc:mati.on, anc'l h:i sto:r:i.cal particulars o ~he se 
latter details present in historical expeTi.ence arG a reflection 
of la:1:1' s moral essence and r,eneraJ_ r8tional:i_ ty. Tdeally 9 t''~ ese 
laws may be said to be 'deduced' from the general characteri.stics 9 
though it is diffi.cult to see exactly uhat i.s here meant by 
1 deduction 1 as such. Even if it is presu:r:nwsed that there 
are moral rules of an absolute nature which su!mly a general 
criter:i.on of all legal and moral duties, how these would be 
used i.n practice in a 'deductive' fashion is hardly explained 
at all. 
Hooker 1 s def:i_n:i.ne; traits of JR.1•! ar~ all to be £cn:md in 
Aristotle 1 s o,,m concept of law and they cl:i.sr)J.8.y the s8_11le 
incoher8n.ce in the Jl!_c~cl_~'?.-~E!~§~"t:bP~§l,;:-\)?_o);,:i~X as tht>y Cl.o in /\.ristotle 1 E 
- 117 ~ 
' l works.-- As ,.m h.avc seen 9 the so~ce.lled demonstration or proof 
o-f the exiotoncc of no.,tural lavr is circElaro T'J.e 'discovery' 
of a rational and natural pattern of human conduct an.d the 
description of disastrous consequences for deviatjng from 
such a pattern do not in themselvAs consti~Itc a nroof nor 
indicate tl'e 1 existence' of a uniform proAc:ript.ive order of 
natureo It is 9 however, in such a fashion that descriptive 
principles and prescriptive rules, and logical conclusions and 
moral values apparently fuse into one system. The distinctions 
between theory and l'ractice 9 explanation and prescription are 
all blurred so that, according to one's particular intention of 
the moment 9 emphasis ro.a~· be placed o:n either ex.)!lnr.u'~,tion or 
prescription without ostensibly breakin~ the ~~d~ntive' chain 
between theory and practice. rll.oreover, reinforced by the con-
ception of God as n rational law giver, Hooker further blurs 
a distinction betvreen legal validity and moral value, and en-
deavov.rs at tl1e purely 'natural 1 level to eqllate legal rules 
with moral norms. 
The doctrine that allows, indeed requires, these distinctions 
to be less than absolute in this manner is that of n8,tv.ral 
teleology. It is this doctrine that deme.nds, on the one hand 9 
change to be considereEl. a characteristic of la.1:r, which c2n thereby 
be described, appreciated and justified. On the other hand~ it 
may demand, shOl)ld t~1e occasion arise, the assimilation, at the 
'natural' level, of political action and legal rules to moral 
purposes, for the former are means to the supreMe moral end. 
This moral end is natural and is sup~'}orted by the doctrine 
1. W. von Leyden, 'Aristotle and the Concept of Law', 
]-'_hJJ.o~s~oph~i_cal~gu.?:__J:terlJy, _val. 42 9 1967 o Von JJeyden considers 
'to the extent that he /Aristotle? advanced, in a rudimen-
tary form 9 thf) notion of law as ~eneral and rationP.l? he· ·can 
be b.eJ.d rOAJ"JOnR_i.bJ_e fo:c some of t11e conftlsions in.b.c:t?CY1.t j.n ·-:::: 
the concept of l:::n.i__?:f~n-~!_'!2:re '-·--~:., __ 1] ~- ··------
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of n~tural teleology. nonse~uently the ~istinction between 
kin~s of action and statements about these actions beco~es one 
Merely of ~egree. 
and powerful 'theoretical' inst~1ment; but there is a tendency, 
c1es:-,nite t:he SUj'.'1)0S?d uniforrrdty and 1 tiJneJe.ssnes.c::'of nC~.tura.l 
order, for Hooker to admit that it had to be employed in argument 
in c-c:. heuristic fa.shion. and revised in the li,'?;ht of the Vi"lr~ri.ng 
Quite simply, the ex:r;lanation for this is tha.t Hooker 1qants 
to have the best of both v.rorld.s. Be desires natuxal lcl.1.'! to hc:tve 
the force of 'philosophical' or 'natural' argument and yet to be 
applicable in practice. This, however, cannot he ~one, for in 
the end natural law becomes merely a principle or mode of argumen-
tation to be used in practical argument. In short, it loses its 
'philosophical' forue and ch0nges its character to suit the 
occasion. 'PoT in its o:;::-iginal form as an 1 e}q}la.:natory 1 concent 
:n8.tur8.1 la1.,r is feet:' too ,c~P.ner."J.l to be of r)j_rect j)ractj_cs.l :=~id 0 
The notion of the human condition propounded by Hooker is like-
~ise too abstract for the ends he has in mi:nd. To be a~plicable 
:Ln •;ractice the ch<:!ra.cteri2.tic 9'eneralj_ty must be re:Jlaced by 
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o:l:' historicgl soc5_et:i 0G a le:e-:itin1ate o_evelo:::n·ncnt of h1}T'l8X_ 
activity in time. ~hc~e is a tendency in his formal exn~ination 
for T--Too 1~:o:r:' to leave f1.r:-irle t-he notion th~_t positive lO,I:J is 
Tierely coeJ:>cive and roote~ in sin, and to asse~t that it is 
b2sic to the 11ai:;l1_r8.l hurll8J1 es"<ence to C:r:'8a:te a soc:i_ety" Tt :i_,s~ 
conser'l,_e11tly 9 only ~-.rhen he snee.ks of the oriP.;j_-ns of pol:i_ ti_n8.l 
societ:;r th8.t Hooker snl:l,scr:-il1es to the J<]pJcurc8J~~/~I\nt:wsti_l1j_an_ 
view a 0-1;1--1erwise he vEJJ.FcEJ hi:~hly th_e ~oo::>:i_ tion ann_ stand:iJJ.f of 
political euthdrity ~ithin society and GTibscribcd to its 
evide•"t 11ecessit~r a11cl {':oooncGSc Thi.s 9 I thj_nk 9 is 1·rb01.t one 
~ould ex~c~t if ~here :is to be, as Hooker as~eJ:>ts the~e is, 
sorr1e ldnd of harmony bet1-recn man as o_ voluntary ae;ent and 
1natnrev. 
_ ~h :i.s tendency to co:nsio er positive lmv c>.nd goverr_ment as 
havj_ng more than a coercive fv_:o.ction_ in society is a noti6n 
that Oalvin and those infl11enced by him implicitly deniedo 
In contrast to their ideas on church cove:r:'~mcnt it would auncar 
that they ~id not consider any sin~le form of politic~l or~er 
to be absol11tel~r the hest. They did? ho1:.'ever~ hold ve:r:'y 
d efinj_ tely that 9 Fhile political Enlt"ho:ri t3r VJ8J3 t1• e gift of 
God and therefore a vnatuJ:>al necessityv, its function was 
exhausted in keeping sinful activity unde:r control. Thus 
political order itself had only an indirect influence on 
~oodness and morc>.l co:ncluct as sucho :!Hrect control of r,Joral 
conduct j_tsclf was left to the Church. In regarc1_ to t:·'e la.tter 
institution God h8.d le~islated into existence one valid v~yP 
one 11erfent arranr~~9ment for all tru.e Ch:rj_st:i_ans o 
Hoo~c0~ :recoe:nj_~?,eo. nl.8.n to be ,o;e:nr-~2.1J~r <:J voluntc\:ry RXJr'l 
creo.t:i ve 0 r,·eY't? a C~r:'88.t11Y'C of c:!1oice c~eatin[': :=lYJ O:r:'Cl.er ·'~U.i. table 
numerous societies 9 so are t~ere various types of ~overnme~t 
appropriate to the character of these societieso fl:heoe 
arran~eBentA are to be reco~ni~ed as an achiovement 9 not 
General charRctcristicsa ~he reaRonableness of positive law 
is thus indicnte~o It .i_s a IJ8.rt of man. 1 :;. 2.ctiv.±ty as a r8.tional 
being to onRct posjtive lawsa ~ositive laws are nei~ er ar= 
bi trary 9 nor i1~retional 9 nor :rnerel;r coe,cive" 
of '-vhat may be co<.'lshlerecl to be the n1ore form.:lJ_ aspects of 
o~C'igi.ns ann. n8.t1.1re of politj_c,c:~.l activity j_c::; n.ot of a.n extP.,'~dccl 
character" It takes the fo~C'm of 2. repetition of traditional 
of revolutionary action or at lenst the t·hrc8.t o:P snch act:i.on 
to the charncter of actual politic?l societies than to an 
analysis of tho lo~ical or natural preconditions of political 
society in :0;ene:ral o 
J'oli ty a,<)pea.r8 very s1~etcl1.y ( tl1 or!.gh 9 exc e:Jt :fo:r t:h e ·1Tery irn-~ 
.,.. o::::...~- ,.- -::- ~--· . -- ~ -
content) a rrhis is c>,lso the reason 1·rh~r j_t i~ much ,_:n.ore di_-f"-i'l,se 
and ~mphasises to a much l8reer extent traditional activity. 
The nosition outlined in Book One was adA~latB 9 so Hooker 
juffeed 9 for hin ~urpose. For even in skctchin~ his posit~on 
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t~ olJser,re t~e111~ r:tn_d ye {the nTe8l)ytc:r:i_s:fl_~7 1:J;r no Y'IP.r.e:=:ni t3r 
bQ_lincl to j_~:r:tpur-~ them' 0 1_ Des -:;1 t e thi';l acJr..::lr)1_·._rJ_ec'l[;ernent _ t1,o.,t __ he 
has D.l:r:OEH'l3r a:r:ri,red at a concl_usion contr?.;:>~r to that of the 
In othe:r~ ·word2., 1iJB ma~r ta:cc h' __ ]_I]l to be S2>~;r1Y1:'::: tlJpt }1 e i s -=1.bovt 
to 1 de:rJ.onst1:'8.te I Hhat the truth is in :ree;a:rd to 13.1.'[ 0 ·:rhis 
intention he attempts to carry out in the fi~st book of his 
yi_p,_·r of n1~j_ch 9 he 8J1t:i_cj_p8terl i_t 
1 mJ.o;ht -ne:r<3.c1VP. 1'1_t1n~e lJRiTP l>een lT\OrP rrn;_wJ_::l.:t:' 3.nO ffiO!':'EJ 
pla~sibie to vuJ~~:r: e~es, if th1s fl:r:~t disco~:r:se h~d 
bee·n_ q:r,ent in extollin2' t~1e fn~ce of J8vrs 9 in ,co.heyri_•1,c:; 
the g:r:Gat necesAity of the:rn 1111e:n the;r D.re r,ood 9 8Jl_d in 
c:-e~g::8.V8ti:n,o: theiT ~f;cmce by wh_om public laws aTe in-
JUTlOnsly traduced .-
:But Hooker chose not t:he bee.ten :oath of polcmic;o~.J o.ssert:i_on 
l)ut the 8."1}arentJ:y p1ore :!J:rofi table cou~r:'se of 9.ttewptinc; to 
1 teac)'1 me11 a. reason 1•rhy just encl. J::'caso:n?bl e l8J:!S 8.re of 
so ~rcat foTce, of RO gTeat usg in the wo~ld; and to in-
form th2ir mJ_nc1P. with some method of :recl1_1 cine; the lavrs 
viliereof there is present controversy unto t~efr f~rst 
Ol:'.i.("i_-·1;-:l_ c<:'.'Ses~ t~1~~t snit !flOY lJp _i_n e•rw-~~r 2'~=d~i_r"-l<"'J::' 
nrrl_i:r-.·nce t;:,<:>:r'ellv tho bette!:' diocerY!_ecl_ 9 Hbetncr t110 flf'"P0. 
be '::'0?.C"'<O:n<lrl_c;~ ;i;'lst .~-r'~- 1~.i~··ht2nrs nT :ro 1 cJ_ 
S0}1h5_c8.1 1 fo:cce. 'Jl}Jj_ny of COPJ:>C)8~ :i.n no \'!83' i:n,rcl_i0.8tPs his 
FonkeT 1 s invc~tj~atio:n 1 -tl]_ 8 
cuJa~ly 2~plicable to the ~attaX' in ~lest5.on, na~oly the stntus 
not o b p, c rv c cl hv rp ;-=' n •r r • 2 
• • • ·- . ··J h 01·rover 1 i 8 cl j_f f j_ 0.11_1-+; ~ (' 11.0. 
'jn~icj_nvs 1 ~ecisions. 
hraeds in 1 reli~ious' mi~~s 
lo 
2 0 
~) 0 
1rpt2_f,_,l er::-:~-;_-(Y}Eti on of G.ll l21·'cc 9 '-'·1n Ui'e 8.nc1 bc!1.cfi t 
1:rlH:!reof ve ~.ee 9 l1CCCJ1H"18 thr:re C8.n 110. nn rlo1111t l111i; that 
lf'WJ 2:~1~):?.X'r'i1tl:~;· ":ooc1. C'r::'e (.c1.s j_t 1:reX'o) t::.-i:nc"i CO:'}ir:d -, 
ov_t o:f tl..,_e Y'8X'Y t.'.'l.bJas nf t"l'].c1t 'hizh e"'rerle':'t:i_n/>; J.21.·r'. · 
:Reel 0 J'nJ 0 9 _l 9 xvi 9 l. 
!Jn~c1_,_ ~ Pnl.,, p I 9 xvi 9 1. 
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schools, ;:mc1 tr1.0se v.rho h8.ve not l;ee!l. ednc8.tFH'1 to such n st:-<:nc'l8.:t'rl 
have no h1Jstness in TJu'::oJ_ic lifo o 
8,8 1•re hP.VC 8 8 e:n.; 8 1 1_·rr:; j_ zh t~r 1 
j_ t folJ_o;-rs t"l;:J.t CT'i. tic ism of e~d.stin(~ l;:n-_r :i_E: of the snrr!e 
character'. 
are publicly accrer1i tccl IJCJ:'snns and 1.fho ·he.ve the cnpacit3r to 
e.s a Hhole or j_:n pe.rt o 
by the_lm-r _Qf )JUbl j_c deter.m.ination.s overJ:'ul-ed ~ 1_,re take 8.wa-y 
ll '1 ']_' t f' . bl l . f' . tl·l __ e 1,t_rorl;:J_ t cl 8_ ____ Ji088J_ Jl l ,y 0.: SOC:I_;-=1, __ P. _l__e l:O _ u 1Jh:i.le n~_tnre 9 
in short 9 ~ives to experience a finite chnJ:'acteJ:' 9 it is political 
OJ:'~er th8.t gives a measuJ:'e of certainty to the actions of 
OJ:'flj_:n8.r;r Flen :i.n the vro~.-:'lCi. o 
•:rho EJ.re ie;noJ:'ant of the various i~y~Jes of 18.VJ an_r3. of the force 
behind them and regard the nccessaJ:'y distinction between public 
and private as 'irrelevant'. En~~land :i_s as 8 .. con.se11vence torn 
b~r dissent o Hor t_ne PJ:'csoy-ter:i_ans 1/ho 8.1:':> ma1.d.n7 sll.ch rla:n-
,n:erous cx·.i. tic isms of JT:nr-r,lish institutions are e..r:r~ot~a:nt nnd 
l}_nablc 9 because of tn e :i.r assert:i_ VP.Y1 ess 9 to ace ept the n'or2.l:i_ ty 
of their identity as members of ~~Blish society. 
indiv5~ually be the best of all peo,le. 1 Ye2. 9 I F'l.m :c>e:r::~uad.ecl.', 
Hooker declares 9 
l 0 
2 0 
'that of them w:i.th ~:/hom. :i_:rt thj,s c::3se \'Te stri,re, t1'1e:r:-e ;o_:r.e 
,.rhosc betters 3T'lO!I.:~:st men ucwJJt l1a-rrily oe fo,,nri_~ i.'€' t:hey 
did not 1ive amnnpRt men, hut in soma ~ilderncss hy tham-
l I ? se .. ves o-
~.i~c; c 1 0 :>o:_ 0 9 -r ? xvi 9 G 0 
T';cc1 n :coJ 0 ~ T 9 xv:i_ 
' 
(-) 
* 
1 ') '7 
c:tnc'l_ i,::norA.:nt nf c j_>r:U_ l'1.1_·r o 
p•~:i_v::ltf? l:'eo.son; ,.,r1e:rP. t'•c l8.1:rs nf' :::ml1]_j_c c;}1ouJrl. tD_\e )1J!<CI) 9 
the:; breed c1i_stm:'bance 1 a 1 
mRy readily iae-ntify it as he:ing of a practic2l ch~r~ctc:rc 
:tn_ oth o:r:-
,._,ith_ t1--Je con.n_nct of 1:i.fe ·in e;e-n.er2..Jo 
N0.tte:r:-,s of co:n.c1nct :i_:n_ the 1:ro:rJd nf nr:'l"Jnti_ce :res11lt i!l. 
i rt 
. ~ •J 
. ;:) t "l d . 1 ' . l ~~~c"se ~~e .Rl. we oo1rec. ~o a~rJve. 
c }l_PJ!.e;iz:tr; o 
part of identityo 1'!ithnnt che:n?;e :::u-, j_r'IP.nti_ty f!OFl.CI. :not O'CiGt 
Tho ~orld is ~eculiar jn thRt in practice it con~iRts 
pJ_ive. 
EJJ:TG its • 
1 1Jel:i_evecl. i_n i;'."c f:~"0e11 J5,o:l1t 9 t}lr-: o:rr:~:L<-1.stic :fntP:>:P. th2t 
y~ar by yn2r reoedeR br-:f0:re ns. It eluded UG then 9 but 
tl--c_t 1 s no rne.tteJ::> -- tomol:'J::>m·T 1·re 1·.rill rnn fester', st:r-:-ctch 
o11.t ouJ::> a:t:>ms fF:t:>ther "0." A11cl one f::i_:n e rn.o:>:n5 nr; 1 o 2 
No such fine moJ::>ning can ever come, tlhethP:r it iP in the fo~ro 
I•Te are, t11ercfore, forced to concluc1_e the.t j_n t~e 1.-ro:r::-lrl of 
1. 1filotP.l cllcl'JGe is 8.lNRY8 rnol::'e exteEPi_vo t''1e11. tbe C1"..,1".'."P. 
riP.S'i.(·;ncr(; ancl tf1 f' 1.·rholo 0f: i·,rh;=J.t j_s entnj_leci. C'~.:-1 :r:te1t!1eJ::> he 
f'nrns e en Yl o:r::- c j_ :rcnrs c r:i_·b eeL T(l_ 0~1 t.~. ty c c>.l"" o t o orr. ,l_ r=>t eJ_~, l; e 
rlPte~mineCl. 1 '"'• (),gJcosh ott~ .R0 t;\on . .,_~_j_mn in. ~')oli,_t;_c:s., J,onclo:n. 
J 0 6?, :n. 17?.. 
?() ;,1 , n 1 ,) Tilif;,~r~('ll'J'":'Il_,.:~') r~-l~'l(' r'-..-.""'p-!-;- r_r..:--l:r1 ly·u, 51'1 r,l,-.,,....., -~-~')_(':lc~;r. r~fc;~fJ- _'~r,()-'~_t, 
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practice 9 in a world of selves and other selves 9 a man's 
identity or that of a particular society is 
1 oooo nothing more than an unbroken rehearsal of contin-
gencies, each at the mercy of circumstance and each 
significant in proportion to its familiarityo It is 
not a fortress into which we may retire 9 and the only 
means we have of defending it (that is 9 ourselves) 
against the hostile forces is the open field of our 
experience9 by throwing our weight upon the foot which 
for the time being is the most firmly placed 9 by cleaving 
to whatever familiarities are not immediately threatened 
and thus assimilating what is new without being unrecog-
nizable to ourselves 1 ol 
I suggest 9 then 9 that Hooker in the EcclesiasJ;_ic_?,l_I:oJ-J-Jx 
is concerned with such identifiable particulars and with such 
order as the English Commonwealth of his day enjoyedo The 
effect of this interest is to condemn the consequences of 
certain beliefs and actions on the laws and tJt>aditions of 
Englando In short 9 he is concerned with the identity of the 
English constitution in the face of what he considered to be 
undesirable change o We have seen that the Presb .. -terians have 
been castigated as irrational because they are ignorant of t~e 
difference 9 for instance 9 between the public good and a private 
dreamo They likewise deliberately disregard the distinction 
between probability and necessity which any rational being in 
the world ought to be aware ofo It is clear in Book One of the 
Ecclesiastical Polity that at least; Hooker is conveying his 
audience to the conclusion that the Presbyterians do not under~ 
stand what it is to have a rational and indeed a properly 
Christian experience of the worldo By the end of the first 
book he has shmm to his own satisfaction at least that the 
Presbyterians are (1) irrationalp (2) ignorant9 and (3) irres-
ponsible9 and has at least implied that they do not know what 
lo Mo Oakeshott 9 Rationalism in PolitiCS 9 Po 17le 
YE!.r.:i_ 01_1 s ls,_·rs of n2 tn,:-e 0 
of i·r}18.t l:i.vLnP' i_:n ~i v:i.l "'40C.i_et:;r j_-rqrol;res o 
ex•;e~ci ence of ,_.rhat hetn ": d.v.:i.lisefl. 2-Y1.Cl. r2.ti cn-=1 1 ent~ 5.1 s c 
(.i_ j_ ) 
Jn the m~jn? Boo~ nne o~ the 
J+: 2.ttf':nJ.DtP- to 
e:n.rl ec.VOlE' m.i.[:':ht a];r>lee,r to be philosoprdc8J out tbe <=wh.i cvemc:mt 
il l 
.ll.Cto 
On_e of 
c ::1.8.YJ.~~~ 0 
1J:!l1_e coYJclusi ons of t:·"' investi_gation co·rcl.Fctecl i_:n Book 
8.re ~ui.tc cJ.cRrly hounCl up 
that Book One of the ~cclcRiE'-Atical 
- ~ . ~ ' 
l_ c; -.;:·;- +'•·i_n T rl" 11'ft ]TI(''l'" -1-:" ~,or•('nt ~1o0i~ n"",''PJ:' -r.''01'"'11'!'; 
'i;'·,:c-•+ -~·-•i:lJ_::~~l_ l_:-:>1-r ,_,..,,_, Yln-1~ 1-1~~''8 I c 
nBrticul~~Aa ~he endeavour to~~~ds co~nrehenninn ~na cohe~ence 
may lea~ to philosophy often by mere inadvertence, ~ut si~~ly 
because i_cleas 8.re tJYi te genero.lly ex~rJT'PGsed ~~T no me8J•S ,__,.:i_,rf's 
l f?:eneral o- H . ... e lS 
corned to characterize Christian thoucht and conducta 
con-
It •:rould not be clo.iroecl b~r anyone today~ J t~lin!;;:, -:~hp_t 
the Christian reli8'ion :i_s sor:neh ow a philosophical creed o It 
is~ to put it at its simplest 5 mainly concerned with mc~'s 
rolat:i.onohip to 0-od o.r•d t'be SBJ_v~.t:i_on of· his soula "lut 
Ohrist·i.s:rU.ty i_.s involveclvritl-t. conduct :i_n the •:rorld. Inrleen? 
for thE Chr~sti8n his religion enters into all his acti~ity. 
In the rn_j_n_dle a.ges thc:: vrhole of rea.l:i_ty COl..l.ld be :iJl.e,•t:i_f:i_ed 
as Ohrjst:i.an. Conseouently, Christianity could b~ taken 
to rc:c:>rcsent J:'e8.li ty. For instance~ .since in t}1 e Ec clAsias-
with revealed relieion (and it is only by claiming that 
nature leads 'rationally' to re~elation that a conflict 
may be conceived) the conclusion vie FlG.;;r jus tifj_8.bly drP.•:r ~ 
at least as f8.:r' as Hooker i2 concerned., j_s that natlJ_re.l lavr 
ernm c :i_a t e s OD.}_~r t1' o s e :rr:i_:nc i pl o s to •:r>i ch tl"1 e Churc lJ rray 
1. r11ho ·t1:JO o.rc 9 i11 .. E1Y VieV·T~ )J.:-txdly cl_Jsti.njuichable :i_'l,'' 
Hoo:::er 1 8 :r~ccleA:i ~.Gti_cFtl T''o:U ty desni te tht~ form of 
the ar~un,·c:-n.-t·~-- - -------- ~--· ·· 
,. ' . f' .-
-I 
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:r1a8 ,,,ore th_8.n ~pe.rti 8.lly l:'evealecl_ i tnelf' o 
tone. tn.e Be o~- 28j.n~~-t5_c:t}_ 
~ - - . 
of Rpparently ab~olvte princi~les. 
is :nr8ctical. 
Hocker r s 21~:'1lPleni~ c.<:Jn be j_(l e:ntified ntill :rwre clea.rly? 
relieious experience may be defined as being in ~eneral con-
t ' lt. t ,l cerneo_ wj_th 'one'R 8,ttitu_dG to1-12~rdr-; oneself 8nd jne ,__,__ J.n1.2, c " 
rflhe nJ .. ti)llate nee~ :11ot 9 so it i" n.Jle~~erl_ 9 re£er i•" partj_Clll(l.:r 
to n t:r'3J1SCeY10.ent r.'-od 2 (in '·'he,teve:r sense tra~Jsce--(lcl_ent Dl8.y 
be to.\':e:n) lmt ~n -~~oo:V.:r-:r's case :i.t ~loCRc 
1)1l_t 8.ls o theologic2.l in tlw.t the 111 i~:i.rnB.te referent j_s C:or'l 
and his creation" 
1 o J o No Keynes 9 1 i\'fy -,,~~rly F'-el:i_ efG 1 in rp, ro -,,,1_emoL("'s_ 9 T,onn on 9 
19~9, no 82. 
2n f[lhj_s? :r ,~!<.I'<? to ·f:;})j_-;1lr:; is Yl_Q~; r2nJ_l_~r t-rEe. If n:ne •rc:•~e 
8.tteJnl1-+;i_nn~ to esi~-?l->l:i_r:3l"_ ~- :th_i_lo""OT)h:icFl.l e:~·-:J·:,.-,.,t·i n:n of' 
'·rhe,t rr:<U.,r~JJJ!lp r:;v;~r;-e"_('>-''CP. :i.'' ,,1;r-r1t, ~~:~cl" t1~r C'J~1C:0nt. of' 
r'orl rn•2t .c<,']lr>Pl:r f:j_._.,n i i;p. nJ~cr; ~ .. , _; t c 
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seen to 2rise in con:rectinn ,,,j_trt ~~he rr.nl1Jem nf rc-fe:cx-ifl[' in 
reli~ious activity and a:t:"gument. 
Book One of the ~cc]_en5aoticGl Pnlitv iP t~e n91vini~t nonition 
+ ~ - .-- .,_ -"- -=o;o ----.·-! • 
1.'72,8 in the.i:t:" c;;res so der;enex-a_te that it. he,d l:i_ttlc O::' ;•o 
Jt i~ the Rjhl~ that 
of the Church. 
he is 8.nd 1·.r'l-J.ex-e -i-! e io ~oinc: 0 qe has no identity of m~jor 
frarnevror~( o 
1 o l1Tatnre.l t 11_ col o:o;y 9 o { co nTs e 9 0 e•" j_ e s t'1 Fl t rR l i.c;.i ow--.; 0'':-rJe~,._,i_ enc e 
is :r11en:l3r ~c:Lf·-mnvinp; fl.nCl cons:i_r1ers that rcl:i_;~Jnn'-1 ste.te= 
me:ntR en(l_ nr.r·;llJ'llcntn rnay be ver:U'ied h~r re:?o:r': nee to non·-
:rrJ.i,o-:i ot~R st.,tcme'"t'j ox- aT:·:.;vments. fl:}lj_8 rl_j_sC~,~·;rceme),t 
lJP.t'·.reeT! r1" tll':','ll -1~<.., r:clo:''Y 8J"~c) 1non-n'' t;UJ::";:l.l 1 tll '·oJ.or·y is 
T):::tPt of the CO:"ltc:rT. 'IT i-;1'18 0:i Q}'ll'tr:> l)p-:~, 'f':P]1 Ho.-)lrpp -~~71('1 
hie-! Q'1·'()'1P'<t.:-~c 
CT'P:=J.t i OY1. o 
cl.ef:i. ni tj_ on. 
l c· r .. , ·i 
(iii) 
,q t 8i·iffii Yl p 
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ft?rence 1 of a name or:> r:o•1.copt f:ron that 1f'j_ch i·:: nsvaJ}~r 
sicUo.:r:y 1 011_8 0 
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no-rn··2.ll v 
. ,, 
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~eflectio~ o~ nocieJ activity ~~~ o~~anization. 
~~d society n~turol. ~h0 one thus sunDorts the other and 
t-r:'l1tb 0 
1'-od 1 s Tt::8, ·on. 
l 
reflC'cti Tr'lo r--
JJ'l tJn1e? thP. 
o:n 8. le.:r:'/CO sc2.le cia not become JilCG.nt:r::-(l_ePs rrorely by 1->ei:n.~a; 
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sue~estion that so~~ chan~es mi~ht be inexpl~cnble froM this 
point of yj_c;l'fo 
.IHJ thj_G 9 J R11.0:f7~st 9 ;:n}plj_es to Booker's -rlOsj_t..ion an(l_ 
arf>:u•n e·(l t , 
nhn~ i~ R helieve~ r~sur~ity, believ0fl hoc~uce the ~bsurdity 
.s;oes unreco::;;nized" 
Jt is not ~'- nyth :nor e. C8.te,r;ory 
mj_.ste.lce at all; it :i_s on] y 01'1C fo:-:'m th8t rn~actj_caJ converse:l.tion 
lo ,Jo Fa Hexter 9 'The J,oom o:c I,2.i1~(U.8.(:8 P.Prl t11" Fal) j_c of 
I0prratives: the Cane of Il Principe nnd Uto,ia', 
.~T~OT:i_con HJ<:d:;s_r)-~C}3)-__ };e.'r:i_c~-~ 9 vola J,:cnc~ 1C)64o 
2o Oo:Uin_~_,rood h2.0 a sj_rnil8:r y;r:-oblern j_:n 8.CCOl'nt5_nP for 
C}lAJ'J.crc:-J j_n r\lJsnlute ·nr:-r.nll~Y,-JOSi tions o See 1~<'1_ ::·;~<'12V en 
}'~c.t}='-1J1}y,s},9_s,, Cb':forn. 9 l<J4-0 9 :Do 48 9 :rw-:~ eo 
n·P l_C?,f2o 
.. l ?.Jn c. 
some kind of cnhPrenco tn 8 variety o? helicfo and jm~0~Pti1res. 
Tt 
Our l::' r ,0,tJ.8 r: c :i. 8 
i -· .. _.., 
Bxtended metapho~s may be said to have ~~rir ori~in in 
limitless s~ope and ar~l:ic~tion. 
meta_1Jhor is? therefore 9 ' th n ;J l oo .... __ ca~·-
( i v) 
In other ~orr'ls, the term 
natural merely gives Rn ~nnarent objectivity tc what is alrPady 
believed to be the t~uth :i.n any cace. 
1 cl elnonstrG.t:i.on 1 of the trl:' th of thE'·s e jJi :<'~-8 0 
natl, re is th c trEe not:i. on r1nd that it should, in eny ar:~nrne:n t 9 
It J11l,_Rt be 
s}lm,r:n. that certc:lin hu:rnP:n ::wt:i_,ri ties anrl the :nroper orclcr:L:nc; of 
the8e <?ctJ,ri ties are er:1ne:ntic:1.1 c-1.nn co:nsti tutive of ,,,-h:Jt Jt j_o to 
lo 'J:'ncc.t j~; 9 :i.t j_s Yl.Clt ,.r.,r.r.r's•:i_,~('(l ;1c: rn,~-·-:'::>l.y ;=1, ':1'0t::-·'~]1Qc"j_c-:,J. 
o c;nc~:>i_nt:i.nn ~ 
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short, DreRonts his cesc as nne of 1 ~o0in~ iG heliavJn~ 1 ~ it is~ 
fT1_1~ r._ I ]'l_':-1 -]~111';';1.]_ I_ 
t',1emsclves~ 
I}'= C • 
'":' -.,,, ,,, l..., ,,-...";I"\ i- \ 
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absolute Drincirles do not have the unthority he ~Jnjms they havn" 
T:n t!•j_s 
:'Ilodc of c>:-:De:cie~'~cc 1:12 ~13ye cor.1e to think th8.t tl1c:rr j_s :n.n P110.1~ 
thing a.B P.l'~ 8Y::i.ornatic Jl:t:'inciple that can 8.ct as tho fi:n8.l (1eter-
mj_ nPYJ t jn 
ano ;,rhat rlctr::rl'l.ines authority in ~nr8.etiee 2ncl. in '):::'8Cticc,l 
arg11ment is ttme anc1 si tuationo /\.utl1ori tic::s in yn.·nctical activity 
some extent 7 such argument ID.8.y determine tJ'Jc character 8.nd COllJ:'SC 
of an exerclse of such authorityo Clearly the 1 n~tnral 1 idiom of 
expression in Book One of the :P.cclesi_C?.stical :roli ty is thou£>;1:.t 
c. -o · · - ::- . _ ..= ~ • • • . - '=--=oo -=.--~ '--
VC?.:riety of lawso TJ1:_s defence of lcn-r j_n e;ener8J_9 )10i·TP,'IJ8r? j_s 
c1.1lar la•:rs j_n the :·~ngJj_sh Com:r:1oD.1:ree.l tho T~e conclvcion of 
Hoo1ce:r 1 s 8T~~um211.t is t11at the 'n2t1~ral 1 i(l_j_orn au.t1'lori tc.:bvely 
determb1es the veJj_cHty of tr1ese paTt!tcul8.-r la'·Iso In f8ct 7 
HnokeT's o-p.Lnions as to t}-~e vFJ.lue of tr1e lP.tt.e:r 8.1'8 prj_o!:' to their 
reinforcement by the apnea]_ to natureo 
enjoys j_s for the most port 8. ve:r~' v3.lv.2.ble trar'1itio11o 
ar~ument ~-.rh.:i_ch cl:-:dms '-"rl12t is valv.able i!l. pn~tic1,J.3.r is T' 1.t:i_r:-n::d 
.A..t t:h r; ontsct 
Loncl.on.? 1967 o 
irt -·w:-tc:t5cco 
of >in c'l.iscv!3sion of :P':Il . .:i_·i~icRJ. 
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PART V 
NATUREu TRADITION 
AND AUTHORITY 
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EXPERIENCE, AUTHORITY k~D ORDER 
In the fifth part of this essay our attention will 
be directed to the important place that tradition and insti-
tutional order attain in Hookervs thought principally in 
relation to his detailed examination of scriptural inter= 
pretation, the nature of the Church in time, and the order 
of the Christian Commonwealth. The present chapter intro= 
duces us to these subjects by endeavouring to examine 1 in 
a broad fashionu the nature and the place of tradition and 
authority in the Ecclesiastical Polity. The chap_ter is 
divided into three sections~ the first deals with the notion 
of an objective external authorityv the second investigates 
traditional authority and institutional orderu and the third 
attempts to trace the relationship between these facets of 
natureu tradition and authority. 
Beforeu howeveru undertaking this discussion; we may 
remind ourselves of the "natural 11 status of the principles 
that inform realityu for this has a direct bearing on our 
examination. The enveloping form of Hooker 1 s argument is 
I_ 
metaphorical or isomorphic in character. In the 
Ecclesiastical Polit_y this isomorphic argument is expres= 
sive of a uniform and consistent disposition of mind, and 
1. On isomorphic argument see S. J:vlorris Engelu 1'Isomor= 
phism and Linguistic Waste" v J:vlindu vol.L~~V u 1965. 
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this disposition is simply to see in the multiplicity of 
man°s experience structurally similar patterns. The metaphor 
is employed as a means of displaying to the understanding 
the underlying unity of the natural and the super~natural. 
This system is not merely descriptive in character, it is 
prescriptive also. Opinions of a prescriptive nature may 
be "deduced" from the principles revealed. However, the 
logical operation of 1'deducing" recommendations or justi~ 
fications of proposals about what to do in particular his-
torical circumstances is nowhere elaborated. The system 
proclaimed provides only a vocabulary and serves merely as 
a context for Hooker 0 s prescriptions. 
The mode of argumentation employed by Hooker, namely 
that of correspondence, purports to lay bare the structure 
of reality. Potentially it is able to determine what is 
and what is not a part of this structure, and thereby to 
determine the pattern of reality. But, although ostensibly 
this order was considered to be "natural 1', that is, not 
created by human artifice, it was clearly a construction 
of related ideas purporting to represent the world from a 
particular point of view. 
In Hooker 0 s judgement, the principles that informed the 
order of experience were authoritative in regard to the ends 
that man does and o~c;}ht to pursue. Such isomorphic support 
as these principles had was not, however, of the compelling 
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force that Hooker supposed. To unfold a correspondence 
is not to offer a logical "demonstration °1 • Indeed, it 
was tacitly admitted by Hooker that the natural principles 
governing reality in general were so abstract as to stand 
in need of interpretation. Such principles may be considered 
to circumscribe in general, in particular situations an 
informal judgment was necessary to determine upon a par-
ticular course of action. 
It was, nonetheless, assumed, if neither argued nor 
explained in a clear fashion, by natural law theorists that 
natural law did help to reveal 10 correct'0 or 0'right 11 answers 
in regard to conduct. This they needed to assume 6 for the 
moral nature of this law would otherwise become practically 
superfluous. At the level of political activity in parti-
cular, the force of natural principles was such as to make 
those who had authority and power accountable both to God 
and to the citizen body. The duty of obedience of the 
latter, indeedv was in part conditional upon the ruler 
conforming his reason and will to the principles informing 
political society. Accountability 6 in this sense 6 has 
certain identifying features. It is not, for instance, the 
kind of responsibility and accountability that may be seen 
within the legal system of constitutional rule. Here the 
standard to which the ruler is held is either a written con-
1 
stitution or a body of common and statute law. In such 
1. See J. R. Lucasv The Principles of Politicsv Oxford, 
1966, p.34. 
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cases a subject may claim that a statute passed by the 
legislative body is not validv that isr not truly law, 
and can obtain a validation of this claim from the judiciary. 
If this procedure is allowed to work with some success, 
it is more than likely no great pressure for a form of 
accountability external to it.~ill cosueo 
Such pressure, in any case 1 assumes that such a form 
of accountability external to traditional authority can be 
satisfactorily devised, although it is extremely debatable 
whether it can. The accountability implied by natural law 
theorists is not of the kind just described. Natural law 
itself is not identical with the particular arrangements 
of any association in timev and it is possible that 1 in 
the present conditions of imperfectionv it may be "in-
terpreted" in an incorrect fashion. The right consequently 
assigned by nature to the rational man = the right to dis= 
obey the authority of a ruler when the latter violates one 
or all of the principles governing political order = is 
not a constitutional right of the character that finds 
expression·in some procedure for testing the legality of 
a particular statute or a particular action. It is a right 
assigned not to the individual subject at all but to a 
rational beingv and this right comes into play only as the 
result of a personal or "private" judgment o:E a kind external 
to the political and legal order itself. Indeedp to speak 
of right instead of duty and to talk of this judgment 
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as 11 private" may be considered to be a distortion of the 
truth, for natural law is not a personal area of experience 
but a general rational measure potentially open to all 
rational men. 
The difficulty with natural law as an objective exter= 
nal standard is that it cannot, without a good deal of 
qualification and elaboration, do that which it claims to 
do, which is to offer a judgment or judgments applicable to 
all historical circumstances. There is no guarantee that 
in practice appeals to natural law would be consistent with 
each other, despite the fact that it (natural law) supposedly 
offers the "correct" answers. There appears, therefore, the 
possibility that a subject, or in this case a rational agent 
who happens to be a subject, may judge, on consulting natural 
law, that he must disobey the rulerQs laws, while other 
subjects and, indeed, the ruler himself have an equal duty, 
based on thedr own "rational" judgment, to compel right 
action. One of them (or none, but not both) must, according 
to the law of reason, be "correct" in the subjects judgment, 
for in every situation there are categorical injunctions. 
The kind of accountability that requires that the ruler 
conform to an absolute standard of which the individual rational 
agent has equal access is a necessity (to use HookerQs 
terminology) 0 The other kind, which subordinates the subjectQs 
truly private judgment to the findings of a public office, takes 
its specific identity from the particular order to which it 
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referso The distinction between the two kinds of accounta~ 
bilityu between a constitutional right determined by public 
procedure and a rational duty imposed by external standardsu 
is one that did not clearly emerge in the middle ages" 
There are perhaps two reasons for this" In the first in-
stance, natural law was not merely an explanatory body of 
knowledge, it was also a collection of prescriptive injunc~ 
tionso There was, thereforeu no absolute distinction 
between theory and practice" In the second instance, the 
Catholic Church claimed from time to time to be the proper 
arbiter between the ruler and his subjects" That is, it 
endeavoured to act as the authoritative interpreter of the 
authoritative lawo In this way the potentially radical danger 
that is an ever~present consequence of the attempt to set 
up standards external to the politically and historically 
contingent was apparently dissipatedo For the individual 
had a duty of disobedience only subject to the approval of 
the Church whichu therebyu acted in the capacity of a public 
judge in disputes over the interpretation of natural law 
in specific caseso As a result, the potentially anarchic 
situation that could possibly ensue if each subject were to 
be the judge of what was correct in every situation, wasu 
in theory, avoided by virtue of the fact that both subject 
and ruler were liable to the final and uni versa.l authority 
of the Churcho 
This apparent solution did notu howeverv settle this 
problem at all, because; as the subsequent development 
of medieval political thought revealsv the difficulties 
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have only been c~is:._12.2.ced to a "higher 1' level and not elimi= 
natedo Forv since the Church was constantly attempting to 
act as the public judge of the rational essence of particu= 
lar lawsr it tended to become incorporated into the poli= 
tical p~ocess and as subject to the historically contingent 
as the "lessern political powers" If the Head of the Church 
claimed the right to define the conditions of political obedi= 
ence and disobediencev then inevitably the institution of 
the Church would become the authoritative institution 
covering all aspects of human existenceo Thereforer in spite 
of the appearance of political and ecclesiastical dualityr 
there would, if the Church had been able to impose its willv 
have been only a single unitary system and a single 11 poli= 
tical" order of which the Papacy would be the headv and within 
which the authority and power of the lay institutions would 
be merely derivativeo This was a conclusion that was openly 
recognized and often welcomed by many papalist writers of 
the fourteenth centuryo 1 It appears to have been implicit 
in a great deal of ecclesiastical thought about the charac= 
ter and status of political order throughout the later middle 
ageso 
This theoretical coalescence (and that is all that it 
was) of church and commonwealth as the superior and the 
inferior powers in a single associationv gives rise, unfor= 
tunatelyu to the same question that was previously raised 
1" See generally M o Wilks r The Problem of. Soverei_g-p_!:~ 
the Later Middle Ages, Cambridger 1963" 
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in relation to the whole political order. That isv may the 
ruler (in this case the Pope) not act in a manner that contra= 
venes the natural law? This question was commonly answered 
by claims that it was impossible for the Pope to err by 
virtue of his special relationship to Christ. Such an answerv 
howeverv is of a character different to the natural law 
thesis that the ultimate basis of the duty of political 
obedience is a rational assent to the authority of natural 
law. It amountsr indeedr to a doctrine of a unique personal 
authority for which faith is the only warrant" The real 
interest of the question in this new form is that it forces 
one to decide whether one holds to natural law theory in 
its "strong" or 11 weaker" form. In its strong form there is 
no possibility at all of public judgment of claims based on 
natural law against the political authority. In its weaker 
form an institution such as the church interposes itself as 
the final arbiter, against whose interpretation of the natural 
law there can be no appeal. It will be seen that Hooker 
for all practical purposes held to the weaker form. 
The Reformation resulted in the loss on the Protestant 
side of one form of external accountability, namely the 
Papacy. Among radical Protestants natural law tended to lose 
the theoretically important place it had previously heldv 
and was replaced by another form of absolute norm, that isv 
the Scriptures. Howeverp the interpretation of Scripture 
likewise became institutionalized in various ways. One of 
the sects that claimed authority in this sphereu as the Papacy 
had claimed it in anotheru was the Calvinist. Thusu in timer 
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any political association that came to contain within its 
borders a strong Calvinist movement was faced with similar 
problems as when the Papacy attempted to impose its full 
theoretical authorityo 
Not all churches or political associations that rejec-
ted the authority of the Papacy did so for the same reasons. 
Some in point of fact did not immediately have to face and 
oppose a radical congregationu claiming through illuminationv 
and intent upon establishing 6 absolute authority in religious 
activity. Yet the Protestants v1ho still held to some form 
of natural law in the scholastic sense had their own parti~ 
cular ''theoretical'~ difficultieso For with the loss of 
external accountability in the form of the Papacy 1 the Protes= 
tant scholasticsv including Hooker; werev in theory at leastu 
faced with the strong form of natural law. The gap felt by 
the Papacy was scarcely filled by the "national 11 churcheso 
For in England; to take one case 1 the national church was 
not in a position to claim; let alone enforcer absolute 
authorityu over and against the Crown. 
Hookeru s argumentu in the ~ccles·iastical Po~i_'!::l.u 
may be judged to be "political 11 in that the notion of insti-
tutional continuity is brought to the fore to crush poten-
tially radical criticismo An institution immune to the pas-
sing of time isu on his termsu an impossibilityo For insti-
tutional arrangements are not directly matters of "necessity" 
but take their character from historical change and tradi-
tional development. Such traditional ~'growth'' is potentially 
good in itselfu and in Englandus particular case her insti= 
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tutionus display no absolute flaw that would require radical 
alteration" The authority of the English constitution, 
consequently, is legitimate and comrnands the respect of all 
Englishmen. 11For its dignity is authentic." 1 
To remark that the English constitutional order has not 
contravened any of the precepts governing political associ= 
ation tells us very little about its particular character 
and iden~ity" The importance of institutional continuity 
in the Ecclesiastical Politx_, thereforeu necessitates an 
examination of Hookerus attitude to traditional authority 
and to the problem of change in the world" The discussion 
is invariably somewhat complex. On the one handu few thinkers 
denied the importance of continuity and order in political 
and religious associationso On the other hand, in the disputes 
about the character of institutions and about the na·ture of 
doctrine there were a number of "true 11 and absolute standards 
that were regarded as necessary aids to judgment" It was 
notu therefore 0 merely a matter of denying the relevance 
and l.mportance of continuity or of certain standards, butv 
especiallyu of determining their relationship to each othero 
Mark Pattison pointed out the error of regarding the Refor= 
mation 11 as an appeal to scriptures versus tradition'' when 
it was more precisely an appeal to history. 2 The histori= 
cal work of the Reformation shifted emphasis not necessarily 
lo Rebecca West 0 The Meaning of Treasonv Londonu 1965, pol5o 
2 o Mo Pattisonu TsaaC ca·saubo~.r 1559=1614 v Londonv 1875 v 
Po362o 
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from classical to Christian antiquity, but from profane to 
sacred historyo Such work centered on an a·ttempt to re-
cover and reconstruct the exact text of the Scriptures and 
the precise institutional character of the primitive churcho 
The Calvinistu hov1ever v was not merely, nor even prima= 
rily, a historical writer seeking to explain what had happened 
in the past by giving what he considered to be the "most 
probable of possible" interpretations, but a prescriptive 
thinker attempting to give authority to what he held to be 
the absolutely true church and to its position within 
mundane historyo The reformer was a man of radical dispo~ 
sition. His intention was to use the new "recoveries" 
to prove that the historical church had failed to transmit 
authority in its proper form (it had become corrupted by 
change), and hadu as a resultu forfeited it by a preoccu~ 
pation with mundane affairs~ Yet, once they had condemned 
the present churchu they, like other exponents of the 
"strategy of return" 1 faced the question of how to define the 
identity of an authority which had existed in the past 1 by 
what authority they now claimed to recognize it, and how it 
had devolved to them in the presento Since what was in dis~ 
pute was the relevance of the action of the sacred Scriptures 
to the world of historical timeu the radicals claimed 
0 the authority of the sacred acting on and through 
themselves, their acts being conceived ascpposed to 
tradition; they claimed both to interpret the past and 
to reform by personal authority and charismao 1 2 
2. J. G. Ao Pocock, "Timeu Institutions and Action: An Essay 
on Traditions and their Understanding," Politics and 
Experiencev edso B. C. Parekh and P. King 1 Cambridgeu 1968, p:-2-27 0 
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The Calvinist 0 s concern was initially with the necessary 
means t:t:Y- salvation. One aspect of this concern related to 
the nature of the "true 1' church, those institutional arrange-
ments laid down in the scriptures for Christians always to 
follow. The establishment of the "true" church was no 
guarantee as to precisely who was saved, but it was a 
sign that among the members of the community some at least 
were the chosen elect. 1 Whileu thenu the underlying interest 
revolved around the salvation of the chosen individualu 
this often appears to have been lost sight of in excessive 
deliberation about the exact features of the '1godly" community. 
In general, the possibility of the resurrection of the indi-
vidual through faith and grace, and the emphasis on inherent 
sin and predestination u combined with the 1'timeless" character 
of the "true" church, led to a great devaluation of traditional 
activity and particular institutional order. Manvs actual 
entry into eternity was not influenced by his time-bound 
deeds. 
This radical differentiation between the activities of 
time and the order of eternity is not present in Hooker 0 s 
Ecclesias·tical Polity. The decisive difference as to the 
1. Calvin himself is ambiguous as to how many will be saved. 
Collinson, for instance, writes that "any Calvinist would 
find objectionable all men might be saved. 11 (See his 
The Elizabethan Pur·itan Movementu Londonu 1967, p.37) 
Howeveru Calvin wrote somewhere in his Commentary on 
1 Timothy, 11 By exhibiting to all the Gospel and Christ the 
Mediator God shows that he wishes all men to be saved," 
and again, 11 the fruit of the sacrifice by which He 
made atonement for sins extends to all." 
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apparent reconciliation of the orders of time and eternity 
is the influence of Aquinas and of schdastic thought. 
Aquinas 1 synthesis of philosophy and theology, and rea-
son and faith served, so it was heldu to allay the inevitable 
clash and bind the orders of existence in·to an apparent 
coherent whole" Whileu however, there could be no radical 
differentiation between the orders of time and eternityu 
important distinctions were not to be overlooked. For, 
although man could contemplate the eternity of God or at least 
his natural "timeless 11 person as well as the flux of tempora-
lity, he was incapable of fulfilling his true end within the 
bounds of time. Between eternity and timeu thereforeu there 
was a distinction but not a radical differentiation. Such 
a projected differentiation was an irrational notion. God 
could not be separated in such a fashion from any part of his 
rational creation. 
The use that Aristotle was put to by Aquinas and the 
scholastics in order to reconcile the faculties of faith and 
reasonu the modes of nature and super=nature was but one 
aspect of the synthesis. What was importantu more so for 
Hooker than for Aquinas 0 was the emphasis present in Aristotle 
on non=philosophical modes of thought and experience. At 
this level it was held that common experience was composed 
of numerous strands of expression 0 of skills and activities 
to which the rational and universal knowledge achieved by 
the philosopher could never be precisely equivalent. 1 
1. Hooker is of course equivocal here. All knowledge is 
potentially relatable to first principlesu to 11 rational" 
knowledge 0 and in principle is deducible from natural law. 
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Since these skills and activities were the product of time, 
they appeared, especially in the Ecclesiastical Polity, as 
those well=established traditions which formed the greater 
part of a particular political association 1 s awareness of 
itself and its contexto 1 
In addition, then, to the idea of eternity, there is 
present in the Eccles·iastical Polity the notion of tradition 
or custom, the image of political order as composed of activi= 
ties practised in the present on the presumption that they 
were practised in the past, and by predecessors in an inde= 
finitely preceding number of pastso Such an image is arrived 
at by repeating the presumption of usage and successful prac= 
tice an infinite number of times~ In Hooker 1 s Ecclesiastical 
Polity, however, such traditional order is not] formally at 
least,self=justifying, and there is a presumption not only 
of previous performance but also of rational performance" 
Clearly Hooker was anxious to invest the present political 
order with authority. This he attempted to do not merely by 
regarding it as an inheritance from the past, but as a rational 
order bequeathed from a past which was likewise rationally 
ordered. Such a presumption the doctrine of natural ends 
allows him to make. 
1. Traditional activity and natural law have quite distinct 
characteristics. They too are potentially relatable, 
and there are certain things that are explicity regarded 
as irrational and may not be performed at all. These 
refer to denials of the truth of Christianity etc. 
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The injunctions of natural law, however, necessarily 
informed the activities of past generationso In reality, 
therefore, these actions alone, which apparently incorporated 
in their workings the injunctions of natural law, could throw 
light on what it was to be rationaL The process of "de~ 
duction 11 need not be attemptedo Such a position has strong 
support in the Ecclesiastical Polityv· for traditional acti= 
vity was regarded by Hooker as particularly importanto Yet 
the form and, to some degree, the structure of his argument 
take on a different character, for the precepts of nature are, 
theoretically, held to have a force independent of their 
efficacy in past or present activityo To have held otherwise 
would involve relativism, absolute relativismo This is pre= 
cisely what the natural law doctrine does not alJ.owo A 
naturalistic ethic may be relativist at very little apparent 
expense (as, indeed 1 Hooker displays), but not at the expense 
of itself completelyo 
Hooker rejects, then, fundamentalism not only in politics 
but in religious activity as wello The common theological 
and philosophical distinction between things necessary and 
things indifferent is employed to justify "political ur in ten= 
tions and conclusionso In this distinction the former 
(things necessary) encompassed the authorized injunctions of 
nature and the Scriptures 1 the latter (things indifferent) 
defined an area where human purpose might endeavouro Origi= 
nally "indifferency" was employed by the Stoics as a moral 
term to describe actions neither good nor bad, but subject 
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to fortune alone. 1 Among English Protestants, including 
Hooker, it was also frequently applied to external actions or 
movements. The Preface to the Book of Common Prayer, for 
instance, describes 'the particular forms of Divine Worship, 
and the Rites and Ceremonies appointed therein" as 
"things in their own nature indifferent, and alterable." 2 
Such external things, in regard to power of dominion in the 
Church of England, do have a political aspect for they may 
be changed only at the instance of the political authority. 
Hooker is, of course, defending such proceedings and the 
results of such proceedings. 
While, then, the notion of things indifferent created 
an area of experience open to human interpretation and choice, 
Hooker had to avoid leaving it to the caprice of individual 
private judgment. Within this area of things indifferent, 
the law of nature was intended to act as some kind of guideo 
Philosophers could reach certain knowledge of natural law 
in those areas not rendered imperfect by the "stain of human 
frailty. 11 As h~s~been previously pointed out, however, it 
was not necessary to engage in philosophical reflection in 
order to be able to act in an appropriate fashion. At this 
sub=philosophical level of knowing Hooker insisted that the 
1. Diogenes Laertius, Li''?es o~ the Philosophers, passim~ 
2o In this regard it is important to note that Book Five 
of the Ecclesiastical Pglit.x; is in part an examination 
and defence of the content of the Book of Comm<?n Prayer. 
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individual must 0 in general 0 act in accordance with the prac~ 
tice of previous generationso That is 0 to act in a proper 
fashion was to act traditionallyo In this regard 0 "the world 
will not endure to hear"v the Presbyterians were informed 9 
"that we are wiser than any have been which went before." 1 
Minimum knowledge of the laws of nature may be gathered from 
"signs"v from uniform activity present in the world. Know= 
ledge thus gathered amounted to "principles universally 
agreed uponp and not by onef or two 0 or few but by allo" 2 It 
was an appropriate conclusion that "the things that are es-
tablished" represent "the general persuasion of all men". 
It is 9 consequently 0 the duty of all members of English 
society to obey the authority of the Crowno For the monarch 
occupies an office that has long been established and is in 
no way contrary to natural and divine lawo It is not the 
business of individual members of this society to judge the 
actions of public authdrityo To be qualified to pass judge-
ment in such matters is not merely a matter of membership 
but 9 most of allv of a proper public educationo It is only 
as a consequence of a correct initiation into the public 
affairs of the community that the individual may legitimately 
pass an opinion on such matters. Such an education introduces 
the individual to the proper principles and criteria by 
which decisions are made, and these principles are those that 
have been duly tried and found to be helpful to the associ= 
ation in question. To take on a publica persona in such an 
1. Ecc o Polo v V v vii, 3 • 
2o Ecc. Pol. 0 Iu viiiv 9=10. 
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associationv it is necessary to be aware of the difficulties 
of the role and to know the duties of tha·t posi·i.:.ion 0 
Obligation to a political association begins with member~ 
ship" The terms of membership are defined by the association 
itselfv or formally by the authoritative officers of that 
association. More often than not so=called wilful membership 
pf political associations at least) is nothing more than 
continued membership after a certain ageo After due reflec= 
tion it may be decided that membership of such an association 
is abhorrent and evilv but change usually means adopting 
membership of another association. For a political associ= 
ation is only indirectly a voluntary society. Entry into a 
political association entails acceptance of the duties of 
membership o Stress on indi v::tc1i.tal choice u however v may lead 
various groups to attempt to redefine conditions of entry 
and acceptancev and thus to change the identity of that 
polityv and of its members. This in essence was the Presby= 
terian endeavour. Such a move however was an anathema to 
Hooker, and his warnings against the disastrous implications 
for the English .Commonwealth of those who would judge public 
order by inappropriate private criteria were numerousg 
uThe patrons of liberty have made solemn proclamation 
that all such laws and commandments are voidv inasmuch 
as every man is left to the freedom of his own mind in 
such things as are not either exacted or prohibited by 
the law of God oooo The plain contradictoryu whereunto 
is infallibly certain. Those things which the law of 
God leaveth arbitrary and at liberty are all subject 
unto positive laws of menu which laws for the common 
benefit abridge man 1 s liberty in such things as far as 
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the rules of equity will suffer. This we must either 
maintainu or else overturn the world and make everyone 
his own commanderov~ 
Hooker concluded that 
uof peace and quietness there is not any way possible; 
unless the probable voice of every entire society or 
body politic overrule all private of like nature 
within the same bodyou2 
Public reason mustu thenu have precedence over 
private opinion. It wasu howeverv not merely the collec~ 
tive reason of a particular time that was superior; rather 
it was the shared agreement which linked together past 
and present generations. 
0 Whereof as any man°s deed past is as good as long 
as he himself continueth; so the act of a public society 
of man done five hundred years sithence standeth as 
theirs who presently are of the same societies; 
because corporations are immortal; we move then alive 
in our predecessors; and they in their successors do 
live still. 0 3 
From these and foregoing remarks it is clear that Hooker 
had a very important place for tradition in his defence 
of the Elizabethan Settlement against Presbyterian claims. 
He implies that part of a nation°s duty and obligation 
to laws and government is its obligation to its own paste 
Thereforeu to avoid confusion and indeed "devolution"u 
any change within the community oughtu if possible; to take 
place in keeping with its traditionso The established 
authorityu which isu directly and indirectly; the achieve~ 
1. ECCo Pol.u Vu lxxiu 4. 
2o Preface u viu 6o 
3o ECCo POlou Iu Xu 8. 
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ment of the activity of past generationsu should control 
any such alteration in public institutions and actionp 
For Hookerv thenv change was a necessary aspect of 
historical existence, 
u .. , whereas it is the error of the common multi= 
tude to consider only that what hath been of oldv 
and if the same were well to see whether still to 
continuev if notv to condemn that presently which is 
and never to search upon what ground or consideration 
the change might grow; such rudeness cannot be 
in you so well borne withv whom learning and judgment 
hath enabled much more soundly to discern her for the 
times of the Church, and the orders thereof may alter 
without offence,ul 
Change was looked uponv neither as a mere innovationv nor 
as a return to a perfect formv but in Englandus case at 
leastv as the perfecting of what was already potentially 
perfect, Changev in shortv was an aspect of continuity, 
I 
In ~he end traditional authority 1 custom and continuing 
practicev if not the most perfectv are the most appropri~ 
ate guides to action in a society that is as obviously 
ordered as England is, 
Institutionalization isv as J, G. A. Pocock has so 
lucidly shownv 2 the necessary cause of traditionalism, 
A society judges itself in purely traditional terms in 
proportion as it is aware of itself merely as a cluster 
or constellation of institutionalized modes of transmitting 
conduct, In the seventeenth century in Englandv for 
2. Principally in "Timev Institutions and Action~ An 
Essay on Traditions and their Understanding"u Riitics 
c::t!l:5!..~ Experience 1 ed, B, C, Parekh and P, King 1 Cambridge 1 
1968, 
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instancev many if not all social and political institutions 
could be and often were conceived as closely bound up 
with the common law. That law was regarded as customv 
and the activity of law making as the conversion into written 
precedents of unwritten usages whose sole authority was 
that of immemorial a~tiquity. The character of institutions; 
in shortu was such as to favour the assumption that the 
only form of action was transmission and the only form of 
knowledge the inheritance of learning.1 There is much of 
this of this style of thought in the Ecclesiastical Polityu 
although as a natural law theorist he could not wholly 
subscribe to such a purely traditionalist view. Nonethe-
lessv in view of his emphasis on the difficulty of formu-
lating good law and on the danger of indiscriminately 
criticizing existing law v he is a tradi tional.i.st. Em-
ploying the distinction between necessity and indifferencev 
he can afford to adopt such a position withoutu in theory 
at least, jeopardizing the more formal aspects of his sys-
tern of thought. 
If one may so term itu the institutional vision is 
somewhat different from the transhistorical vision of the 
human condition. For it, the institutional visionv is 
focused on the systemv or the political order itself, 
rather than on the self. It modifies the trans-historical 
vision for the simple reason that the self or individual 
reacts and appears differently in an institutional order 
than in one not subject to merely political order. He 
1. See of course J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution 
and The Feudal Lawv Cambridge, 1957-.·- ·.- · -~----- ---···--·· 
.. .,,_ __ ----~-- ,..~-· ·- -. - -~ ~ 
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exists amongst his fellow creatures and takes his identity 
t 0 ·t;J..,.U!!l. 
from -~r,1 <;_ rela tionshiplo Society and individual persons 
ar.e, in this sense, co=existent and continuous with each 
othero Therefore, the understanding of timeu and of human 
existence as experienced in timeu disseminated in a poli= 
tical orderv is an important aspect of that societyus 
understanding of its own identityo 
In the Ecclesiastical Polity Hookerus interest centres 
on the relationship be·tweeri man as a creature destined 
for eternity and the character of his existence in time" 
It is clearly the emphasis which Hooker places on the 
time=bound character of man 1 s external activities that 
differentiates~· him from those who would place all signi= 
ficance on the relationship of man before Godo ThUsu 
while the Fall has separated manu for the duration of his 
stay in history, from his final endu it should not be 
concluded that manus experiences in time are of no impor= 
tance, either absolutely or relatively; to that endo 
It is true that through Revelation or by philosophy manu 
insofar as he is capableu may attain a certain knowledge 
of his true endo Yet Hooker neither expects nor hopes that 
every individual will become a prophet or a philosopher" 
At the hLstorical level of man 1 s existence; the traditional 
nature of political and moral action provides a measure 
of order which ~s not to be despised for its lack of 
absolute certaintyo It is of supreme significance in 
manus "external 01 actions o 
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Despite its comprehensive characterv thenu the ex= 
tended metaphor of nature does not give a complete picture 
of reality nor of human experience. What is missing is an 
idea of historical existence and the notion of tradition 
order. It is this latter notion that gives political 
space a time=dimension of its ownv arrived at by extra= 
polation of structure; and thereby a dimension of order 
rather than of disorder and chaos. Since the presumption 
on which it rests is one of continuity rather than identity 
with somethic.XJ,<:}o~-t~~rnal (in short 1 con tin ui ty i tse 1 f con= 
stitutes/its identity) v it leaves room for- even while it 
stubbornly resists = the idea of a past alike and yet un= 
like the present. In this way a political and conserva= 
tive image of qualitative change is arrived atv and this 
furnishes an important antithesis to the idea of time as 
the dimension of disorder and as the arena of evil. 
Nonetheless; surrounded by areas of absolute certainty 
which necessarily have some bearing on man 1 s conduct in 
timeu traditional order cannot be entirely self-supporting. 
The notion of things indifferent does not comprehend 
complete indifference to absolute values Qt all. Politics 
can neverv therefore; be a purely "secular" affair, 
because reality is not of such a character. Historical 
existence is bound by eternity and lower nature. Since 
man is eventually destined for eternity, time=bound exis= 
tence is of value only as the natural path to that goal. 
But peace and security along this path are necessary; 
since only in such conditions may the good life be sought 
andu to some degree 0 found. To ensure such peace the 
= 169 = 
ordering of traditional activity must partake of the 
character ascribed to it by the necessary principles of 
nature. In the first instancev there must be about it a 
certain regularity of order and changev for these are the 
general characteristics of all natural activity. In the 
second instancev society should not only imitate or endeavour 
to imitate nature in the regularity of its workingv it 
should likewise display a clear hierarchy. This hierarchy 
within society should be based on an ordered chain of 
knowing. Thus v those who are W'ise and skilful should 
occupy those places that constitute the highest.points 
in the hierarchy. Society in generalv theref.oreu is a 
hierarchy of roles whose occupants have the capacity 
to fulfill those positions. In an imperfect worldu howeveru 
even those highest in the hierarchy are subject to the 
'
1external 11 au.thori ty of God and nature. 
To concludev thenv while manus end is to exist eter= 
nally wLth God, this should not lead into the concluaion, 
as Hooker continually points out, that time=bound exis= 
tence must rest upon a sea of uncertainty with constant 
likelihood of disaster. For history is not an area of 
disorder nor of any order whatsoever. There are sign=posts 
in the sea of experience. Changeu howeveru cannot be 
reduced to the mere application of first principlesu and 
this is admitted by Hooker with his distinction between 
necessity and indifference. The latter cannot be reduced 
to the former¥ but neither can the first principles be 
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ignored in this area of things indifferent" Hooker 1 
nonthelessv comes to place obvious importance on the tra~ 
ditional order of knowing and actingo Thus 1 as long as 
those who hold public office are aware of the necessary 
principles informing reality 1 then historical existence 
may offer some opportunity for the good life. The insti= 
tutional ar~angemenwof Church and Commonwealth may not 
encompass all aspects of man°s experience 1 they are yet 
necessary for their enjoyment" They constitute the insti~ 
tutional minimum both for life itself and for the good 
lifeo Respect for authority is an essential attribute 
of membership of a societyo To assess its achieve= 
ments by inappropiate criteria is the greatest danger to 
unity andthe common goodo It is this danger which provides 
the occasion for the extended discussion of scriptural 
interpretation 1 the character of the church in timeu and 
the identity of the English Commonwealth which occupies 
the greater part of the Ecclesiastical Pol:ity. To these 
subjects we now .turn o 
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12 
AUTHORITY AND SCRIPTURAL 
INTERPRETATION 
The importance that Scripture attains in Calvinist 
thought has been observed, and in this chapter we shall 
investigate the arguments that Hooker employs in rejecting 
the Calvinist interpretation of the Scriptureso Scriptural 
interpretation itself was dependent on particular habits 
of ex~~esis and specific notions in regard to what was 
considered to be a rational approach to the question under 
discussiono The Presbyterians claimed that Scripture 
revealed the godly model for ecclesiastical communities, 
and for all conduct of any truly significant value; that 
what the Scriptures prescribed ought to be implemented 1 
and what was not explicitly there ought not to be practised 
at allo Hooker, however, considered that the Scriptures 
were authoritative for all things that pertained to sal= 
vationu but permissive for those that did nota In the 
latter instanceu thereforeu men had to adjust their affairs 
according to that which they held to be appropriate in 
the circumstanceso It was this dispute about the author= 
ity of Scripture that was generally accepted at the time 
as the centre of a long and bitter controversyo 
In the dispute between Hooker and the Presbyterians 
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it is clear that the point was determined on both sides 
by different ideas about hwnan nature and the hwnan con~ 
dition in general. We haveu on the one sidev a radical 
attitude to the human conditionv and 9 on the other 9 a 
conservative disposition in regard to the possibilities 
of human actiono For the radical it ts the particular 
act 9 or event that acquires special significance and im= 
portance. Such acts and events offer a "key" to the prob~ 
lem of human existence. They become points of certainty. 
Oftenu however, this certainty is ascribed to a particular 
institutional order; which may then determine the conduct 
of all who are fortunate enough to be born into such a 
society. Birth and death make little difference to that 
perfect state; there are no new departures. 
The basis of traditionalist thoughtv on the other handv 
may be seen to be an emphasis on the present political 
order as the origin of all relevant and rational action. 
Political actions, even to approach the success soughtv 
must take into account the configuration of present par~ 
ticulars. Success 9 in short, depends upon adequate infor= 
mation and an informed judgment. It may be that the present 
order is generally regarded as unsatisfactory, but for the 
man of conservative disposition there is no absolutely 
safe place to which one may retreat. The most secure point 
in such a situation is that part of the present order 
'itJhich is held to be more rather than less satisfactory. 
~ 1'13 -
Only working from a concrete situation may success, however 
limited, be achievedQ 
It is, of course, only rarelyv as J. GQ A. Pocock 
has remarked, that a society regards itself in purely 
traditionalist terms. 1 In Hooker 0 s mind sacred action 
as well as institutional continuity are both important 
aspects of manvs existence. The workings of God himself 
and human order in history are conceptually distinct and 
entail different images of action and time. Yet they 
can be related, and what is important is the precise nature 
of this relationship in the work or works of any one per= 
son. Hooker, in his dispute with the Presbyterians, 
insists on the importance of institutional continuity 
and restricts the influence of the sacred to what he 
considers to be the proper area of its operation. The 
church itself is an historical commemoration of the most 
important of the sacred actions, and it provides the 
outward conditions, so to speaku for the "internal" 
operation of grace. This, however, does not mean that 
ecclesiastical organization and grace are not logically 
distinct. The Calvinists, in Hooker 0 s judgment, here 
confused the two. His own discussion of the Scriptures 
is a working out of these distinctions. 
Hooker examines three propositions of the Presby= 
terians in regard to the nature, content and interpretation 
1. J. G. A. Pococku 10 Timev Institutions and Actiong An 
Essay on Traditions and their Understanding", pp.210=212. 
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of Scriptureo The first concerns the use of Divine Law 
in Scripture; whether it can and ought to be the sole law 
that gives direction to manus activity in all areas of 
his experienceo The second centres on the law govern-
ing the arrangements of the Church; whetheru indeed, there 
is such a law or model to be discovered in the Scripturesu 
and if sou whether additions are legitimateo The third 
proposition relates to certain laws within the church in 
England, whether they ought to be further reformed so as 
to remove remaining "Popish" elementso As this third 
proposition is derivative, we shall be chiefly concerned 
with the examination of the first two propositionso 1 
It must at this point be noted that our investigation is 
undertaken not merely to unearth Hookerus opinion on this 
or that point, but to bring out the character and struc-
ture of his thought in coming to grips with particular 
problemso The formal structure of Hookerus thought has 
already been examined, and in this chapter we shall see 
the characteristic principles of his thought brought into 
closer contact with the particulars under discussiono 
We shall likewise observe the emphasis on traditional 
authority and interpretation of the Scriptures arise quite 
naturally for Hooker out of a discussion of these parti~ 
cular problemso 
lo I propose to deal with the second proposition and the 
character of the Church in time in the following 
chapter a 
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One of the conclusions of Hooker 0 s general investi-
gation of human experience was that there were a number 
of distinctive spheres of activityu although all were 
relatable to each other by being incorporated into their 
natural context. This view of the structure of reality 
governs his investigation of proposition oneu and we may 
surmise that it will be rejectedo As for proposition twov 
thj.s is likewise governed by his initial rejection. He 
is, howeverv forced to enter into the whole matter of 
interpretationv for, at first sightv this question deter= 
mines the manner and content of his opponent 0 s argumentso 
Theyv at leastu considered themselves to be merely poin~ 
ting out the truths contained in Scriptureu not inter= 
preting it as sucho In reply to this position we shall 
see that Hooker himself relies not only on his own in= 
terpretation of Scripturev but also on previous inter= 
pretations which had gained authority over the years. 
These interpretations could be investigated in a "rational" 
manner. Such an undertakingu howeveru should be carefully 
conducted. For the same principles that govern the making 
and the changing of public laws inform also the inter= 
pretation of Scripture. 
For Hooker there isv of course, a strict sense in 
which the Scriptures contain all that is necessary to 
salvationo This authority, however, rests upon a confluence 
of evidences for the Scriptures cannot in theory authorize 
themselveso The reason is that, although Scripture 
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may profess in itself to contain all things necessary to 
salvation, 
0 yet the meaning cannot be simply of all things which 
are necessary in some certain ];j.nd or form; as all 
things which are necessary; and either could not at 
all or could not easily be known by the light of 
natural discourse; all things which are necessary to 
be known that we may be saved; but known with pre-
supposal of knowledge concerning certain principles 
whereof it receiveth us already persuaded; and then 
instructeth us in all the residue that are neces~ 
sary. v 1 
It isu in such a manner that the Scriptures are shown to 
be the true revelation of God. The 11 leap 11 from reason to 
faith is made as small as possible. Really there is no 
leap at allu merely a logical progression from lesser to 
higher forms of knowing. Faith in God 0 s revelation isu 
therefore; a higher insight into His universal purposeo 
In Hooker 0 s judgment one proof of this is offered by the 
fact that within Scripture itself there are many forms of 
utter~cev non8 necessarily incompatible with the otherso 2 
The principles and the structure of this hierarchy 
of "knowing'1 inform Hooker 0 s opinion that faith must rest 
upon a foundation of sense experience, and thereby on 
historical evidenceo This in itself; if "correctly" 
interpreted; cannot but lead to a verification of the need 
for revelation. The proof of this is certainv but what is 
revealed must be taken upon faithu 
1. Ecc. Pol.q Iv xivv 1. 
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0 The Assurance of things which we believe by the Word 
is not so certain as of what we perceive by sense 
••.. Yea I thoughtv that things which God doth 
promise in His Wordv are surer unto us than anything 
we touchv handler or see. But are we so sure and 
certain of them? If we beu why doth God so often 
prove his promises unto usu as he dothu by Arguments 
taken from our sensible experience? We must be surer 
of the proof than the thing provedu otherv,7i·se 
it is no proof.ul 
This distinction between proof and things proved isu how~ 
everv spurious for Hooker has not shown in what way an 
investigation of natural experience leads necessarily to 
salvation at allo He has neither 11 demonstratedn the neces= 
sity or absoluteness of natural principles nor the ladder 
of necessity leading to Revelation. He simply assumes 
that this can in principle be donev but assumption consti= 
tutes no proof. In shortv the authority of Scripture 
rests upon faitho The problem of interpretation stillv 
of courseu remainso 
The extended metaphor of the Great Chain of Beingv 
then, determines the general position that Hooker adopts 
in his examination of the Presbyterian argumentv the ori= 
gins of whichv so he would arguev stem from "a desire 
to enlarge the necessary use of the Word of Godo 112 
This desire in its turn "hath begotten an error enlarging 
10 1'Mr Hooker D s Answer to the Supplication that Mr Travers 
Made to the Councilv 11 Worksu ed. J. Kebleu Oxfordu 
1836v vol. IIIv Section 9u p. 718. 
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it further than (as we are persuaded) soundness of truth 
will bear. 111 Hookerv consequentlyu pretends to a thorough 
examination of the central presuppositions of the Presby= 
terian position. Yet he is not concerned to investigate 
every particular detailv for opinions on these matters 
t t . f 1 d' 't' 2 are symp oma ~c o a more genera ~spos~ 1on" It 
is this general disposition which must be thoroughly examined 
since 
1 in all parts of knowledge rightly so termed things 
most general are most strong. This it must bev inas= 
much as the certainty of our persuasion touching 
particulars dependeth altogether upon the credit of 
these generalities out of which they grow"u3 
In Hooker 0 s judgmentv the centre of the Presbyterian 
position is simply the belief that 
0 the Scripture of God is in such the rule of human 
actions 0 that simply whatsoever we do and are not 
by it directed thereunto; the same is sin. 1 4 
Equally categorical is his own approach" He restates his 
opinion that the paths to truth are numerous and variedo 5 
These approaches are necessary even for an understanding 
of Scripture" 6 In Hooker 1 s judgmentv therefore 1 the proofs 
2" Ecc" Polo u II v i u 3. 
3" Ecc" Pol.v IIv iv 3. Here Hooker means natural 11 generali= 
ties 11 out of which the significance of particulars may 
be deduced" 
6. He repeats this assertion a number of times. See for 
example Ecce Polar IIu ivu 2. IIIv viiiu l3o 
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that the Presbyterians cJ.uim to find in the Bible to 
support the exclusiveness of Scripture may be shown on 
examination to be false. 1 What is particularly infor= 
mative in regard to this apparently objective examination 
of the textual basis of the Presbyterian position is 
how much Hooker is bound by his own presuppositions and 
disposition. Indeed, he 0 in his turn, can claim that 
there are indications to be found in the Scriptures to 
support hi.s own manner of thought. 
The most important text employed by the Presbyterians 
2 to support their case is taken from Romansv where it is 
alleged that St Paulu speaking in regard to things indif= 
ferent, concluded that 
1whatsoever is not of faith is sin. But faith is 
not but in respect of the Word of God. Therefore 
whatsoever is not done by the Word of God is sin.r3 
For Hooker, this judgment is a consequence of the use of 
mistaken criteria 0 and he answers from within the impreg= 
nable walls of his "rational 11 fortress in the following 
1. The proofs concerning the exclusiveness of Scripture 
are, according to Hooker, to be found in 
a) Four texts i) Proverbs 0 ii, 9. 
ii) .1 Corinthians, x, 31. 
iii) Romans, xiv, 23. 
iv) l Timothy 0 iv, 5. 
b) Negative arguments of the Church Fathers. 
2. Romansu xiv 0 23. 
3. Ecc. Pol. 0 II 0 iv, L 
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manner. 
1 That albeit the name of Faith being properly and 
strictly takenr it must needs have reference unto 
some uttered word as the object of bel.tefg neverthe-
less sith the ground of credit is the credibility 
of things credited, and things are made credible, 
either by the known condition and quality of the 
uttererv or by the manifest likelihood of truth which 
they have in themselves; hereupon it riseth that 
whatsoever we are persuaded ofv the same we are 
generally said to believeo In which generality 
the object of Faith may not so narrowly be restrained, 
as if the smae did extend no further than to the 
only Scriptures of God. 0 1 
In shortv faith is knowledge and knowledge is beliefo 
It is in this remarkably extempore fashion that he dis-
misses the various texts employed by the Presbyterians 
to substantiate their position. 
When he had shown to his own satisfaction that the 
interpretation put upon certain Scriptural passages by 
the Presbyterians were entirely without foundation, 
Hooker directed his attention to the considerations con-
sequent upon the distinction between things necessary and 
things indifferent. Since the area of things indifferent 
is directly informed neither by absolute command nor by 
necessary obligationv any achievement in time is the pro-
duct of human perseverance and skillo Choice and purpose 
are human characteristics r and 0'the choice is left to 
our own discretion, except it principal band of some higher 
duty remove the indifferency that such things have in 
themselves." 2 Negative arguments from Scripture can do 
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nothing to destroy this distinction between things neces~ 
sary and things indifferent. 1 In Hookervs judgment such 
arguments are absurd. Therefore 
vconcerning the force of negative arguments so 
taken from the authority of Scripture as by use they are 
deniedv there is in all this less than nothing.n2 
This conclusion is important, since the dispute over 
the interpretation of the Scriptures in general and c-;:::r 
certain passages in particular is not in Hooker 1 s jud~nent 
merely an academic exerc.i.se. His own specific concern is 
directed towards the safety and validity of institutional 
order, and the particular lesson he wishes to draw is 
that the scope of Presbyterian pleading against human 
authority 
0 is to overthrow such ordersv laws, and constitutions 
in the Church 1 as depending thereupon if they should 
therefore be taken away 0 would peradventure leave 
neither face nor memory of Church to continue long 
in the world, the world being especially such as 
now it is. u 3 
The Presbyterians by so endeavouring to enlarge the area 
of necessity to include discipline are in danger of under~ 
mining the institutional order that is at present in the 
world. This order is the most weighty stabilizing factor 
in the visible, "external" world. The attempt, therefore, 
to reform these institutional arrangements by employing 
mistaken standards will achieve nothing but destruction. 
1. Negative arguments of the kindv 11 Scriptures teach it 
not, avoid it therefore." 
2. Ecc. Pol. 0 II, vi, 3. 
3. Ecc. Pol. 0 II 0 vii, 1. 
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It isu consequentlyu politicallyu as well as intellectual-
lyu necessary that the correct standards and the proper 
principles should be known and adhered too The world 
cannot afford to entertain Presbyterian notions of what 
is reasonable and righta They are so obviously wrongo 
The authority that a man may possess or may come to 
possess Hooker defines generally as "the force which his 
word hath for the assurance of another 1 s mind that buil-
d th · t nl e upon ~ a This definition applies not only to matters 
of testimony and factu but also to opin:i.on and judgmento 
Much of our knowledge about the pastu for instancer de~ 
pends upon human testimony; and such reliance is unavoi~ 
dable despite the many infirmities of man°s naturea In 
regard to political actionr human authority is equally 
necessary and doubly important for "the weight many ttmes 
of some one man°s authority is thought reason sufficientu 
even to sway whole nationsa 112 In Hooker 0 s judgmentr there~ 
forer direction in opinion and action depends quite 
emphatically on human authoritya Such a state applies not 
merely to the "singular~~ sort who are apparently unable to 
think even a little for themselvesv but also to those who 
are commonly thought to be somewhat more intelligento 
Moreoveru because of their knowledge of experienceu authority, 
with regard to the latterv 
la Ecca Polar IIu vii, 2a 
2a Ecca Polar II, viiu 2o 
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1 is much more strong and forcible, because they only 
are able to discern how just cause there is why to 
some men°s authority so much should be attributed.ul 
The higher one scales the hierarchy of knowingv therefore 1 
the greater the place authority has in experienceo The 
authority ascribed to the necessary principles guiding 
reality informs those who are capable of attaining to such 
knowledge that human authority is itself a necessary as= 
pect of timer·bow1d existencea Hooker 0 then 0 assumes that 
••nature" prescribes a particularly important place for 
human authority in historyo He goes on to propose that 
this theoretical or abstract justrification of human author~ 
ity in experience may have some application to political 
order in particular associationsa "Nature''u howeverv 
merely prescribes in general/ it does not reveal categori= 
cally what particular authority should be obeyed. Only 
specific experience can give any indication as to whom 
to obeya 
Hooker is implicitly aware of this problemv and he 
regards the authority ascribed to a particular order 
as a specifically historical achievement. To disparage 
such authority for "necessary" reasons is to apply, in 
England 0 s case at leastv incorrect reasoning. In general 0 
the force of human authority does not flow from 11 natural 
necessity 11 0 but is an endowment from the past to the 
present. Hooker himself applies "necessary" standards 
only because the Presbyterians have applied their own 
1. Ecca Palau II, viiv 2. 
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(mistaken) absolute principles to England 0 s institutional 
order. Hev howeverv is able to keep the absolute standards 
at his disposal at some distance by means of the distinc= 
tion between necessity and indifferenceo This move leaves 
him free to stress the importance of proper order in 
experience and the significance of custom in institutional 
arrangements. 
The need for authoritative guidance may equally be 
seen in the interpretation of the Scriptures for 
eutterly to infringe the force and strength of manes 
testimony were to shake the very fortress of God 0 s 
truth. For whatsoever we believe concerning salva~ 
tion by Christv although the Scripture be therein 
the ground of our beliefr yet the authority of man 
isu if we mark itu the key which openeth the door of 
entrance into the knowledge of the Scripture. The 
Scripture could not teach us the things that are of 
Godu unless we did credit men who have taught us that 
the words of Scripture do signify these thi.ngso 
Someu may, thereforeu notwithstanding manes infirmityu 
yet his authority may enforce assento~l 
It is appropriateu thereforeu that the methods employed 
to attain to knowledge in other areas of experience 
should hold in the interpretation of Scriptureo Though 
the objects of knowledge may be different and the paths 
leading to them quite distinctv authority has a necessary 
part to play in the attainment of all the proper objects 
of thoughto 
Authorityv thereforeu is a necessary aspect of reli~ 
gious experience. This recognition of the place of author~ 
ity in experience is the starting point from which to 
proceed to a proper estimation of and attitude to realityo 
l. Ecc. Pol.v II, viiu 3. 
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Authoritative guidance is the path by which the individual 
may attain to a correct understanding of not only a parti~ 
cular society, but also his particular position in the 
social hierarchy. On such an understanding of reality 
teaching of the divine Word itself relies. Hooker can see 
no valid reason why this should not be the case. For 
0 if 0 the natural strength of man°s wit may by experience 
and study attain unto such ripeness in the knowledge 
of things human, tha·t: man in this respect may presume 
to build somewhat upon their judgment; what reason 
have we to think that even in matters divine, the like 
wits furnished with necessary helps, exercised in 
Scripture with like diligence, and assisted with the 
grace of Almighty God, may grow unto so much perfec~ 
tion of knowledge, that men shall have just cause, 
when any thing pertinent unto faith and religion is 
doubted of, the more willingly to incline their minds 
towards that which the sentence of so grave, wise, and 
learned in that faculty shall judge most sound.ul 
His argument being what it is, Hooker is quite confi~ 
dent that he has not gone too far in attributing so much 
importance to human authority in the interpretation of 
Scripture. There are obviously degrees of assent, and 
submission to merely human authority is not the highest. 
It is after all, Hooker affirms, no part of his belief that 
"authority of man should prevail with man either against 
or above Reason." 2 However, whether the appeal is made 
to nature or to revelation, human judgment is still neces~ 
sary. Even those who claim that their position is based 
on divine authority alone are really offering an interpre~ 
tation of Scripture. For it (Scripture) is not, Hooker 
judges, transparent in its meaning except in those places 
1. Ecc. POl., II, vii, 4. 
2. Ecc. Pol., II, vii, 6. 
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concerning salvationo It isv consequentlyv utter madness 
to proclaim that the Scriptures contain all that man needs 
to live well while existing in conditions of imperfectiono 
0 Admit thisv and markv I beseech youu what would 
follow. God in delivering Scripture to his Church 
should clean have abrogated amongst them the law of 
nature~ which is an infallible knowledge imprinted in 
the minds of all the children of manu whereby both 
general principles for directing of human activities 
are comprehendedp and conclusions derived from them1 
upon which conclusions groweth j_n pa:rt.i culari.ty t.he 
choice of good and evil in the daily affairs of this 
life, Admit thisv and what shall the Scripture be 
but a snare and a torment to weak consciencesv filling 
them with infinite perplexitiesu scrupulositiesu 
doubts insolubleu and extreme despairs? 0 1 
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13 
THE CHARACTER OF THE 
CHURCH IN TU1E 
The character of the churchu thenu may riot be defined 
by mere reference to the Scriptures. In these circumstan= 
ces not only is there a great necessity for a correct 
understanding of the character and place of Scripture within 
the scheme of thj.ngs, there is an even greater need for 
a right evaluation in regard to the relationship between 
the church invisible and the institutional church in his= 
tory. Thisu Hooker considersv is vital for a clear judg= 
ment concerning the present state of the Church in England. 
To confuse the two modes of the church is dangerous to 
the position of the traditional church in England. For 
1
'church regiment 11 in history is a thing indifferentu and 
to compare its character with the body mystical in a direct 
fashion is to apply not only too high a standard but the 
wrong one. This chapter; therefore, consitutes an exami= 
nation of Hooker 0 s ideas about the character of the 
church in time. 1 
Before continuing in detail a further elaboration in 
regard to the distinction between visible and invisible 
churches must be noted. This distinction, as one would 
1. I have reserved a chapter for an examination of the 
principles of judgment in regard to ecclesiastical 
arrangements. See the following chapter. 
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expect 1 parallels that between nature and supernature" 
0 That Church of Christ 1 which we properly term his 
body mystical 1 can be but one; neither can that one 
bG sensibly discerned by any manu inasmuch as the 
parts thereof are some in heaven already with Christ 1 
and the rest that are on earth (albeit their natural 
persons be visible) we do not discern under this 
propertyu whereby they are truly and infallibly of 
that bodyo 0 1 
This mystical churchv consequently 1 cannot be made visible 
in any way at all. Even the sacramentsu since they are 
an aspect of the church 0 s existence in histor.y 1 are sym= 
bolic in their outward formo 2 
The visible church in history stretches from the 
beginning to the end of time" This historical company 
can be divided into two "moieties''~ the one beforeu the 
other after the Coming of Christo This latter company 
shall exist from then until the Day of Judgment. 
0 And therefore the Apostle affirmeth plainly of all 
men Christian 1 that be they Jews or Gentilesu bond 
or free, they are all incorporated into one company 1 
they all make but one body" The unity of which visible 
body and Church of Christ consisteth in that infor~ 
mity which all several persons thereunto belonging 
havev by reason of that one Lordv whose servants Jchey 
all profess themselves, that one F·aith which they all 
acknowledge u that one Baptism vlherewi th they are all 
initiated. v•3 
This formula const:i.-i:utes the necessary essence of the 
Church of Christ in history. This creed must be adhered 
to through all the vicissitudes of history till the Dis~ 
solution of time itself. It would be sinful andr taking 
into account the natural support that the Scriptures have 1 
lo Ecc. Pol., IIIu iu2• 
2. See chapter fifteen. 
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irrational to repudiate the Christian religion in its 
essentials. As Hooker constantly reiterates, however, 
much more is required for the Church to functionv to exist 
evenu in history. It needs organization and requires 
protection for itself. Two common errors, howeverv must 
be noted. One is to suppose that the visible church 
cannot be infected by corruption~ The second is to insist 
that the visible church itself should have an institutional 
unity. 
0 As therefore they that are of the mystical body of 
Christ have those inward graces and virtuesu whereby 
they differ from all others, which are not of the 
same body~ again; whosoever appertains to the visible 
body of the Church, they have also the notes of 
external profession whereby the world knoweth what 
they are~ after the same manner even the several 
societies of Christian menu unto every of which the 
name of a Church is given with addition betokening 
severalityv as the Church of Romev Corinth, Ephesus, 
England and so the rest, must be endured with corres~ 
pondent general properties belonging unto them as they 
are public Christian societies. And of such proper-
ties common unto all societies Christian; it may not 
be claimed that one of the chiefest is Ecclesiastical 
Polity.'l 
It would appearv then; from the foregoing remarks 
that the identity of the various Christian churches as 
public objects depends upon the institutional arrangements 
that they adopt. That this is a matter of human choice and 
historical growti1 does not mitigate against its importance. 
It isv consequently; essential not to confuse organisation 
as a matter of necessity. For general matters necessary 
1. Ecc. Pol.; III; iu 14. 
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to salvation are 
0 of a different nature from ceremoniesQ order and the 
kind of church government; and that the one is neces= 
sary to be expressly contained in the Word of God, 
or else manifestly collected out of the same, the 
other not so; that it is necessary not to receive the 
one, unless there be something in Scripture for them; 
the other free if nothing against them may thence be 
alleged. 0 1 
Such distinctions are not examples of "misdistinguishing 11 
as the Presbyterians could have ito They are in fact, 
according to Hooker, quite "natural 11 • DistinctionsQ in 
his viewQ depend for their efficacy and intelligibility 
upon correspondence, "upon comparison between our conceit 
and the nature of things conceived. 112 There is, indeedQ 
an obvious distinction between matters of faith and the 
varieties of actions. It isu thereforeu absurd to oppose 
ecclesiastical organization, a matter of public action, to 
the concerns of faith. 
Ecclesiastical arrangements are 0 then, the business 
of public action. As Hooker reiterates, however 0 the 
framers of laws that govern this area of experience are 
not free to follow caprice. For even in this area there 
are necessary principles that must be observed, though these 
are framed in such a fashion that it would be self-defeating 
for a professed Christian community not to follow them. 
It is yet obvious from the general character of such laws 
that much is left to human judgment. It isu consequently 0 
presumptious of the Presbyterians to forbid limited change 
1. Ecc. Pol., III, iii 0 2. 
2. Ecc. Pol.Q III, ix, 1. 
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in the sphere of public action. Moreover; though public 
lav1s are not directly elements of necessity; it is not a 
matter of complete indifference whether one should obey 
1 those laws or not. Once formulated with the correct 
understanding of natural law and of the particular situ= 
ation in mindf laws are binding on the whole church or 
public regiment. This is so since ~~-the lL]Jht of natural 
understanding; wit and reasonS' is from Godo 112 The general 
conclusion is~ 
0 Surely if we have unto those laws that dutiful re~ 
gard which their dignity doth require; it will not 
greatly need that we should be exhorted to live in 
obedience unto themo If they have God himself for 
their author, contempt which is offered unto them 
cannot choose but redound unto himo The safest and 
unto God the most acceptable way of framing our lives 
therefore isv with all humility; lowliness; and single~ 
ness of heart; to study; which may our willing obe~ 
dience both unto God and man may be yielded even to 
the utmost of that which is due.'3 
In this passageu clearly; both method and disposition 
combine to justify the conclusion. The extended metaphor 
itself allows Hooker to circumscribe the sphere of neces~ 
sity without danger of the Christian religion being 
confined to one specific area of experienceo For God 0 s 
grace and rationality pervades all activities; not merely 
lo Ecco Polov IIIu ixu 3o "Unto laws thus made and re= 
ceived by a whole church; they which live within the 
bosom of that church must not think it a matter in= 
different either to yield or not to yield obedienceo 
Is it a small offence to despise the Church of God?" 
2 o E c c " P c:>l o ; I I I v ix v 3 o 
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those ostensibly "religious". Hookerus disposition 
is revealed in the way he equates the safe (and success= 
ful) way of conducting human affairs as the one most accep= 
table to God. The safestv indeed the bestv way is to accept 
the traditional church for what it isv and to change it 
(if it requires changing) in accord with its recognized 
traditions of conduct. 
That the area of necessity is, relatively speakingu 
quite narrow is further disclosed by the fact that divine 
law itself is in certain respects mutable. Hooker distin= 
guishesu yet againv between the end of law and the route 
to that end. 
urf the reason why things were instituted may be 
knownu and being known do appear manifestly to be of 
perpetual necessity; then are those things also per= 
petualu unless they cease to be effectual unto that 
purpose for which they were at first instituted.ul 
It is quite mistaken to presume that God has instituted 
all laws pertaining to the Church. God us law is not at;-·:. 
all dishonoured by partial change in its workings so long 
2 
as the "Rule of Faith u• is adhered to. Yet upon one thing 
in particular does Hooker bear down heavilyv and that is 
the habit of adding to Scripture by attributing to the Word 
of God quotations from speeches 11 in some historical narra= 
tion or otherv and to urge them as if they were written 
in most exact form of law." 3 Indeed Hooker asksu 
1. Ecc. Pol. v IIIv Xv 1. 
2. Ecc. Pol.u IIIu Xv 7. 
3 • Ecc. Pol. u III u i v 3 ~ 
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uwhat is to add to the law of God if this is not? 
When which the word of God doth but deliver histori= 
callyu we construe without any warrant as it if were 
legally meantu and so urge it further than we can 
prove that it was intended; do we not add to the laws 
of Godu and make thBm in number seem more than they 
are? It standeth us upon to be careful in this caseo 
For the sentence of God is heavy against them that 
wittingly shall pressure this to use the Scripture.ul 
The Presbyteriansv in short, are not only irrationalv they 
are also inc~~stent. For they are quite unable to prove 
or support their position without additions to that body 
of truth whichu in their judgmentu really verifies itself. 
The questionu thenu once the fact of Presbyterian 
inconsistency has been accounted foru appears to revolve 
around the proper limits of discretion as to ecclesias~ical 
arrangements" The Presbyterians would restrict quite 
specifically the room for changeu but this move was, in 
Hookerus judgmentu entire-ly mistakeno Rev naturallyu had 
his own limits outlined. These limits 8 .. however, were 
generously broadu and within such limits he is prepared 
quite categorically to uphold the varied traditions that 
particular churches have displayed. 
uwherefore to reject all orders of the Church which 
men have established is to think worse of the law of 
men in this respect than either the judgment of wise 
men alloweth, or the law of God itself will bear. 1 2 
In the endu not only are the presuppositions of the Presby= 
terian movement irrational and unsoundv the very principles 
1. Ecc. Polau IIIv v, la 
2. Ecc. Pol. 8 IIIu xiu 13. 
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that they considered the Scriptures contained are not dis= 
played in the sacred work. Their interpretation (and Hooker 
is quite sure that it is an interpretation) constitutes 
a repudiation of all rational authority. It has been 
shown to be incorrect by that authority. Consequently, 
they 17 the Presbyterians 17 must agree that 11 they have moles= 
ted the Church with needlesss oppositiono"l 
It is, thenv a feature of Hooker's argument that the 
area of necessity is narrower in its application by far 
than the Presbyterians would have the world believe. 
Indeed, "the substance of all religious actions is delivered 
from God himself in few words. ~~ 2 The administration of the 
sacraments as well as other ceremonies, however, require 
a good deal more in words and deedso Much of the outward 
form of all religious actions is for the edification of 
the whole church 0 and in this regard it is not words which 
are of the greatest importance, but ritual which has the 
most profound impacto 3 For 17 generally speaking 17 
1. Ecco Pol., III, xiu 18o 
2 • Ecc. Polo , IV 1 i, 2 o 
3. Men are edified "when either their understanding is 
taught somewhat whereof in such actions it behoveth 
all men to consider 17 or when their hearts are moved 
with any affection suitable thereunto; when their 
minds are in any sort stirred up unto that reverenceu 
devotion, attention 17 and due regard 17 which in these 
cases seemeth requisiteo 11 Ecco ,!?Olop IVu iu 3. 
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0Words 1 both because they are common 8 and do not so 
strongly move the fancy of manu are for the most part 
but slightly heardg and therefore with singular wis= 
dom it hath been provided 8 that the deeds of man which 
are made in the presence of witnesses should pass 
not only with certain sensible actions, the memory 
whereof is far more easy and durable than the memory 
of speech can beQ 0 1 
Experiencev then, has shown the necessity of this outward 
recognition of things promised or undertaken" Of·ten the 
origins of such ritualistic actions have been forgotten, 
yet they nonetheless retain their value o 0'The things which 
so long experience of all ages hath confirmed and made 
profitabler let not us presume to condemn as follies and 
toys 8 because we sometimes know not the cause and reason 
of them.~ 2 There is 8 in this passage, no direct reference 
to the notion of testing particular aspects of experience 
by reason or natural law" Those who see in Hooker a 
"rational 11 conservative as opposed 1 for exampleu to that 
"irrationalist 1' conservativeu Burke, would possibly con= 
strue these remarks as indicative of a fall from grace. 3 
It is true that here Hooker is momentarily free from the 
trappings of the "natural" idiom of thought., It is stillu 
however 1 in character foru as he never fails to reiteratev 
criticism of existing institutional arrangements 8 even 
when the necessary principles are theoretically available 
2 o E c c • Po 1 o · v IV u i u 3 o 
3 o Burke as an 11 irrationalist." is now something of an 
exploded stereotypeo Much to be preferred is 
Jo Go Aa Pocock 0 s interpretation (of one aspect of his 
thought at least) • See "Burke and the Ancient Con= 
stitution~ A Problem in the History of Ideas 0 " The 
Historical Journalv vol.III 8 1960o 
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should be carefully framedo It is to this concern for 
institutional order that natural necessity takes second 
place" 
The particulars that constitute the world of practical 
experience are all that there is in practice" To impose 
an order on this mode of experience that does not partake 
of its character must necessarily fail" This does not 
amount to an admission that the particulars of historical 
existence have no order at allo lt means that order in 
practice is always traditionalo Present order is the pro= 
duct of past achievement" It is bound by the possibilities 
of time 0 and consequently there is no certain course for 
the order and the direction of affairs that can be imposed 
from withouto Order paradoxically is bound up with and is 
a part of historical changeo Within the context of 
his distinction between necessity and indifference 0 Hooker 
does to some degree recognize this position for he clearly 
believes that there is necessarily no absolute arrangement 
that the church must adopt" As long as it adheres to the 
principles of its true faithv that is 0 as long as it remains 
recognizoably Christiano it is free to choose and develop 
its own particular arrangementso Consequentlyv the 
Presbyterians are mistaken in condemning certain Popish 
and Jewish rites as "ipso facto" sinfulu since they are 
not apparently to be found in the Apost6lic Churcho In= 
deed, the foolishness of extreme opposition to "Popish rites" 
stems from a presumption against change and particular 
experience in ecclesiastical governmento Here again the 
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the Presbyterians cannot hold categorically to their rigid 
principles for there are rites of a Roman origin at Gcnovao 1 
Yet the real point of all Presbyterian criticism is 
that the Church in England should imitate the reformed 
churches on the Continento No church, howeverv is bound 
by necessity to follow the practice of anothero Such think-
ing stems from an irrational presumption that in external 
relationships there may be found a refuge from the passing 
of timeo 
It may be seen from the fore=going examination of 
Hooker 0 s attack on the central theses of the Presbyterian 
position how his emotional involvement with the maintenance 
of social stability was at all times his main pre=occupation. 
Most, if not all, of his emphasis is placed on the value 
and importance of institutional ordero Those who desire 
to extend the area of necessity to include institutions 
arev in Hooker 0 s judgmentu dangerously mistaken~ The 
Presbyterian attack on the whole notion of things indifferent 
is by implication an attack on existing institutionso By 
extension it is an assault on the habit of authorityu the 
pivot of all institutionso 
Public criticism by the ignorantv thenu Hooker explicitly 
distrustedo Public reason was the prerogative, indeed the 
very quality, of those best qualified to take part in 
public activityo Those, who were only fitfully aware 
(if at all) of the difficulties involved in public action, 
lo Ecco POlo, IV, xiv, 2o 
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were disqualified by th•Jir ignorance from holding public 
officeo ili~itious but misguided people ought to be made 
aware of their proper station by those more learned; and 
Hooker clearly suggested that when controversy aroser it 
should be settled by those holding public officeo 
1 Easier a great deal it is for men by law to be taught 
what they ought to dov than instructed how to judge 
as they should do of law~ the one being a thing which 
belongeth generally unto allv the other such as none 
but them wiser and more judicious sort can performo 1 1 
Uninformed and unqualified criticism wasu in Hooker 0 s 
judgmentu dangerous for its potentially disastrous political 
consequenceso To encourage public criticismu thereforev in 
a haphazard fashion merely played into the hands of those 
who wishedv for quite irrelevant reasons, to overthrow the 
Elizabethan Settlemento 2 A dutiful estimation of public 
authority was necessary to correct such viewso More-
overv while first readings of the Scripture were carried out 
under the auspices of the churchu a completely rational 
acceptance of Christianity could not possibly lead one to 
doubt the authenticity of the church 1 s authority in regard 
to Scriptureo The reliability and authority of ecclesias~ 
tical teaching was so obvious and necessary that an in-
discriminately critical attitude was unwarrantedo 
0 When we know the whole Church of God hath that opinion 
of the Scripture 1 we judge it at the first an impudent 
thing for any manu bred and brought up in the Church 
to be of a contrary mind without causeo 0 3 
2 o Ecc o Polo v V v Ded o , 4 v 5 u 6 o 
3o Ecco Polov III, viii; 14o 
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So bound up with the necessity of authority were his 
arguments the Hooker refused to acknowledge that the sup-
posed independent rational activity could do other than 
verify the authority and teaching of the churcho 
0Afterwards 1 the more we bestow our labour upon 
reading or hearing the mysteries thereof fioeo of 
Scripture] , the more we find tha·t the thing itself 
doth answer our received opinion concerning it~ so that 
the former inducement (of the Church) prevailing some= 
what with us beforev doth now much more prevail when 
the very thing hath ministered fa~ther reasonovl 
It was Chillingworth who considered such an argument 
10 presseth a man ° s modeqty than his reason 0 " 2 Indeed it 
doesv and for Hooker that is the whole pointo For in any 
area of experience the prevailing mood should be one of 
intellectual cautionv not 11 prideful" ambitiono Any pos-
sible radical interpretation of natural law is thereby 
closedo The necessity of institutional interpretation of the 
Scriptures is emphasized to such a degree that all radical 
criticism may be stigmatized as irrational and impudento 
It would appearv then, that an "external" point of view 
by which to judge present experience is difficult to attaino 
Hooker's argument, therefore, is an illusion (not a trick 
for he is not aware of the illusion) o While he may claim 
that he is investigating the underlying principles of ex-
lo Ecco Polo, III, viii, l4o 
2o Wo Chillingworth, The Religion of the Protestant-s, II, 
po30, in Collected Works, 9th Edo 0 London, 1727o This 
reference to Ro Ro Orrv Reason and Authority, Oxford 0 
19 6 8 0 The three previous paragraphs ov.Je much to the 
passing remarks on Hooker contained in this worko 
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perience, this is hardly an adequate description of what he 
is about o For deference to aut.hori ty tends in his argument 
to swallow up any independent discourse that he is likely 
to attaino In this way it is true that natural lawf 
for instance, is not in Hooker 1 s project "a creature of 
premeditation in advance of political activityv but of 
meditation upon a manner of politics., orl And indeed, to 
adapt Oakeshott 1 s terminology, so far from natural law being· 
the quasi~divine parent of political activity, it turns out 
to be its earthly step=childo Consequently, the argument 
of Book One of the Ecclesiastical Polity_ does not logically 
presuppose the arguments or the opinions of the later books 
in a 11 deductive" fashiono Tactically, toov the area of 
necessity outlined in the first book has only direct appli~ 
cation in an extreme situation., What remalns, so to speak, 
is the historical dimension of human experience., The Word 
of God and natural law must certainly pervade historical 
experienceo It only remains, however, to acknowledge the 
essence of the Christian religion and the principles that 
inform activity in generalf and much is left to human 
judgment and discretiono 
l., M a Oakeshott, Rat:ionalism in' Politics, London, 196 2, 
Poll9o 
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14 
ECCLESIASTICAL ARRfu~GEMENTS 
AND PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT 
We have seen how HookerQs argument was structured by 
his distinction between necessity and indifferenceo His 
main concern was clearly with the status and the importance 
of public arrangementso Since the church as an insti= 
tution partakes of the character of these arrangementsv it 
is obviously subject to change as much as any other insti= 
tutiono If certain principles are observed, Hooker argues, 
such change may become an ordered progression towards the 
end desiredo In this chapter these principles will be 
examinedu but this examination will be put into focus 
by first glancing at a manner of thought whichv generally 
speaking, reveals a marked opposition to HookerQs reflec= 
tionso 
By acknowledging that the church is subject to changev 
Hooker is not conceding that religion does not have a 
special place in the worldo Indeed, religious experience 
itself is the root of all goodness and virtuous conduct" 
It (religious experience) extends beyond the confines 
of public worship and private devotion" It "perfecteth" 
even 11 manQs abilities unto all kinds of virtuous services 
in the conunonwealtho"l Any belief sincerely held may 
~ 202 ~ 
help to do good in the world. It need not be the whole 
truth; what is important is that beliefs must be sincerely 
adhered to. Hooker judges that we have sufficient reason 
to conclude 
0 that all true virtues are to honour true religion as 
their parentv and all well~ordered commonweals to 
love her as their chiefest sway.'l 
There arev howeverv certain people who desire that 
religion should not have a special place in the worldo 
They are by definition atheists. Since the world is ob~ 
jectively God 0 s creation and experience of God is the sup~ 
reme value in man 1 s existence 0 such people proclaim them= 
selves to be so irrational that "they hardly and scarcely 
., 
seem to hold the place of human being.''"'' It is v Hooker 
allegesf fruitless to argue with them. 3 Indeedv the great 
danger is that 0 while he (Hooker) and his opponents argue 0 
atheism will strengthen itselfo 
0 With our contentions their [the atheists~ irreligious 
humour is much strengthened. Nothing pleaseth them 
better than these manifold oppositions upon the matter 
of religionu as well as for that they have hereby the 
more opportunity to learn on one side how another may 
be oppugnedv and so to weaken thecredit of all unto 
themselves; as also because by this hot pursuit of 
lower controversies among men professing religionv 
and agreeing in the priricipal foundations thereofv 
they conceive hope that about the higher principles 
themselves time will cause alteration to growo 0 4 
L Ecc. Pol·o 0 V1 iv 5o 
2o Ecco Pol. 0 Vf iiv lo 
3 o Ecc 0 Polo 0 V u ii u 1 o "Till some admirable or unusual 
accident happens (as it hath in some) to work the 
beginning of a better alteration in their mindsv dis~ 
putation about the knowledge of God with such kind of 
persons commonly prevaileth little.3 
4o Ecco Polov Vv iiv 2. 
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According to Hookeru the greatest and most immedi= 
ate danger stemming from atheism is the merely political 
use of religiono 1 Yet he is quite prepared to grant 
one of Machiavellius fundamental principles~ 
uwe agree that pure and tmstained religion ought to 
be the highest of all care appertaining to public 
regimentg as well as in regard of that aid and protec-
tion which they who faithfully serve God confess they 
receive at his merciful handso; as also for the force 
which religion hath to qualify all sorts of men; and 
to make them in public affairs the more serviceablev 
governors the apter to ruler with conscience; inferiors 
for consciences sake the willinger to obeyou2 
Hookeru however; is aware that there are limits to his 
agreementv and he warns that religious choice should not 
be a matter of fashion nor or political tacticso Whileu 
consequently; he may agree with Machiavelli that favourable 
auguries before battle strengthened Roman elan and helped to 
lo 11 For a politic use of religion they see there isu and 
by it they would also gather that religion itself is 
a mere politic device, forged purposely to serve for 
that useo Men fearing God are thereby a great deal 
more effectually than by positive laws restrained from 
doing evil~ inasmuch as those laws have no farther 
power than over our outward actions only; whereas unto 
man°s inward cogitations; unto the privy intents and 
motives of their heartsv religion serveth for a bridleo 
What more savage, wildv and cruelu than manu if he 
see himself able either by fraud to overreachu or by 
power to overbear; the laws whereunto he shall be sub= 
ject? Wherefore in so great boldness to offend, it 
behoveth that the world should be held in aweu not by 
a vain surmisev but a true apprehension of somewhatv 
which no man may think himself able to withstand. This 
is the politic use of religion. 11 Ecco Pol.v Vv iiv 3o 
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bring victoryv 1 such an outcomeu Hooker maintainsv ensued 
not merely because they believed the auguries but because 
whatsoever good effects do grow out of their 
religion v who embrace instead of the true a fals~J r 
the roots are certain sparks of the light of truth 
intermingled with the darkness of erroru because no 
religion can wholly and only consist of untruths.u2 
The point is fundamental. Religion cannot be a merely 
external force. 3 It must contain something of "the light 
of truth" for it to be efficacious and true to reality. 
It is clear that the differences between Hooker and 
Machiavelli turn upon different ideas of the moral and the 
politicalv and the relationshipv if anyv between the two. 
For Machiavelli himself the importance of political actionv 
even in regard to religious objectsv depends upon a success= 
ful outcome. Thusu ·the princev as any other in a world of 
change, must learn how not to be "moral 11 • For 
0 The individual who is concerned to act morally on 
every occasion must necessarily come to grief among so 
many who are not moral. Therefore 1 it is necessary 
for a prince, if he wishes to maintain his rulev to 
learn how not to be moralv and to use this (experience] 
as circumstances may require. 0 4 
Consequently, if the prince is to preserve his political 
positionv he cannot afford to adopt a purely private 
1. Ecc. Pol.v Vu iu 3. 
3. Seeu for instancev Machiavelliv The Discoursesv 2 vols.u 
trans. L. J. Walker, Londonv l950v vol.l. pp.243~44. 
4. Machiavelliu The Prince, trans. G. Bullu London, l967v 
p.91 (trans. changed slightly) a 
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(and internal) moral point of visionv 1 but must learn how to 
actv not with reference to the requirements of what he might 
conceivably deem to be the "truth'1 v but with reference to 
the requirements of external circumstancesv and these 
include the point of view of other men. 
The necessity for successful outcome determines the 
place of other men°s opinions and the attempt to influence 
those opinionso For the problem the prince faces when he 
acts is posed by the character of his political position. 
0 Dismissing those matters which concern only an imagi-
nery princeu and discussing those that are realu I 
assert that all men = and particularly those princes 
who are more exposed to view = have attributed to them 
various qualities which earn them either praise or 
condemnation o u 2 
To the extent that the prince 0 s position renders him and his 
actions particularly externalv his specific probl~~ of 
preserving his political power is the problem of preserving 
certain estimates of himself in the mitds of his subjects. 
The externality of his actionsv howeveru is not the occas= 
ion for the disclosure of his own 11 internal tv moral charac= 
ter and of the "true 11 principles which he holds. His 
politically relevant moral characteristics are no longer 
his own (on the assumption that he has a character other 
1. It must not 1 in any caseu be thought that Machiavelli 
would necessarily subscribe to the distinction between 
a public and a private lifeu where the individual in 
the latter area is 11 non=Machiavellian 11 • Such a view 
appears to be too simple a deduction. See M. Fleisherv 
"Trust and Deceit in Machiavelli us Comedies u 11 Journal 
of the History of Ideas 1 vol.27u 1966. 
2. Machiavelli; The Princev trans. G. Bullu Londonu 1967v 
p.91. (trans. changed slightly). 
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than a political one) f but those which others attribute 
to him by way of praise or blame. Men, generally 1 in 
Machiavelli 0 s view 
1 judge more by their eyes than by actual contact; 
for everyone can see but few can understando Everyone 
sees what you appear to bev few recognize what you 
really are. And those few will not dare to oppose 
themselves to the opinion of many 1 who have the majesty 
of the state to defend them. And in the actions of men 1 
and especially princes 1 from whose verdict there is 
no appeal, one judges by the resulto So if a prince 
conquer and maintain the statc 1 the means will always 
be judged honourable and universally pr0).sed o For 
the common people are always impressed by appearances, 
and the outcome of a course of action~ and in the world 
the common people are everything. The few have no1 
recourse when the many have rallied against themo 0 
The end that justifies the means here is not a higher end 
that justifies what would otherwise be an immoral course of 
action 0 The end is a ''fait accompli" ~ an historical out~ 
come which must be attained; only then in retrospect are 
·the means justified. 
Politics becomes, then, the necessary imposition of 
orderf and religious activity is caught up in the net of 
political success. It is this wholly external character 
of politics and religion propounded by the ''atheists" 
that practically compels Hooker to brand them as 11 this 
execrable crew", 'these wise malignants '' 0 2 The latter 
epithet can be taken to be a grudging admission of the wis~ 
dom of some of their opinionsv for Hooker can and readily 
does recognize the political uses of religion without allow~ 
ing it to be merely an external affairq a matter of absolute 
lo Machiavelli, The .Prince, transo Go Bull, London, 1967, 
Po 101 (transo changed) o. 
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indifference. Foru in a divinely ordered universe a 
matter of absolute indifference is a contradiction in termst 
all things have a guiding moral purpose. 
Methodologicallyv and indeed tactically, Hooker 
occupies a point mid~way between the purely 11 secular•v 
position of Machiavelli and the fundamentalism of the 
Presbyterians._ He naturally subscribes to the truth of 
Christianityv but he is aware of the historicity of the 
institutional church. The point against Machiavelli is 
that the church in its institutional arrangements is but 
one aspect of the Church of Christv the reality of which 
pervades the whole of time and eternity. Equallyv the 
point against the Presbyterians is that the institutional 
church has no specific form wholly settled for all future 
time. It mustv thereforev change in time. 
Atheism poses an external threat to religious experience. 
A religious traditionv howeveru may collapse from within 
through excessive zeal and fear. Both of these provide 
the necessary and sufficient causes for superstition. Zealv 
however, in Hooker 0 s judgmentv is possibly the most dangerous 
for it 
0 useth the razor many times with such eagernessv that 
the very life of religion itself is thereby hazarded~ 
through hatred of tares the corn in the field of God 
is plucked up. u 1 
Fearv in contrastv is a slow disease, although it too may 
destroy valid religious traditions. For fear itself 
L Ecc. Pol.v V, iiiu 1. 
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1 neither knoweth the right kind 1 nor observeth the 
due measure of actions belonging to the service of 
God 1 but is always joined with a wrong opinion touching 
things divineo 0 1 
Hooker is, of courser agreed that superstitious practices 
must be removed" The problem is to determine what really 
are practices of a superstitious natureD The Presbyterians 
are of the opinion that many of the actions and ceremonials 
subscribed to by the Church in England are riddled with 
t 't' 2 supers 1 10no Consequently; the legally enacted laws of 
the English community in regard to public worship are sin~ 
ful and must be changed by any means at hando 
In reply to this position; Hooker grants, as he mustu 
the point that superstitious practices are a sign of cor= 
ruption in the church. Before 1 howeveru he discussed par= 
ticular details, he again reiterated his distinction between 
necessity and indifference; this time in regard to public 
worshipo 
0 There is an inward reasonable; and there is a solemn 
outward serviceable worship belonging unto God~ Of 
the former kind are all manner of virtuous duties that 
each man in reason and conscience to Godward oweth. 
Solemn and serviceable worship we name for distinction°s 
sake, whatsoever belongeth to the Church or public 
society of God by way of external adorationo It is 
the latter of these two whereupon our present question 
growetha 0 3 
2. "It is judgedu our prayersu our sacraments, our fastsu 
our times and places of public meeting together for the 
worship and service of Godu our marriages, our burialsu 
our functionsu elections; and ordinations ecclesiastical; 
almost whatsoever we do in the exercise of our religion 
according to laws for that purpose establishedu all 
things are some way or other thought faultyu all things 
stained with superstitiona" Ecc. Pol. 1 V, iv, 1. 
~ 209 -
Within this context public worship itself may be distin= 
guished into its various facets, since it is 
0 ordered partlyu and as touching principal matters, 
by none but precepts divine only; partly, and as 
concerning things of inferior regard, by ordinances 
as well human as divine~ about the substance of re= 
ligion wherein God 0 s only law must be kept there is 
here no controversy. 0 1 
It is in fact against what Hooker terms things indifferent, 
the public arrangements of a given people, that the label 
of supers·Lition is levelled. Such a label follows from 
the Presbyterians 0 denial that in regard to the order of 
the church man has a choicea 
Hooker himself suggests that the principles that allow 
the Presbyterians to label the traditions of the English 
Church as superstitious are mistakena In their place he 
proposes his own precepts or princip~es which are more 
indicative of the considerations involved in ordering the 
English Church. There are basically four. l) Intrinsic 
Reasonablenessu 2) Antiquity, 3)Church Authority, and 
4) Church Dispensation. 
Intrinsic reasonableness must necessarily be mentioned 
since this is a characteristic of God 0 s ordered universeo 
The reasonableness of religion itself is to be measured 
by the worthiness of the subject from which it proceeds 
and by the object to which it proceedso And 1'that which 
inwardly each man should be, the Church outwardly ought 
to testify"o It followsu thereforeu that "the duties of 
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our religion which are seen must be such as that affection 
which is unseen ought to be." In generalu to be able to 
commend an action or an institution as rational a corres= 
pondence with "reality'1 must operate, "signs must resemble 
the things that signify". Consequently, 
0 the public duties of religion [are.'( best ordered, 
when the militant Church doth resemble by sensible 
means, as it may in such casesu that hidden dignity 
and glory wherewith the Church triumphant in heaven 
is beautified.ul 
Although there isu Hooker assumes, some 11 resemblanceur 
between internal and externalu the world of historical 
experience does not present a perfect order. It cannot 
take on the certainty of eternity. For those who do not 
appreciate this situation there may be inconveniences. 
1 In which casev for such private evils remedies there 
are of like conditionu though public ordinances; 2 
wherein the common good is respectedu be no·t stirred. 0 
Apart from intrinsic reasonableness which the needs 
of his system require Hooker to mention 1 antiquity; it 
appears; is the best test for the appropriateness of par~ 
ticular institutions and modes of conduct. Indeedu those 
who have had experience of practical affairs have '1 never 
as yet found it safe" to depart radically from ·the ·tradi-
tions that have long been adhered to. 
0 It is therefore the voice both _of God and natureu 
not of learning onlyu that especially in matters of 
action and policyu "The sentences and judgments of 
man experiencedv aged and wiseu yea, though they speak 
without any proof or demonstrationu are no less to be 
hearkened unto, than as being demonstrations in 
1. Ecc . Polo u V u vii u 2 o 
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themselves; because such men°s long observation is as 
an eye, wherewith they presently and plainly those 
principles which sway over all actionso'l 
The quotation contained within this passage is from Book 
Six of Aristotle 0 s Nicomachean Ethicso This book deals 
specifically with what might be (and has been) termed 
practical wisdom2 , and its conclusions would appear to 
contradict the orthodox view which Hooker adumbrated 
in Book One of the Ecclesiastical Polit~ in regard to 
demonstration in argumento The passage is quoted with 
obvious approval by Hooker, who goes on to remark, 
0 Whereby we are taught both the cause wherefore wise 
men's judgments should be credited, and the mean how to 
use their judgments to the increase of our own wisdomo 
That which sheweth them to be wise, is the gathering 
of principles out of their own particular experiments 
according to the rule of their principles shall make 
us such as they areou3 
The gist of this passage is clear enough, but we 
must remember that at this point Hooker is examining the 
character of things indifferento In this area of experience 
any principle employed in action and argument may be con~ 
sidered to be a reflection of a particular experienceo 
What the precise relationship between these second~order 
principles (if one may so term them) and the absolute prin~ 
ciples or ends propounded in Book One is, Hooker nowhere 
explicitly relateso It appears indeed that the second~order 
lo Ecco Polo, V, vii, 2o 
2o See Wo Fo Ro Hardie, Aristotle 0 s Ethical Theory, Oxford, 
1968, chapoXIo 
3 o Ecc o Pol o , V, vii, 2 o 
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principles need notv but in theory mayv be "deduced" 
from the higher principles. However., the two sets of prin~ 
ciples can in fact only be held together in the way pro~ 
pounded by a pre~emption in favour of the 11 natural 11 
view of reality and of the Christian religion. Yet what 
direct practical influence such absolute ends can and need 
have on public action is strictly limited by the distinction 
between necessi·ty and indifference. Consequently v just as 
Hooker does not recognize it as a profitable enterprise·to 
debate with an irrational atheistu so he believes the com~ 
plete and absolute end of man is not really a matter for 
disputev except in Book One. Here he does recognize that 
the Presbyterians deny the ·setting he has provided for manus 
end and its relation to historical existence 8 and makes 
a reply. 
It isv therefore; argued in the latter books that in 
regard to public institutions "lesser 11 principles are of 
more immediate momentv and herev as we have seen, antiquity 
or durability is of supreme importance. For that which 
endures in time is valuable in itselfo In practical acti~ 
vity to say that the paths followed are old and well~trodden 
is sure to find favour. Indeedv it is Hooker 0 s view that 
most men (up to the present momentv that is) have been and 
are naturally conservativeo "That which is newv if it 
promise not much 8 doth fear condt~mnation before trial. " 1 
Consequentlyv 
1. Ecc. Pol.v V8 viiv 3. 
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0 The main pretence of these glorious names; where they 
could not be with any truth; neither in reason ought 
to have been so much allegedu hath wrought such 
a prejudice against them in the minds of the common 
sortv as if they had utterly no force at all; whereas 
(especially for these observances which concern our 
present question) antiquity, custom; and consent in 
the Church of God, marking· with that which law doth 
establish, are themselves most sufficient reasons to 
uphold the same; unless some notable public inconveni= 
ence enforce the contrary. For a small thing in the 
eye of the law is as nothing.ul 
Since, hov1ever, the insti tutiona.l arrangements of the 
Church are ever changing despite the antiquity of many of 
its practices; it is necessary for the church to have suf= 
ficient authority to regulate its affairs uas need requireth". 
Clearly those traditions that have endured through time 
are the product of wisdom. They comeu therefore; to 
possess authority in the present. 2 As it happensu such 
authority is now vested in the English church which hasv 
therebyu power to change laws uteaching matters of order". 
It is true that all inconveniences cannot be removedu but 
such 1'imperfections" do not justify purely private judgment 
on the church 0 s present identity. For "that which the 
L Ecc. Pol.u Vu viiu 3. 
2. "To prescribe the order of living in all things; is 
a peculiar prerogative which Wisdom hathu as queen or 
sovereign commandress over other virtues. This in 
every several man°s actions of common life appertaineth 
unto Moral, in public and politic secular affairs 
unto Civil wisdom. In like manner, to devise any cer= 
tain form for the outward administration of public 
duties in the service of Godu or things belonging there~ 
untou and to find out the most convenient for that use 
is a point of wisdom Ecclesiastical.'' Ecc. Pol. u V, 
viii," 1. <~-~~~--
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Church by her ecclesiastical authority shall probably think 
and define to be true or goodv must in congr~:t.:i.ty of reason 
overrule all other inferior judgments whatsoever.~ 1 
It isv thereforev irrational to reject outright the authority 
of the present Church in England for. public order is a 
necessary aspect of living in time. The institutional 
church can in no way annul the imperfection of this exis= 
tence; it can merely alleviate the difficulties. Conse~ 
quently, if neither the divine law of Godv nor the "strength 
of any invincible argument otherwise found out by the light 
of reason"v nor public inconvenience; show to the contrary, 
qthe very authority of the Church itselfv at least 
in such cases, may give so much credit to her own lawsv 
as to make thetr sentence touching fitness and 
conveniency weightier than any bare and naked conceit 
to the contrary. 1 2 
In Church and Commonwealth, thenv the vested authority 
has the capacity to enact laws appropriate to the occasion. 
In carrying out their tasks the holders of the authoritative 
offices are guided by certain general principles; but 
"there are and will be always evils which no art of man 
can cure." Howeverv matters are made much worsev Hooker 
argues, by application of incorrect principles. The 
end result of such rigid application of incorrect standards 
may be, and, more than likely, will be disastrous. The 
cause of such a tendency lies in ignorance of the appropriate 
criteria by which to judge a situation and in an inability 
to apply principles as the occasion demands. It is not 
1 o Ecc o Pol., V v viii, 1. 
at all enough to be aware of the correct standards" Equally 
important are the variety of circumstances and information 
about such circumstances" And 
1 these varieties are not known but by much experience, 
from whence to dre.w the true bounds of all principles, 
to discern how far forth they take effect, to see 
where and vvhy they fail, to apprehend by what degrees 
and means they lead to the practice of all things in 
show though not indeed repugnant and contrary to one 
another, requireth more sharpness of wit, more intri~ 
cate circuitions of discourse, more industry and depth 
of judgment, than common ability doth yieldo 1 1 
There isv in practice at least, no rest from the task of 
understanding, and 1'generali ties ,,2 are of help only to those 
who are aware of the limits of their use" In Hooker 1 s 
opifiionv only to the ignorant and the common do principles 
of such a general nature offer seemingly exact guidance. 
It follows, as a matter of some importance, that those 
who are skilled in the execution of public actions should 
be allowed, as an extension of their authority, the power 
of dispensation" This power, however, may be legitimately 
used only during times of "necessity~ and all it is able to 
do then is to devise 
vhow that which must be endureth may be mitigated, 
and the inconveniences thereof countervailed as near 
as m~ybe; that when the best things are ~ot possible, 
the best may be made of those that are. 1 ~ 
1. Ecc, Polo , V u ix, 2 o 
2. 11 Wi th gross and unpopular capacities nothing doth more 
prevail than unlimited generalities; because of their 
plainess at the first sighti nothing less with men of 
exact judgment; because such rules are not safe to be 
trusted over foro 0 Ecc. Polo, V, ix, 2o 
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This distinction between "ordinary" and "extra=ordinaryn 
powers is, Hooker aTguesu common in civil affairs, and he 
sees no reason why it should not be extended to include 
ecclesiastical arrangementso In fact this distinction was 
ancient even in Hooker 0 s dayo Later, in the reign of James I, 
the ex·tra=ordinary powers of the Crown were emphasized to 
the extent that the limits placed on authority by the rule 
of law were overshadowedo All lesser powers were exercised 
by the king 1 s permission, to be overruled when he considered 
necessaryo In the "Ecclesiastical Polity'', however u extra= 
1 
ordinary power means exactly thato Its use is strictly 
limited, and the intention behind the use should not be 
''to turn the edge of justice''o Exceptions, then, to 
general rules may be allowedo The authorities may be allowed 
or may grant such exceptions but only in unusually diffi= 
cult circumstanceso 
lo Fo Oakley in "Jacobean Political Theologyg the Absolute 
and Ordinary Powers of the King'' u Journal of the Histor~ 
of Ideas, volo29, 1968, argues that the distinction may 
have been first used with reference to the power of God, 
and then found its way into canon and civilian lawo 
Hooker, in fact, judges that the distinction firstly 
concerns God 0 s authority, but may be applied analogously 
with reference to civil and ecclesiastical affairso 
= 217 = 
15 
THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY 
OF ENGLAND~ A PARADIGM 
CASE 
It is a common characteristic of what we have termed 
system~tically misleading practical or political argument 
that the more elaborate the superstructure of ideas erected 
the safer it is felt that the practical conclusions 11 de= 
duced" areo It is such a view that governs Hooker 1 s dispute 
with the Presbyterianso It is only in Book Five of the 
Ecclesiastical Polity that he finally arrives at a discussion 
of some of the particulars of English societyo It is of 
course his purpose to defend the identity that this society 
has achievedo Howeveru not merely does he defend it, he 
comes to the conclusion that it may be considered to be a 
paradigmatic example of what an association should be in 
at least two wayso In the first instancev the changes 
that have taken place in English society have been exem= 
plary in their caution and consequently in their successo 
Such changes have attempted to continue the traditions of 
the past and have attained some continuity of identity with 
that pasta In the second instancev the present practices 
of the English community in no sense contradict the die= 
tates of right reasonu of nature herself. There is no 
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necessary case against those practices. 
For Hooker some indication of how to conduct public 
enterprises is provided by an examination of how the 
11 reformation 11 in England was carried through. The first 
thing to notice, he suggests, is how changes in regard to 
the legal structure of any public association ought to be 
implemented. Clearly change in the law is often necessary 0 
and many laws are enacted for '1extra-ordinary 11 occasions 
alone. Such laws naturally must be abrogated when the 
circumstances occasionoing their existence have passed. 
But 1'true withal it is, that alteration though it be from 
worse to better hath in it inconveniences, and these weighty. 111 
Indeed 1 when a law is abrogated as being badly formulated 
and yet the occasion for its existence remains, even then 
Hooker asksv 
0 do we not herein resolve our very own deed 1 and up-
braid ourselves with folly 9 yea, all that were 
makers of it with oversight and with error?a2 
In generalu then, if continual practice has established 
a law as usefulv it would be quite wrong to change it. 
Unnecessary change would mean the loss of something valuableu 
a part of that public association°s identity. Much discon-
tent is or would be caused by voluble criticism and by 
swift change of that which had appeared tvnaturaltvv that is 9 
well~founded and long practised. Hooker concludes 
l. Ecc. Pol.,IV, xiv, 1. 
2. Ecc. Pol. 1 IV, xiv, 1. 
0 What we have to induce men unto the willing obedience 
and observation of laws, but the weight of so many 
men°s judgment as have with deliberate advice asserted 
thereunto; the weight of that long experience, which 
the world hath had thereof with consent and good liking? 
So that to change any such law must needs with the 
common sort impair and weaken the force of these 
grounds, whereby all laws are made effectualo 0 1 
Clearlyv far from being chiefly interested in the origin 
of law generally, Hooker is much more concerned with the 
effectiveness of such laws as England herself possessed" 
He is aware that change is a necessary aspect of historical 
existenceu but uppermost in his mind is the need to stress 
that the necessity for change must be great. Any change 
contemplated must in any case respect the character of 
established traditions, as indeed those who had conducted 
2 the "reformation 11 in England had done" The profit from 
change, therefore, must be as clear as possible. It would 
otherwise be dangerous to the authority and order of the 
institutional arrangements of any associationv 
0 If we have neither voice from heaven that so pronoun= 
ceth of them~ neither sentence of man grounded upon 
such manifest and clear proofv that they in whose 
hands it is to alter them may likewise infallibly even 
in heart and conscience judge them sog upon necessity 
to urge alteration is to trouble and disturb without 
necessity. As for arbitrary alterations, when laws 
in themselves not simply bad or unmeet are changed for 
better and more expedient; if the benefit of that which 
is newly better devised by but small, sith the custom 
of easiness to alter and change is so evil, no doubt 
but to bear a tolerable sore is better than to venture 
1. Ecc. ~ol., IV, xiv, 1. 
2. Ecc. Pol" , IV u xi v u 3 • 
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1 
on a dangerous remedy.u 
The wisdom of these remarks is supported by the 11 peaceful 11 
course of the moderate reforms in England. Hooker adds 
almost as an afterthought that the good f@rtune of the 
English nation following these changes is undoubtedly a 
sign of Godvs special Providence over England- a case 
clearly of 11 godly 11 conservatism well rewarded. 2 
This, in broad terms, is "how" the reformation in 
England was successfully carried ·through. Now '1what" 
has it producedu what, indeed, is now the character of 
English religious practices? An enquiry into the distinc-
tive marks of these practices is forced upon Hooker by 
the Presbyteriansu allegation 
uthat touching the several public duties of Christian 
Religion, there is amongst us much superstition 
retained in them1 and concerning persons which for 
performance of these duties are endued with the power 
of ecclesiastical orderu our laws and proceedings accor-
ding thereunto are many ways herein also corrupt.u3 
The immediate objects of Hookerus attentionv then, are the 
public duties of the Christian community of England and 
their administration. What public duties are prescribed 
in this Community are those set forth in the Book of 
Common Prayer. Throughout Hookerus investigation of these 
duties the emphasis falls on their reasonableness and 
legalityu and on their practical value which stems from 
long use. In no sense are they corrupt. They are neither 
1. Ecc. Pol. u IV u xi v u 2 o 
2. Ecc. Pol.u IVu xiv, 6. 
3 o Ecc o Pol. u V. 
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against the precepts of natural law 6 nor do they constitute 
a gross undermining of the traditions of that society. 
To be a member of the Christian community of Englandv con= 
sequently involved acceptance of the detailed practices of 
that association. It is the duty of its members to sub= 
scribe to those practiceso 
In the second section of the present chapteru thenv 
some of the details of English practice will be examined 
and their bearing on Hooker 0 s general argument elucidated. 
In particularv our attention will be directed to church 
building or religious space 1 instruction and prayeru andu 
where necessaryv to the incarnation and the sacramentso 
In line with our discussion in the previous chapter Hooker 0 s 
defence of English ceremonies may be seen to be basedv 
not on ndemonstrations" but on good reasonso The particular 
character of these practices is a thing indifferento 
"And so from rules of general direction it resteth that now 
we descend to a more distinct explication of particularsu 
wherein those rules have their special efficacyo" 1 In 
short, we shall discuss what McGrade considers to be the 
most important question that Hooker is seeking to answer 
(at least in Book Five)~ "What does it mean for a commun= 
ity to be Christian? and What is involved in Christianity 
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becoming the religion of a community? url 
The first (and main) step in a community taking on a 
Christian identity isu of course 1 acceptance of the Creedo 
This acceptance constitutes a minimum requirement in the 
common jargono Much more is however required ~o establish 
a concrete identity in the present time~bound worldu and 
Book Five provides a discussion of the public practices of 
one particular Christian community" As ~!lcGrade again 
remarksu 
1 the Polity is intelligible as presenting a distinctively 
public Christianity in contrast ·to the religious 
privacies of the Puritan opposition and the non= 
religious or anti=religious ordering of public affairs 
suggested by the nascent secularism of the day"v2 
It wasu consequentlyu much more important for Hooker in his 
present dispute to ascertain the manner of religious prac= 
tices in England and of the classes of persons involved 
in such practiceso The basic class distinction is between 
the priests and the popular assembly .. The distinctionu 
generally speaking, may be seen in Book Fiveg Chapters 
i = Lxxv discribe the public duties of the Christian assembly 
in Englandu and chapters Lxxvi ~ Lxxxi are concerned with 
1. A~ So McGradeu "The Public and the Religious in Hooker 1 s 
Polity'1 , Church History, vol. xxxvii, p.415. This 
second article of McGrade 1 s on Hooker is somewhat of a 
jumble. The sections 1 howeveru that deal specifically 
with Book V are particularly interesting and have been 
very helpful in understanding the character of Book V 
of the ?cclesia_st_ical Po~itx_. It should be noted that 
the answers to the questions posed by McGrade emerge 
out of Hooker's discussion of particulars. 
2. A. S. McGradeu "The Public and the Religious in Hookervs 
Polity 11 , p.415. 
= 223 ~ 
The Christian ministry~ In this work we shall examine the 
character of Christian practices only, and not pass on to 
discuss the particular characteristics of the Christian 
ministry. 
Hooker suggests in the first instance that we mistake 
the character of a religious community in time if we do 
not think of it as a particular association or as having 
places of public worship. For u•solenm duties of public 
duties of public service to be done unto Godu must have 
their places set and prepared in such sort, as beseemeth 
actions of that regard. url Such places have been instituted 
in various religious communitiesu and the dedication of 
churches in a Christian association is in no way peculiar. 
Such actions are a "natural 11 expression of reverence. 
These dedications, however, transform those previously 
private places into public space; and public space directed 
to a specific end - namely the worship of Godu 2 Such an 
establishment in Hooker 0 s estimationu is particularly im-
portant ''for the avoiding of privy conventiclesu which covered 
with the pretence of religion may serve unto dangerous 
practices.n 3 
It is true, Hooker admits, that churches may become 
tainted with idolatory. Such corruption should not, howeveru 
lead to drastic or radical consequences. It should not 
l. Ecc. Polou Vu xiu lo 
2. ''When therefore we sanctify or hallow churches that 
which we do is only to testify that we make them places 
of public resortu that we invest God himself with themu 
that we sever them from common uses o" Ecc. Pol., V, xii, 6 o 
3. Ecc. Pol., V, xii, 2. 
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above all provide the occasion for 11 proud" men to preach 
"devolution 11 and to call for the destruction of all churches 
as places for 11 Vile purposes 11 • The naming of churches, for 
instance, is not in Hooker 0 s judgment a necessary sign 
of profanityo 1 Nor is the ornateness of churches necessarily 
t . 2 corrup 1ng. Church buildings, therefore, are not to be 
regarded in the manner of the works of the Canaanites. 
"All places" where they had worshipped their gods \vere 
ordered to be destroyed, since they were grossly corrupt. 
In Hooker 0 s estimation, however, the comparison with English 
practice is clearly false for 
0 examples have not generally the force of laws which 
all men ought to keep, but of counsels only and per-
suasions not amiss to be followed by them whose case 
is the like; lbut1 surely where cases are so unlike as 
theirs and ours, I see not how that which they did 
should induce, much less any way enforce us to the 
same practice. 0 3 
In short, the churches of England are patently unlike the 
11 Groves of the Canaanites". They are not places where 
superstitious practices may take or have taken place. 
Indeed, (with his usual jump to the opposite conclusion) 
Hooker judges that they are 1'withal so conveniently framed 
for the people of God to serve and honour him therein, that 
no man beholding them can choose but think it exceeding 
great pity they should be ever any otherwise employed." 4 
1. Ecc. Pol., v, xiii, 1-2. 
2 0 Ecc. Pol., v, xv, 1-5 0 
3 0 Ecc. Polo, v, xvii, 5 0 
4 c Ecc. Polo u v, xvii, 50 
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This, then, is the character of those places where 
men may commune toge·ther for mutual conference, 11 and as it 
were commerce to be had between God and us 1'ol Yet although 
the 1'purpose 11 of a religious community may be said to be 
the adoration of God, this indicates little of the actual 
manner of worshipo Hooker discusses two aspects of this 
worship in regard to the English community, namely, instruc-
tion and prayero The character of these activities in this 
community were under open attack from the Presbyterianso 
In reply Hookerus own discussion reveals how these activi~ 
ties are proper to a religious community and form a sub~ 
stantial part of the English communityus knowledge of itself 
as a religious associationo In Hookerus view the precise 
character of these acts as practised in English society is 
not a direct gift of "nature 11 , but is a reflection of an 
awareness of a tradition of doing thingso Such knowledge 
has to be acquired by every generation, and in the process 
it may, of coursA, become '1 tainted" by ignorance and erroro 
It is Hookerus opinion that, even if this were the case in 
regard to English practices, the criticisms and solutions 
of the Presby-terians would be even more misdirectedo The 
confusion and error would be merely compoundedo 
The first duty of the church, then, is to reveal 
publicly the Word of God and the promise of eternal lifeo 
uFor the instruction therefore of all sorts of men 
to eternal life it is necessary, that the sacred 
and saving truth of God be openly published unto themo 
When open publication of heavenly mysteries, is by 
lo Ecco Polo, V, xviii, lo 
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an excellency termed Preaching.v 1 
Such activity is peculiar to Christianityo It is 
true that there are other means of propagating the Word, 
but none that may be said to involve "public performance". 
Generally speaking 8 Hooker 0 s discussion of instruction and 
reading the Scriptures is circumscribed by the judgment that 
'since the mysteries of our religion are above the 
reach of our understanding 0 above discourse of man°s 
reason 8 above all that any creature can comprehend 
belief consisteth not so much in knowledge as in 
acknowledgement of all things that heavenly wisdom 
revealeth. u 2 
The church 1 consequently 1 in public instruction at least 1 
acts mainly as the '1wi tness ur of the Word of God. The pur= 
pse of this Word is that men might be saved. "Apprehension ur 
of its truth is the first step along the path to that end. 
While 8 however 0 this end ~s essentially mysteriouso the 
revelationv openly displayed 1 is required to be set forth 
in a form sufficiently clear to "maketh [men] wise to sal= 
vation". 3 In Hookerus judgment this saving truth is suf= 
ficiently well formulated in Scripture for the Church to act 
most appropriately as mere witness. 4 
The place that the reading of Scriptures occupied in 
the public worship of the church was challenged directly 
by the Presbyterians. In their judgment sermons ought to 
1. Ecc. Pol. 0 Vv xviiiu la 
2. Ecc. Pol., Vv lxiiv 1. 
3. Ecc. Pol. 0 V, xxi 0 3. 
4. "I hold it for a most infallible rule in expositions 
of sacred Scriptureu that where a literal construction 
will stand 0 the farthest from the letter is commonly 
the worst.'' Ecc. Pol. 0 V1 lix 0 2. 
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take precedence over mere reading, and they went so far as 
to claim that the principal cause of writing the Scriptures 
was that they might be preached upon or interpreted by 
public ministerso The result was that they who held the 
Scriptures to be self~validating could be directly challenged 
by Hooker (who held that they were not) for placing exces= 
sive emphasis on the "interpretation" of the Divine Word" 
Indeedv he in turn could accuse them of placing manvs inter= 
pretation above God 0 s mysterious Wordo 1 Interpretations 
of such a nature, howeverv are to be regarded as but private 
opinion, and the motives of those who constantly claim 
direct support from the Holy Spirit are to be held suspect" 
Horeoverv such excessive emphasis on sermons has dangerous 
consequenceso It mayu for instance 1 cause ignorant people 
to become unreasonably disaffected with present practices 
and "to let those things carelessly pass by their earsu 
which they have oftentimes heard beforeu or know they may 
hear again whenever it pleaseth themselveso" 2 In any case 
the importance placed on sermons "hath neither evidence of 
truth nor proof sufficient to give it warranto" 3 The zeal 
spent in support of sermonsv thereforeu is mistaken and 
perniciousu and Hooker suggests that the supporters of such 
an irrational cause should ask "that pardon which common 
humanity doth easily granto 114 
lo Ecco l?Ol o u Vv xxiiu lOo 
2 0 ECCo l?Olou Vu xxiiu 20 0 
3 0 Ecc. Polo u Vu xxiiu 20 0 
4o Ecco Polo g v, xxii, 20 0 
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A similar judgment that the practices of a community 
should be shaped to the characteristics of the common life 
rather than to private desire informs Hookervs long discus~ 
sion of the nature of prayer and its place in English church 
services" Prayer itself testfies to a communityvs acknow-
ledgment of Godvs supreme goodness" It has two aspects" 
vThis holy and religious duty of service towards God 
concerneth us one way in that we are menu and another 
way in that we are joined as parts to that visible 
mystical body which is his Churchovl 
In its latter aspect prayer may be seen as a general charac-
teristic of all intelligible creation for even the Saints 
in Heaven pray" Since, however v ' 1 the knowledge is small 
which we have on earth, concerning things that are done 
in heaven", 2 Hookervs discussion naturally concentrates on 
the place that prayer occupies in the life of man in time. 
In the first instance, public in contradistinction to 
private prayer must take place at a particular time and 
specific locality" It is alsov in Hooker 0 s estimation, 
11much worthi.er 1' than private prayer. Such a conclusion 
follows directly from the presumption that "the things we 
ask publicly are approved as needful and good in the judg-
ment of all." 3 Moreover, such public devotion is greatly 
aided by the solemn form of the common prayer itself, which 
helps to overcome the 11 imbecility and weakness in us'u, 4 and 
1. Ecc. Polo, V, xxv, 1. 
2. ECCo POlar V, xxvi, 1. 
3o ECCo POlar V, XXV, 1. 
4. ECCo POlo 1 V, XXVg lo 
= 229 = 
is of particular significaneein instilling love for and 
devotion to God. To attack such common prayers is iiimpious", 
and indeed Hooker judges that 
0 The best stratagem that Satan hath, who knoweth his 
kingdom to be no one vmy more shaken than by the 
public devout prayers of God's Church 1 is by traducing 
the form and the manner of them to bring them :tnto 
contempt, and so to shake the force of all men°s 
devotion towards God. 0 1 
Thus by applying merely private standards to pttblic service 
the Presbyterians are playing into the Devil 0 s hands. 
Their criticisms of the ritual of the English Church are 
dangerously misleading, and much of value would be lost if 
their "reforms were to be instituted 11 • The beauty of the 
public service for example would be destroyed, and the 
practice of the people praying after the minister would be 
abrogated for it '1wasteth time 1 and also maketh an unpleasant 
sound". 2 
Ironically, it is Hooker who can recall the Presby= 
terians to man°s limitations. For they, in their zeal, 
have forgotten man°s defects and imperfection. In Hooker 0 s 
judgment it is from this apparent unawareness of man°s 
real limitations that their many criticisms of present 
practice spring. In his view it follows directly from 
recognition of this limitation that "touching prayers for 
things earthly, we ought not to think that the Church hath 
1. Ecc. Pol., V, xxvi, 1. 
2. Ecc. Pol., V, xxxv, 1. 
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set down so many without cause." 1 It is by means of the 
'
1 tender kindness" of the church that the weaker sort are 
helped towards their duty in this wayv "although some few 
of the perfecter and stronger may be therewith for a time 
displeased." 2 Participation in public prayer for things whose 
value is evident to the common sort may gradually induce the 
weak to higher things by "heavenly fraud 11 • 3 Such inducements 
are not to be readily despised j,n man q s present imperfect 
state. 
The recognition of common imperfection informs many of 
the other prayers that are uttered in the rounds of religious 
ritualo Men may pray, thereforev for continual deliverance 
from adversity even though there is in Scripture "no promise 
that we shall be evermore free from vexations 1 calamitiesv 
and troubles"" 4 Such a prayer is no·t repugnant to God for 
one may pray without express promise as Jesus Christ himself 
2. Ecc. Pol.v Vu XXXV 1 2. 
3. By such means 1'there stealeth upon them a double benefit~ 
first because that good affectionu which things of smaller 
account have once set on worku is by so much the more 
easily raised higherv and secondlyv in that the very custom 
of seeking so particular aid and relief at the hands of 
God, doth by a secret contradiction withdraw them from 
endeavouring to help themselves by those wicked shifts 
which they know can never have his allowancev whose assis~ 
tance their prayer seeketh. These multiplied petitions of 
worldly things in prayer have thereforev besides their 
direct useu a service whereby the Church underhandu 
through a kind of heavenly fraudu taketh therewith the 
souls of men as with certain baits." Ecc. Pol.u Vv xxxv, 2" 
4. Ecc. Pol. 1 Vu xlvii 1 1. 
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dido 1 Prayers of this kind are not contrary 
'unto the natural will of God which wisheth to the works 
of his own hands in that they are his own handy work all 
happinessu although perhaps for some special cause in 
our own particular a contrary determination have seemed 
more conveniento 0 2 
Similarly the prayer "that all men should be saved 11 v to which 
the Presbyterians objectedu is supported by the duty of 
Christian charityo 3 Although it is true that it may not 
necessarily be grantedv it is yet entirely acceptableo While, 
then, we have no 
0 personal knowledge touching vessels of wrath and 
mercy Land] what they are inwardly in the sight of God 
it skilleth not, for us there is cause sufficient in all 
men whereupon to ground our prayers unto God in their 
behalfo 0 4 
Acknowledgment of common limitation directs Hooker 0 s discussion 
to the conclusion that English practices in regard to prayer 
are paradigmatic in their rationality and acceptabilityo 
There is no necessary reason why participation in such prac~ 
tices should not be generalo Public reason is clearly 
superior to the promptings of private desireo 
The sacrarnentsu of which instruction and prayer serve 
as 11 elements 1 partsu or principleS 11 thereuntou 5 partake of 
6 the character of both nature and super-natureo However, 
L ECCo Polo r v, xlvii, 4r5o 
ECCo Polo u Vu xlviiu llo 
ECCo Polo u Vu xlix, lo 
ECCo Polo u Vu xlix, 3 0 
ECCo Polo r Vu lu lo 
6o I have not attempted to discuss the difficult theological 
problem of the nature of the Incarnationo For a short 
exarnination 1 see chapters 14 and 15 of Jo So Marshall
0 S 
Hooker and the Anglican Traditionu Londonu 1963o 
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they arey "by reason of their mixed nature, are more diversely 
interpreted, and disputed of than any other part of religion 
besides. 111 Their main force, nonetheless, is 1 in Hookerus 
view, supernatural. For himy Gadus gift of grace is given 
primarily through the sacramentso In participating in the 
sacraments men come to share in Gadus supernatural gifts. 
In this sense the sacraments constitute the main step in res~ 
to ring the broken unity betvleen God and man. They confer 
upon man the gifts of the redeemed humanity of Christ the 
Mediator - the God-Man. 11 Christ is therefore both as God 
and as man that true vine whereof we both spiritually and 
corporally are branches. ug 2 
There is, thenf a particular correspondence between the 
sacraments and Gadus grace. The elements declare not something 
past but something now being effected by God. They are not 
to be taken 11for bare resemblances or memorials of things absent, 
neither for naked signs and testimonies assuring us of 
grace received before rv. 3 Recei vil1g the sacramen·ts f hovJever v 
did not necessarily mean that grace was being bestowed. 
Unless the duties prescribed by the sacraments are continually 
performed, such participntion in these practices may, in 
Hooker us opinion v prove in the end to be "unprofi t.able". 
Following previous remarks 1 salvation 1 Hooker holdsv is not 
merely attained by faith alone but also by good works. 
1. Ecc. Pol., V1 lvii, 2. 
2. Ecc. Pol"f V, lvi 1 9. 
3. Ecc. Pol. , V f l vii u 5 . 
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While v therefore v the use of the sacramenb> may be in man ° s 
hands 1 the effect is God 0 s conditional promise. The corres~ 
pondence, in short, is not one of strict necessity. 
The sacraments have uses that pertain stric·tly to tl1e world 
of time. These uses to be sure are secondary, but they do 
have a certain signifj_cance. Indeed, in Hookerv s judgrnentv 
they constitute the central visible signs of a co~~unity 0 s 
Christian hienti.ty. Generally 
0 they serve as bonds of obedience to God, strict obli-
gations to the mutual exercise of Christian charity, 
provocatlons to godliness v preservat.ions from sin, 
memorials of the principal benefits of Christ~ respect 
·the time of their insti tuticn, anc: it thereby appeareth 
that God hath annexed them for ever un·to the New TesJca~ 
ment, as other rites were before with the Old; regard 
the weakness T.vh.ich is in us 7 aild they are warrants for 
the more security of our belief; compare the receivers 
of them with such <3-s receive t:1.ea not, and sacraments 
are marks of distinction to separate God 0 s own from 
strangers.ol 
To chang2, amongst other thingsr the character of the sacra~ 
ments and their place in Christian ritual wouldv in other 
words .. amount to a change in the identification as ·to whEl . 
. ,,.,ere strangers and fellows in the world. For Hooker the problem 
of de·terrnining l:ow someone becartle a col.nmi tted mem:Cer of a 
religious community was solved by baptism. In this act 
the god-parents made certain promises en behalf of the child 
which bound him for li:.:e. From an ecclesi.D.£.tical point 
of view a contractual relationship was established between 
the child and the church from which there was no receedingQ 
2 The sacraments became a "public duty". Obligation to the 
church was a sign of membership in that particular community~ 
1. Ecc. Pol. , V v 1 vii, 2 . 
2. Ecc. Pol., V, lxii v 15. 
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When one "came of age"u there was no particular change in 
oneus identityo More visible strenuous efforts were not 
necessarily required. 
Such "passive 11 acceptance in adulthood was not enough 
for the Presbyterianso A change in the nature and position 
of the sacraments in the English community was amongst their 
demands. They, in effect, desired a new identification of 
strangers and fellows, sinners and saints. They required 
that the sacraments be taken as mere seals and tokens of a 
covenant between God and man. In short, they took a recep= 
tionist view of the sacraments as signs or seals of that which 
is wrought by faith. More active signs of membership in a 
religious community were in their view necessary, and formal 
adherence by an adult was inadequate without a public pro= 
fession of faith or without a period of intensive partici~ 
pation in specified activitieso 
For Hooker the Church was an inclusive sacramental 
fellowshipo Its "minimumn basis was the necessary reception 
of the sacramentsQ It is from such a position that the de= 
tailed criticisms of baptism put forward by the Presbyterians 
were answered in equal detail by him. He himself pointed out 
the dangers of depending on Godus secret election aloneo 1 
Be denied that the practice of putting questions to the child 
L It 11 is but a self=deceiving vanity" so to do. Ecc. PoL u 
V, lx, 3. 
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in baptism was foolish and without importanceo 1 He defended 
too the use of the cross in baptismo 2 During this long centro~ 
versy we come to realize that; informing all these detailed 
criticisms 1 replies and counter~replies of both Hooker and 
the Presbyterians; are different ideas as to membership of 
a religious community and the identity of such an association 
in the worldo The difference isu in one sense, between a 
conservative view of the world as the best of all possible 
places (this side of Heaven) and a radical stand~point as to 
the corruptness of the present worldo From the latter po~ 
sition the point is to reform the world; to recall it to its 
previous perfectiono The former view assumes that the world 
is never beyond repair even though its resources may be 
limitedo Between the two there was often; as Hooker realizedv 
little fellow feelingo 
lo See the general discussion of interrogatives in baptism" 
ECCo POlo; V 1 lxiv, 1~6o 
2o This subject too is discussed at some lengtho Ecco Polou Vv 
lXVu 1~21o 
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16 
AUTHORITY IN THE 
ENGLISH COMMONWEALTH 
To be a member of English society involvesv in Hookerus 
estimationv not merely acknowledging its customs and practicesv 
but also recognizing the authenticity of its political au= 
thorityo For that authority determines the conditions of 
membership; it guarantees the unity and common good of English 
societyo To dispute its acts without forethought may endanger 
the peace of that society and lead to confusiono A pious 
attitude to such authority isu thereforeu required; for such 
an attitude is an important aspect of a general affirmation 
and enjoyment of what is good in the worldo Yet this pre~ 
carious gift of peace and prosperity may rapidly be destroyed 
by pride and greedo The prideful man himself is enamoured 
only of his own creation and cannot accept the good when it 
comes to him as a gifto He is surly about giftso He has 
not developed a proper attitude of respect towards authorityo 
In a world created by numerous past generations he is an 
agent of destructionv and political unity is his first victimo 
A certain basic unity; thenu isu in Hooker 1 s mindv 
necessary for any political order~ Among the natural law 
theoristsv howeveru unity was often held to be the product 
of the right ordering of societyu whereby individuals were 
~ 237 ~ 
arranged in Aristotelian fashion so that each could discharge 
his proper functiono Society, consequently; was not only a 
hierarchy of skills but also a degree of knowing in a moral 
senseu for only the educated and the wise were aware of the 
requirements of ruling. In Hooker 0 s wordsg 
0 Without order there is no living in public societyi because 
the want thereof is the mother of all confusionu where= 
upon division of necessity followeth, and out of division 
j_nevitable destruction. The Apostle therefore giving 
instructions to public societies 9 requireth that all 
things be orderly doneo Order can have no place in 
things unless it can be settled amongst the persons 
that shall by office be conversant about them. And if 
things or persons be orderedv this doth imply that they 
are distinguished by degreeso For order is a gradual 
disposition.ul · 
He goes on to conclude from these remarks that 
0 the very Deity itself both keepeth and requireth for 
ever this to be kept as a lawv that whatsoever there is 
a coagmentation of many, the lowest be knit to the highest 
by that which being interjacent may cause each to cleave 
unto otheru and so all to continue one.u2 
Public societies have complete authority and power over 
themselveso 3 Whatever may be their historical origins, this 
is true of all societieso Supreme authority in any society 
may rest with one; or fewv or manyo Power may be held by 
conquestv by God 0 s "special appointmenturu or by consent. 
All these arrangements may be said in some way to command 
God 0 s approbation 0 a notion which is a reflection of a passage 
in Scripture, namely, Romans XIIIv nthe powers that be are 
ordained of God". Authority has in part a sacred character 
1 o Ecc. Pol. u VIII u ii u 2 o 
3o Ecc. Pol.u VIIIu iiu 5. 
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that does not derive merely from its historical origin. 
The status and value of authority; thereforev is never depen~ 
dent entirely on human will and action alone. Forv since the 
metaphor of the Great Chain circumscribes all activity within 
the world, there is ever present a divine element in authorityv 
even political authorityr though such a notion is far from 
the divine right patriarchalism of the seventeenth century" 
element 1 
Another metaphorical is there the 0'principal subject". 
The manner in which the human and divine elements are 
brought into harmony and co=operation Hooker seeks to illus~ 
trate by an analogy or a correspondence. It is employed by him 
to showv if not precisely to demonstratev that political 
authorityv though established by human will and actionv 
still has in itself a character that transcends this merely 
human foundation. The passage runs as follows. 
'The law appointeth no man to be an husbandv but if a 
man have betaken himself unto that condition, it giveth 
him the authority over his own wife. That the christian 
world should be ordered by kingly regiment 1 the law of 
God doth not anywhere command; and yet the law of God 
doth give them right; which once are exalted to that 
estatep to exact at the hands of their subjects general 
obediences in whatsoever affairs their power may serve 
to command. So God doth ratify the work of that Sovereign 
authority which kings have received by men. 1 2 
1. For the idea of principal subject see this worku chapter ten. 
2. Ecc. Pol., VIII 0 iiv 6. The analogy is also employed by 
Suarez. See A. P. D 0 Entrevesu ~A_s:hard Hooker~ A Study 
in the History of Political Philosophyv Oxfordv 1932v 
p.l49u n.52. 
lb. Phil. thesis] 
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Although all the princes of this worldv thenv may be 
said to rule by divine approbationv their power (and therefore 
to some degree their authority) is dependent upon its origins 
and upon present circumstanceso In England the peoplev in 
Hooker 0 s viewv have willingly consented to establish a 
political association and to work out its arrangementso 
In this instance the ruler remains in a position of dependence 
upon the communityo ijSo that it standeth for an axiom in 
this case 1 the King is major singulisu universis minor 11 ol 
Since he was not concerned with the difficult investigation 
of the concept of authority nor generally speaking with 
the notion of the derivation of power and authority from a 
communal actu Hooker at this point deliberately restricts 
the field of enquiryo 
0 That we be not enforced to make over-large discourses 
about the different conditions of sovereign or supreme 
power, that which we speak of kings should be with 
respect to the state and according to the nature of this 
kingdomo u 2 
Obviouslyv thenu Hookervs discussion is directed towards 
a particular constitutionv a particular set of political 
arrangementso He doesv however, ask one pertinent question 
in regard to authority and consent, namelyu may a body poli~ 
tic withdraw its consen·t entirely to a duly enacted authority 
if it finds that authority burdensome and bloody=minded in 
its operation? The short and convenient answer (for 
Hooker) is that 
lo Ecco Polou VIIIu ii, 7o 
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vit must be presumed, that supreme governors will 
not in such case oppose themselves 1 and be stiff in 
detaining tha.t.u the use whereof is with public 
detrimentg but surely without their consent I see 
not how the body should be able by any just means to 
help itself, saving when dominion doth escheat. 
Such things there~ore must be thought upon before= 1 handu that power may be limited ere it be granted.u 
In short 1 therefore, if the ruler does not agree or assent 1 
there is no way of justly (that is 1 with the agreement of 
all) dissolving a political association. Presumably, 
if all can agree to constitutionally dissolve 1 then it 
may be said that some trace of a political order yet 
remains. It is thus logically impossible to voluntarily 
dissolve a political association. 2 The next bestv Hooker 
suggestsu is constitutional limitation. But this is 
something very different. 3 
1. Ecc. Pol.v VIII, ii, 10. 
2. It is equally impossible 1 therefore 1 to legislate one 
into existence. The state is essentially not a 
voluntary society, and the notion of consensual origins 
is quite incoherent. And when an association founders 
on the rocks of necessity, it has little to do with 
constitutionally dissolving such arrangements but with 
"appeals to God". In effect the strong form of 
external accountability (i.e. the non=political) re= 
appears. This position 1 Hooker is at pains to point 
out, is inappropriate in the present circumstances. 
3. J. R. Lucas defines the two ideals of constitutional 
rule as constitutional criticism and constitutional 
limitation. The former takes its stand on those common 
values which constitute the essential character of the 
community. The latter specifies on paper the limits of 
authority for as long as the community exists" Hooker 
seemingly endeavours to combine both (or merely confuses 
them) without being able to call on a written consti= 
tution or "articles of co:,~.?act 1'. 
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Constitutional rule in the Ecclesiastical Polity 
is naturally closely bound up with the character of sixteenth 
and seventeenth century constitUionalism in generalo A 
constitution itself may be characterized as a set of poli~ 
tical arrangements determinate in space and timeo Such a 
consti tut.i.on arranges various tasks and duties among a number 
of offices which together constitute the structure of that 
political associationo Constitutions in this sense may be 
classifiedv in the common distinction, as written or un~ 
writteno We shall have little to remark on written consti-
tutions since they do not come within Hookergs purviewo 
Usually, however, written constitutions may be said to re~ 
fleet thought concerned at a somewhat abstract level with 
the question of arrangements of offices and apportionment 
of powero In shortv they offered a ready=made solution to 
1 the problem of ordero But written constitutions were 
familiar only for the reason that such instruments did not 
endure for longo They became lost in the passing of timeo 
The frequency of written constitutions may 1 thereforev 
be taken as a sign of instabilityv and not of perfect 
regimes in actiono 
Unwritten constitutions were likewise concerned with 
lo A written constitution may be seen as an endeavour 
to confine a constitution in spaceo It appears to de= 
pend on a behaviouristic notion of human actiono See 
in general K 0 Thompson v 11 Consti tutional Theory and 
Political Action", The Journal of Politics, volo3l, 
1969¥ and more speculatively No Jacobson, 11 Political 
Science and Political Education'', American Political 
Science Review, volo57v 1963o 
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the arrangement of authority and power" Suchu howeverv was 
the history of English politics that limitations to royal 
authority and power played an equally important part" 
Consequently; the rule of law in England isv or wasv con= 
cerned with what the limitations on government action ought 
to bev as well as where its authority might rune A consti-
tution in this sense is a statement of the relations bet-
ween public authority and the law, orv to put it more pre= 
ciselyu a statementu made by means of the lawv of the re= 
lations between public authority and the individualo This 
manner of constitutional ruler as has been frequently pointed 
outv is predominantly medieval in its origins and post-
medieval in its established operation (when the privileges 
granted to a few became the 11 inherent" rights of all) o 
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries such thinking 
became increasingly important since in a number of the states 
of western Europe the relations between the public authorities 
and various groups or institutions became strained and sub= 
ject to increasing criticismo 
These controversies gave rise to a number of discus= 
sions about the character of particular associations and 
of various details in regard to those associations" The 
notions employed to justify these arguments were often 
quite different from those theories of the political commu= 
nity which occupied the attention of more abstract thought" 
For these notions were concerned not with the political 
community (that isv with its general character) u but with 
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law; and notv for the most partv with law as a universal 
concept; but ·with the existence of particular bodies of 
law in historical associations. Here is a significant 
difference between 11 classical" political and constitutional 
thought, forv while the former centered its attention on the 
nature of political society in generalu the latter was 
concerned with justification of provincial and national 
bodies of law. In the Ecclesiastical Polity Hooker endea= 
vours to utilize both modes of argumentation in justifying 
1 English arrangements. On the one sidev he continues to 
employ classical terminology; on the other sideu as he 
proceeds, it becomes apparent how much he relies on the 
traditional nature of the English constitution and on En= 
glish constitutional thought. We have, consequentlyu a 
constant movement back and forth from parti.cular to general 
conceptsu and there is revealed a gap between natural law 
and constitutional thought that Hookerus rhetoric seeks to, 
but cannot bridge. 
Now the humanists and the jurists were most particu= 
larly concerned with constitutional thoughtv and Hooker, 
quite clearlyv was greatly influenced by his contact with 
the lawyers of the Middle Temple. It wouldv howeverv be 
1. Thus the English notion of the rule of law is conver= 
ted into a principle of constitutional limitation 
imparted into the English constitution at its inception 
(whenever that was) •. In this way the English rule of 
law is made coincidental with the abstract or theoreti= 
cal nottons of contract and natural lawo 
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too schematic to oppose the jurist and the theologiano 
Forv when we speak of constitutional thought and ~classical~ 
or theoretical thought 8 it must be remembered that the two 
are but logical aspects or categories of thinking about 
politics, whichv in realityv may be found side by side in 
the work of any one thinkero Thusv Hookerv while he may 
have considered it as important feature of his project to 
reiterate points of significance in classical political 
thought, was much more anxious about the English constitution, 
its formation and its transmission in time. It is true that 
the traditional nature of the English constitution with its 
notion of non-sacred time is subsumed under the classical 
theory of the origin and character of political society and 
under the sacred notions of time and eternity propounded 
in Christian theologyo Howeveru the problem of political 
arrangements in time is the problem of changer and the 
problem generated by change is the problem of the order of 
political particularso 
Whatu then is the position of the ruler in England 
with regard to "power of dominion?" What does the king's 
~dependence upon that whole entire body, over the several 
parts \'Thereof he hath dominion" amount to? 1 Wellu we must 
make a distinction between consent and election for Hooker 
condemned notions of virtual election of every king who 
appeared to acquire his throne by hereditary successiono 
1. Ecc. Pol. 8 VIII 8 ii, 7o 
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He considered them to be 1'strange 8 untrue and unnatural 
conceits, sent abroad by seeds~men of rebellion." 1 Yet 
in the preceeding passage Hooker had repeated with approval 
one of the fundamental principles expressed in the Vindiciae 
contra Tyrann,os u 11 rex major singulis 8 uni versis minor.'' 
Howeverv the use to which such a principle is put depends 
in part at least on the disposition of the disputantv and 
in Hooker the principle is entirely latent. 2 Thus 8 while 
he admitted that it was true that there was a sense in 
which the king had received his power from the community 
as a whole 8 this had been an original donation. Cicerov 
for instance 8 had denied that this made every king subor~ 
dinate to the corporate power of the people. With this 
1. Ecc. Pol., VIIIr ii, 8. 
2. This principle and others taken from Roman Law inform 
the radical import of the Vindiciae. Its author employs 
in a quite radical sense the notion of joint tutorship 
of a nation. Into the gap left by the extinction of 
external accountability on the part of the Empire and 
Papacy, enter these notions of active constitutional 
limitation. In the Vindiciae these co-tutors are in 
fact ephor-like magistrates foptimat .. es") and they are 
under an obligation to resist potentially tyrannous 
actions by the monarch. See A Defence of Liberty ~i~l!.E;t 
Tyrants g a translation of the Vindici·ae Contra Tyrann<)S 
by Junius Brutusv introduction by H. Laskiv Londonv 1924 8 
p.200. Here it may be interesting to note a contrast 
between French Protestant thought and English radical 
Protestantism. In Huguenot thought the emphasis falls 
on constitutional limitation 8 and Michael Walzer judges 
that "mere private persons have no role in Huguenot 
theory" P. The Revolution of the Saints v p. 56. Hooker 
himself concluded that the English radical Protestants 
had no awareness of a public role and no conception of 
what political duty involved. 
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Hooker agreesv for, while the principle provided a latent 
sanction for authority; it did not mean that every successive 
king had first to be empowered by his subjects. Itv in 
shortv did not reveal how a political society ought to be 
organized; and it did not justify rebellion. Hookerv however; 
perceived a radical import in much of Huguenot thought 1 and 
in this he was not mistaken. 1 
In describing the authority of the ruler as being 
derived from- an act of original cons·ent·v- or contract; 
Hooker was following a traditional argument that has its 
origins in "classical" thought. Whatever the merits or 
demerits of such an argument; it was not particularly use= 
ful for Hookeris own positionv since he himself was faced 
with a somewhat similar notion of a sacred act of foundation 
in regard to the arrangements of the godly community. In 
actuality; the authority of an officer institution or even 
a church is an endowment from the past to the present. It 
becomes what it is by a recognition of what are considered 
to be its achievements over a lengthy period of timev and 
not by a single acknowledgment of its having been instituted; 
divinely or otherwiseu at some distant date. Hookeru we 
may consideru recognized this although he was unwilling to 
part with other justifications of authority which appeared 
1. For the influence of Huguenot thought on English political 
thinkingu see J. H. M. Salmonv The French Religious Wars 
in English Political Thoughtu Oxford; 1959. 
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not incoherent in his eyes. 
Consider the following remarks~ 
0 Touching kings which were first instituted by agree= 
ment and composition made with them over whom they 
reign, how far their power may lawfully extend, the 
articles of compact between them must show~ not the 
articles only of compact at the :f:.i.rst beginning, which 
for the most part are either clean worn out of know= 
ledge, or else known unto very few, but whatsoever 
hath been after in free and voluntary manner condes= 
cended untor whether by express consent, whereof 
positive laws are witnesses, or else by silent allow= 
ance famously notified through custom reaching- beyond 
the memory of man. 0 1 
Although we have here an apparent mixture of both arguments 
concerning authority, we are compelled to ask what has 
become of or what actual importance is attached to the 
notion of foundation. The answer is, practically speaking, 
nothing. Consequently, although Hooker has occasion to 
mention the so=called 11 articles of compact 11 , he gives no 
indication as to what he means by that term, and it is not 
certain whether he is referring to a written constitution~ 
and if he is notu then what? In any case, this uncertainty 
hardly matters to a great extent foru in regard to this 
position he wishes to put forward, the 11 original conveyance 11 
could never become "a sufficient consideration wherefore 
\_the king 0 s] power should always depend on that from which 
it did then flow c n 2 
The classical notion of foundation is, then, sub= 
stantially modified by Hooker, and so too is the idea 
of a constitution as a mode of order fixed in space and 
1. Ecc. Pol.u VIII 1 iiu 11. 
2. Ecc. Po1.u VIII, ii, 9. 
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protected from the encroachments of time. For in the 
Ecclesiastical Polityu while not one of these notions is in 
theory abandoned, Hooker in practice did not hold that 
political arrangements were necessarily corrupted by change. 
Political authority itself takes its place as both the 
creator and the product of this space=time order. Clearly 
it is a matter of where emphasis is placedu and in the 
Ecclesiastical Polity such emphasis is to be located in the 
importance that the historical growth of particular communi= 
ties attain. What authority amounts to in the present is 6 
therefore 6 what is significant for political order. More= 
overu contrary to the idea of violent transition from one 
constitution to anotheru Hooker even admits that kingdoms 
founded by conquest may grow or gradually change 
0 unto that most sweet form of kingly government which 
philosophers define to be nregency willingly sustained 
and endured with chiefly of power in the greatest of 
things.ul · 
It would appearu then, that in England at least custom 
and continual practicer if not the most perfectu are the 
best guides to action. Hooker is not offering a definition 
of authority to be sureu for he is far more concerned with 
the origin and efficacy of authority in practice; and in 
practice authority has many sources. Yetu in Hooker 0 s 
mindu the authority that a particular insitution possesses 
is not something that may be praised on every occasion. 
1. Ecc. Pol.u VIII, iiv 11. 
The quotation in this passage is from Aristotleu 
Politicsu Bk. 3, sect. 1. 
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For, even among monarchies as such, there are many forms 
and these may be estimated as to their desirability" 
In a well-ordered commonwealth, the authority of the mon-
arch is and ought to be limited" For Hooker himself is 
0 not of the opinion that simply always in kings 
the most, but the best limited is best: the most limited 
is that which may deal in fewest things, the best, 
that which in dealing is tied unto the soundest, 
perfectest and most indifferent rule, which rule is 
the law; I mean not only the law of nature and of 
God, but very national or municipal law consonant 
thereunto" 0 1 
For the English constitution itself Hooker had the 
highest regard" He was particularly concerned to defend 
and indeed, to commend the practical skill of those who 
had achieved or had helped to achieve the present order 
of the English polity, for, although every person and 
every cause in that society was subject to the king 0 s 
authority, 
0 yet so is the power of the king over all and in all 
limitedv that unto all his proceedings the law it-
self is a ruleo 0 2 
That law makes the king and that the king 0 s grant of any 
favour contrary to the law is invalid, are axioms of that 
variety of monarchy adhered to in England" While, how-
ever, Hooker highly valued law and the order that flowed 
from the imposition of good law, he by no means conceived 
of order and regularity as the only goods of political 
associations or the only virtues of positive law. In 
lo Ecco Polo, VIII, ii, 12o 
2. Ecc. Polov VIII, ii, 13. 
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particularv though the public good may depend greatly on 
the power of making lawsr in well~ordered communitiesv 
"yea though they be monarchies"r care should always be 
taken that the political body "do not clean resign herself 
and make over this power to making laws wholly into the 
hands of any one" 1 The manner in which Hooker conceived 
the working of this limited rule is most clearly described 
in his own works; 
0 What power the king hath he hath it by lawf the 
bounds and limits of it are known~ the entire commu= 
nity giveth general order by law how all things 
publicly are to be done, so the king as head there-
ofv the highest in authority over allv causeth accor-
ding to the same law every particular to be framed 
and ordered thereby. The whole body politic maketh 
lawsv which laws give power unto the kingv and the 
king having bound himself to use according unto law 
that powerv it so falleth out, that the execution 
of the one is accomplished by the other in most 
religious and peaceable sorto 0 2 
Clearlyu in Hooker 0 s judgment, that which describes 
limited monarchy in general applies to the English consti= 
tution in particularo It presents a modelv if not to be 
imitatedv at least to be admired" 
The English constitutionv howeverv is not merely 
subject to limitationo It is "balanced" as wello In a 
passage to be found in Book Seven of the Ecclesiast~cal 
Pol~~ Hooker described this constitution as a 
0 three-fold cabler consisting of the king as supreme 
head over allr of peers and nobles under him, and 
2. Ecco Polo, VIII 1 . viiiv 9o 
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of the people under them. 01 
The co~operation of the several parts of the body poli,~ 
tic - ~this conjunction of estates~ - is the very essence 
of its unityv and this unity is represented and enforced 
by Parliament. Parliament and convocation are ~that 
whereupon the very essence of all government within this 
kingdom doth depend 0'. 2 In parliamentv Hooker includes 
the king as well as the personal representatives of his 
subjectsy but he also clearly approves of the fact that 
the power to make law is divided between them. In this he 
was following and developing a tradition that could be 
traced back to Bracton. A later representative Sir Thomas 
S~ith in 1565 affirmed that Parliament represented the 
11most high and absolute power of the realme of England"v 
it "hath the power of the whole realm both the head and 
the body". 3 He meanty of course, the king-in-Parliament, 
1. Ecc. Pol.v VIIv XVllly 10. 
See also Ecc. Pol., VIIIr iir 12. Here ~ooker writes: 
11 Happier that people whose law is their king in the 
greatest things, them that whose king is himself the 
law. Where the king doth guide the state, and the 
law the king, that commonwealth is like a harp or 
melodious instrumentv the strings whereof are turned 
and handled all by one, following as laws the rules 
and canons of musical science.~ 
3. Sir Thomas Smith, De Republic,a Anglorumv ed. W. Alston, 
Cambridge, 1906, pp. 48-49. 
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but in any case the clear implication was that the kingDs 
power alonev although perhaps of the greatest importancev 
was not absoluteo 
In accord with these general views Hooker approved 
not only of the existence of a body of positive law in 
general, but also of its directly "representa·ti ve" origin 0 
King {or Queen)=in=Parliament is conceived by Hooker asv 
ideally, the r.epresentative of the whole society 0 that 
part of the whole body politic which aimed at providing 
conditions in which the good of all may be pursuedo 
He argued thatv since the good proper to each individual 
is an aspect ofv though not identical with 0 the common 
good 0 
1 besides that which moveth each man in particular to 
seek his privatev there must of necessity in all 
public societies be also a general moverv directing 
unto the common good 0 and framing every man's par~ 
ticular to ito The end whereunto all government 
was instituted 0 was "bonum publicum 11 v the universal 
and common goode Our question is of dominion 0 for 
that end or purpose derived unto oneoul 
Conflicts of particular. interests may 0 howeverv occur 
between estates as well as between particular individuals~ 
andv if one estate were allowed to enact laws for the restv 
it is easy to see how dangerous this might prove the 
unity of the political ordero Consequently, 
0 Peace and justice are maintained by preserving unto 
every order their rights 0 and by keeping all estates 
as it were in an even balanceou2 
Hooker goes on to argue that the best way of doing this is 
to give to the crown, "their common parent 0 whose care is 
L Ecco Polov VIIIu iiv l8o 
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presumed to extend most indifferently over all 11 v the au~ 
thority to ruleo 1 
For practical purposesv then, Hooker's ideal embraced 
both the Tudor emphasis on royal authority and the idea 
of the supremacy of the lawo This ideal barred in theory 
at least any clear~cut notion of sovereigntyo Elizabethan 
ideas left undecided the question~ which law if there 
was a clash ~ that of Crown (lex coronae) or that of the 
kingdom in general (lex parliamenti) - was to have the 
11 higher" authority? A clash, howeverv was merely a suppo~ 
sitionv a supposition with which Hooker did not feel it 
part of his present purpose to dealo His constant theme 
is the importance of king~in~parliament and of the rule 
of lawv which meant government according to procedures 
duly recognized as authentico 2 What Tudor governments 
2o Each thinking on authority need notv of course, be a 
direct reflection of Elizabeth 0 s views on such matters, 
and Co Cross conjectures that Hooker did not publish 
the later books as they would have offended the Queena 
[The Royal Supremacy in the Elizabethan Church, Lon= 
don, 1969, pa36o] She suggests that Hooker had reached 
a 11 philosophical impasse 11 since his view of the royal 
supremacy did not agree with Elizabeth 0 So This is mis~ 
leading for Hooker was not writing in support of Eliza= 
beth 0 s opinions but to justify the legal structure of 
the English Commonwealth and of the immediate relation= 
ship of the Church to that Commonwealtho How the 
Queen attempted to manipulate this structure isv 
if not entirely another matterv at least irrelevant 
to Hooker 0 s immediate purposeo 
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did achieveu 11 quite unwittingly at timesv was to make the 
concept of a rule of law an autonym for arbitrary discretion 
in governance and a synonym for due process". They 1' trans~ 
formed the medieval principle of lawful procedure into that 
of due processu and they transmhted that unique notionv the 
supremacy of lawv into "the certain rule of law•l. 1 It 
was such a development that in time occasioned a clash be= 
tween crown and parliament o In the Ecc_lesiasti.cal Po lit:)'> 
howeveru Hooker 0 s emphasis on the rule of law in no way "an= 
ticipates 01 the likelihood of such a clash. 
In Hooker 0 s judgmentv thenv the Elizabethan Church Settle= 
ment and the ecclesiastical arrangements of the English 
Church were established by due process of law. That isu 
those arrangements were attended to within the traditional 
pattern of the rule of law" They arer thereforev authenticv 
and they are in no way contrary to the law of God and the law 
of nature. The Presbyteriansv consequentlyu cannot by any 
linecessity" impugn the law of England. Obedience is re= 
quired of them. If they are unable to change the present 
arrangements of the English polity in parliament (and that 
included obtaining the Queen°s consent), then they may not 
change it at all. 
The importance which Hooker places on institutions 
and on the authority of Queen~in~Parliament has led some 
comrnentatorsu H. F. Kearney in particularu to conclude that 
1. W. H. Dunhamu Jr.v 0'Regal Power and the Rule of Lawg 
A Tudor Paradox 01 u Journal of British S·tudies u vol. III u 
no. 2u 1964v p.56. 
= 255 ~· 
Hooker ended "implicitlyu if not explicityv with law as 
the will of the Crownv the voice of a scarcely disguised 
positivist public reason"o He continuesg 
0 At this pointv one again wonders what divides Hooker 0 s 
position from that of Hobbesu who argued 
''That law can never be against Reasong our lawyers 
are agreedc And it is truev but the doubt is, of whose 
Reason it is, that shall be received for lawo It is 
not meant of any private reasong for then there would 
be as much contradiction in the Lawes as there is in 
the ~schooles". And therefore it is not that 11 Iuris 
providentia 11 of wisdome of subordinate judges; but the 
Reason of this our Artificial Manu the Commonwealth 
and his Command that maketh law D 01 
A political theory which emphasizes authority 
almost to the extinction of reason and which defends 
the cause of a 11 supreme governor" in all causesv both 
ecclesiastical and civilv can hardly be Thomist in 
spirito It is in the 'medieval traditionv but rather 
in that of Marsilio than Thomas. The real defenders 
of the rights of the Church against the Statev and who 
therefore were nearer to the traditionally medieval 
position; were those whom Hooker was attacking = the 
puritan divinesv Travers and Cartwrighto 0 1 
Kearney 0 s final conclusion is that 
0 The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity is tlu.uughly Eliza= 
bethan in its clothing of radicai~change in traditional 
formso The voice may be the voice of Thomas but on 2 
occasions the hands are remarkably like those of Hobbeso 0 
Al·though (despite many dubj.ous remarks) this illwni= 
nates something of the direction of Hooker 0 s argumentv 
Kearney is formally in error for he appears to disregard 
the context of Hooker 0 s thought altogethero Thisv in theory, 
is important for in the midst of his exposition of the Royal 
Supremacyu Hooker considers that there are proper limits 
l D IL F D Kearney; "Richard Hooker g A Reconsideration °1 u 
Cambridge Journalv volo 5v 1952v po 310a 
2 o Ibid a u p. 311 
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(imposed by nature and not merely by the Engllsh notion 
of the rule of law which is conventional} not only to 
the powers of rulers over subjectsv but also to the scope 
of human decisions in political actionv and to the com~ 
petence of human skill in providing laws for the Church and 
Commonwealtho With regard to the scope and context of 
positive law it is clear that the discussion in Book Eightv 
as elsewhere, movesu formally at leastv within the limits 
set by natural and revealed law" Consequentlyv Hooker 
insists that human laws must have some rational connection 
with the necessary principles of natural law and with divine 
lawo In shortv constitutional thinking is subsumed under 
the precepts decreed by the Christian/classical tradition 
to be true and necessary; and the principles present in 
English consitutional 0 s thought have thus a rational 
essence which may be derived from Nature" Yet what appears 
as inherently reasonable in positive law is often in the 
E_cclesiastical Polity the product of human wisdom and judg= 
ment" It is truev moreoverv that Hooker does notv indeed 
logically cannotv immediately limk this chain of reasoning 
with his argument that the Presbyterians are obliged to 
obey the laws of Englando Despite the "reasonableness 11 
of its contentv consent and due enactment must be given to 
provide the sufficient ground for an obligation to obey 
every human law that ought to be obeyedo 
Now, as we have seen, this distinction between legally 
enacted law and rational essence could be used by the 
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Presbyterians for their own purposes. That is, they could 
claim a radical form of external accountability against 
the English constitution. They could argue that a human 
law need not be considered reasonable merely because it is 
a law, nor consequently that obligation to obey a law is 
necessary merely because it had been duly enacted and has 
the force of law. Such thinking, however, is met by the 
distinction between necessity and indifference, and by the 
emphasis on institutional continuity. In this way all 
forms of radical or 1'strong" external accountability are 
undercut. Whilst formally a law must have some minimum 
of "necessary~ rationality if it is to claim the obedience 
of irrational men, yet, since law and order are good in 
themselves (for "without order there is no living in public 
society"), the emphasis in the Eccle_s_iastical Polity falls 
on the reasonableness of traditional institutions and cus~ 
ternary activity. There is, of course, a formal connection 
between the two points which the circular argument protects 
from outside attack. Hooker can, consequently, have his 
classical and constitutional cakes and eat them together 
without being overcome by the incohate mixture. 
To be fair to Kearney, however, there is a sense in 
which he is perfectly correct. For, despite the emphasis 
on the rational content of positive law, it is one of the 
recurring motives of Hooker 0 s notions about law to assert 
as strongly as possible the full and complete power of the 
human legislator within the limits of divine and natural 
law. It is clear enough, at any rate, that the obligation 
of human law is not merely dependent upon the objective 
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standard of Nature which they ostensibly embodyr but also 
upon the will of legislator which supports and sanctions 
thema Yet in the main in Book One he subscribes to the 
notion that "Laws do not only teach what is good; but they 
enjoin it, they have in them a certain constraining force"u 
and he adds that 11 laws do not take their constrain:l.ng f.or.ce 
from the quality of such as devise themu but from that 
power which doth give them the strength of law"al In Book 
Eight; however; the evident lack of force of this position 
in practice is revealed by the emphasis that Hooker consi~ 
ders must be placed on human authoritya Thus human lawsv 
however reasonable and wisely drafted; take their force 
11 by solemn voice of sovereign authori ty 1' a 
0 In devising and discussing of lawsu wisdom is speci~ 
ally required; but that which establish and maketh 
themv is powerv even power of dominion; the chiefty 
whereof (amongst us) resteth in the person of the 
king o u 2 
We haveu then 0 two notions of the origin of authority 
and obligation 0 In "classical 11 political ·thought 
the authority of human law stems from its rational content" 
In constitutional thought authority is an attribute of the 
2o Ecca Polau VIII; viv l2o 
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will of the sovereign. 1 This authority that the ruler 
possesses flows from his office and not from his private 
person; and the authority that constitutional arrangements 
generally possess is the product of achievement over time. 
Comments directed at these arrangements need necessarily 
have little connection with "classical" political thought 
at all. Constitutional thought, however, can be accommo= 
dated to some degree into thinking of a more abstract 
character. In this regard, as we have seen, Nature and 
Reason in the Ecclesiastical Polity may act as a context 
for argument over particulars. Consequently, what may 
appear as apparent incoherencies, can be accommodated 
within the circular structure of the Great Chain of Being" 
Stress between context and content need not thus reach 
problematic proportions such that either content or context 
has to be abandoned entirely. 
1. The dichotomy is somewhat artificial in that medieval 
philosophy was not monolithic for there was a nomina= 
listie tradition which stressed will in law and author= 
ity. The distinctionu however, is not entirely false 
in that constitutional thought need not have any con= 
nection with either of the strands of medieval philo= 
sophy. Although, there is an apparent similarity 
between nominalism and constitutionalism, such simi= 
larity neglects the levels at which they operate. 
Oakeshtit~ in his introduction to Hobbes 9 Leviathan 
(Oxfordu Blackwell, 1946 0 p.xii) specifies that 
"there are three main patterns which philosophical 
reflection about politics has impressed upon the 
intellectual history of Europe••. The master concepts 
of these three are Reason·and Nature, Will and Arti= 
ficeu and Rational Will. But this distinction is meant 
to operate only at the highest level of generality. 
At lower levels political thought shows a greater di= 
versity. 
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17 
AUTHORITY IN THE 
ENGLISH CHURCH 
It may be recalled that the Presbyterians maintained 
in essence the existence of two entirely separate spheres 
of existence with two respective types of law and conduct; 
the divine as alone revealed in the Scripturesu and the 
purely "natural" law of the mundane world. The former was 
the focus for all human actlvityu the latter hadu in factu 
no real and lasting place in a Christian co~munity. Theyu 
therefore, distinguished absolutely Church from Commonwealth 
as two separate kingdoms. The Church itself enjoys a 
rigid unchanging formu divine in originu purpose and func~ 
tionu while the Commonwealth is a purely mundane phenomenon, 
alterable according to circumstances 1 and not divine in 
character. Nonetheless in a true Christian community the 
Commonwealth should be arranged in such a fashion that the 
supremacy of the Church over the Commonwealth would be 
ensured. The Scripturesu not duly enacted legal statuteu 
areu for the Presbyterianu the criterion for all Christian 
conductu and an ampleu indeed a completeu guide to any 
action whatsoever. Human reason was incapable o:f: effective 
action in the face of evil. To Hooker such an attitude to 
political and ecclesiastical order endangered the traditional 
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authority of the Church in England, and we shall trace 
in this chapter h.i.s own view of the inter-relationship 
of church and commonwealth in English society. 
To refute the Presbyterian case and to demonstrate or 
show that its doctrines would destroy English society as 
it was traditionally constitutedv Hooker had to do much 
more than to accuse them of being irrational in general. 
He had to prove that they struck at the foundations of all 
authority, especially in regard to English society. To 
this end he was compelled to argue that disobedience to 
ecclesiastical law undermined the political order of English 
society as much as a breach of any other law. This involved 
showing that the ecclesiastical polity of England and, 
indeed, the civil polity itself were not ~nconsistent withv 
nor necessarily opposed to the laws of God and the laws 
of nature. If this could be proved to be the case, then 
neither conscience nor reason could require men to dis-
obey, and undermine and undo the achievements of past 
generations. 
Hooker 0 s answer to the Presbyterian argument for the 
"higher" authority of church over commonwealth amounted to 
a development and an extension of the distinction between 
necessity and indifference 1 between moral and rational 
absolutes and the demands of circumstance, between the indi-
vidual before God and the individual in an institutional 
setting. His own institutional ideal was that of a united 
church ini:!egrally joined to a unified commonwealth, and 
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such,indeed, is a description of the English polity as 
Hooker was inclined to regard it. The radical Protestant 
attacks on hierarchy and traditional authority wouldu he 
argued, reduce this order that England possesses into 
"several impaled authorities." 1 In this way religious 
conduct (in its external attributes at least) is seen to be 
as much an aspect of English constitutional arrangements 
as more characteristically political actions. For, to 
Hooker and to most if not all of his contemporaries, 
religion constituted the main moral support of political 
unity. 2 At this level, that of institutional order, 
religion was of, or took onu a "political" character. 
It followed, therefore, that the political authority, as 
the protector of the commonwealth, had an interest in who 
was teaching and preaching publicly. 3 This did not amount 
in Hooker 0 s mind to a judgment that religion was or should 
be "a mere politic device 11 • For such a view misses the 
fact that Christian is the true religion, and consequently 
no other religionu once Christianity had been propagated, 
would or indeed could suffice. 
This general unity of civil and religious concerns 
and the coalescence of authority in English society is 
the position that Hooker seeks to justify. In endeavouring 
to refute the Presbyterian case in general and in particu~ 
lar, Hooker again finds it necessary to outline his own 
1. Ecc. Pol. 0 VIII 0 i, 4. 
2. See C. Russell, "Arguments for Religious Unity in England, 
1530-1650," The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, vol.l8 0 
1967. 
3. Ecc. Pol. , V, i, 2. 
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presuppositions concerning the nature of realityv law and 
the individuaL, Hov1everv the individual under consideration 
at this point is the Christianr of whom he writesg 
0 The law of nature and the law of God are sufficient 
for declaration in both what belongeth unto each r i.e. 
Christian] man separatelyr as his soul is the spouse 
of Christ, yea so sufficient 8 that they plainly and 
fully show .whatsoever God doth require by way of 
necessary introduction unto the state of everlasting 
bliss. But as a man liveth joined with others in 
common society, and belongeth unto the outward politic 
body of the Church, albeit the said law of nature and 
of scripture have in this respect also made manifest 
the things that are of necessity; nevertheless, by 
reason of new occasions still arising which the Church 
having care of souls 8 must needs take for as need 
requireth 1 hereby it cometh to passr that there is and 
ever will be great use even of human laws and ordinancesr 
deducted by way of discourse as conclusions from the 
former divine and natural; serving for principles 
thereunto. u 1 
What is of especial interest in this somewhat extended 
passage is the distinction which we have previously noted2 
between the individual as such and the individual as a 
member of a societyr as a role player in an institutional 
setting. Clearly for Hooker the individual person is the 
fundamental unit of religious experiences. He regards it 
as a necessary fact of experience that every individual 
has some concern for his own salvation. Because this is 
the case 1 because salvation is individual 8 commitment to 
a religion must be regarded as logically preceeding member~ 
ship of a merely political society. 3 Religionu in theoryr 
2. See this v1ork chap. eleven. 
3. A point made by A. S. McGrade to whose article 1'The 
Coherence of Hooker 1 s "Ecclesiastical Polity''g the Books 
on Powerv Journal of the Hi~tory of Ideasr vol. XXIVu 1963. 
I am greatly indebted for my understanding of Book 
Eight of the Ecclesiastical Polity. 
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is a matter of absolute choice. 1 Hooker gives an example 
of this line of thought in his treatment of the religious 
authority of the civil rulers before and after the conver~ 
sion of Rome to Christianityo When the citizens of the 
Empire were pagan, their pagan rulers had the authority 
and power to order the arrangements of pagan religiono 
When "whole Rome" became Christian, its Christian rulers, 
according to Hooker, must necessarily have been conceded 
a like authority in matters of Christian religion" 2 
Salvation is thus to be attained neither through obeying 
the commands of an earthly power nor by merely following 
the dictates of fashion. PresumablYu if the rulers of the 
Roman Empire had not assented to the change in religious 
opinionu then a situation of "necessity" would have ensued 
for the Christians for they alone were in possession of the 
trutho Onceu however, the Christian religion was adopted 
as the official religion, such a situation need not de-
velop. Indeed, if rulers in general conduct themselves 
with the truth ever before their eyes, then no situation 
of this nature wi.ll be likely to arise in the future o 
Thus a rational acceptance of Christianity entails no 
absolute disobedience to civil authorityo Since the rulers 
and the citizens of England profess the Christian religion, 
1. I say in theory for in reality all rational roads 
now lead to Christianity. 
2o Ecce Pol., VIII, vi, 6o 
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since together they hold that religion "in gross", the 
government of Elizabeth may justly claim authority in 
ecclesiastical affairso 
Religion is ideally not a device for ensuring politi-
cal success, and to "live well", in Hooker 1 s view, is to 
live religiouslyo When, however, the individual "enters 
into" a political association, the need for individual 
salvation must be supplemented by laws and arrangements 
appropriate to his new situationo But, of course, the 
distinction between necessary and non-necessary rules does 
not parallel the distinction between individual principles 
and political lawso It is not the case, in short, that 
only individuals are subject to necessary and absolute 
principles, while the rules governing societies are all 
customary and conventionalo For, as we have seen, Nature 
itself has specified what is required for existence in a 
political associationo In practice, however, "new occa= 
sions 11 constantly arise which a community "must needs take 
order as need requiretho" In such circumstances, natural 
and revealed law serve as principles and as guiding rules 
in determining the considerations involvedo In other words, 
they provide the proper and necessary context for the 
politics of timeo Argument of another character, however, 
is required to reach a particular practical conclusion 
that may, it is hoped bring order into historical circum= 
stances a 
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Hookeru then, draws a distinction between the indivi= 
dual and the individual in society~ Heu moreoveru believed 
that Church and Commonwealth are 1 by functionu separate 
societies 1 but thatu on occasionu of which he considered 
his own day to be an example, they could be united in a 
particular political and religious association. He thus 
assumed that not only do men generally have some regard 
for their salvationu but they also incorporate this con= 
cern in their association with each other. Citizens and 
Christiansu consequently, may in certain cases be the same 
personsu and politics is fundamentally the concern of an 
association of persons, not of a band of zealots intent 
in the implementation of private aspirations without re= 
gard for other persons. If Hooker, in general, agrees 
with the Presbyterians in drawing a distinction between 
the temporal and the spiritualv he is yet able to argue 1 
in England 1 s particular case 1 that there is a coincidence 
of religious and-political concerns in each of her subjectso 
Now in asserting the unity of Church and Commonwealth 
in one association Hooker was endeavouring to give some 
justification for a position that was straightforwardly 
asserted in the Act of Supremacy. 
v •••• That the Queen°s Highness is the only supreme 
governor of this realm as well as in all spiritual 
or ecclesiastical things or causes temporal, and that 
no foreign prince 1 person, or prelate 1 state or poten= 
tate hath or ought to have any jurisdiction; power, 
superiority 1 pre=eminenceu or authorityu ecclesiastical 
or spiritual with this realm 1 and therefore I do 
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utterly renounce and forsake all foreign jurisdictionsv 
powersv superiorities and authoritiesu and do promise 
that from henceforth I shall bear forth faith and true 
allegiance to the Queen Highnessu her heirs and lawful 
successors.ul 
The nation was thus declared to be a self-sufficient and 
natural institutional unit. Henceforth religious associ-
ation and po.l.it:tcal society were to form a unity with 
ultimate authority in the hands of a Christian prince; 
obedience and allegiance vlere 11national". 
Hooker considered that there was nothing in such an 
arrangement that necessarily invalidated this concern 
between church and commonwealth. In any case in most 
societies the civil government had always been concerned 
with religious as well as purely political matters. 
uThe heathen themselves had their spiritual lawsv causesv 
and officesv always severed from their temporal~ 
neither did this make two independent estates among 
them. v 2 
The difference between Christianity and other religions 
isv of course, the fact that Christianity is the true re= 
ligion. Consequently if the members of a political society 
embrace the true religion; then that society is or becomes 
by definition a true church for 
u •••. the Church of Jesus Christ is every such public 
society of menu as doth in religion hold that truth 
which is proper to Christianity. As a politic society 
it doth maintain religionv as a churchv that religion 
L G. R. Elton (ed.) '· The Tudor Constitution, Cambridgeu 
1960u Po 366. 
2. Ecc. Pol.v VIIIv iu 4. 
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which God hath revealed by Jesus Christ. 
With us therefore the name of a church importeth 
only a society of men 6 first united into some public 
form of regimentg and secondly distinguished from other 
societies by the exercise of the Christian religion.ol 
In shortu there exists in England one substance, that is 
society in general; and that substance has two accidents 
with their particular functions, namely commonwealth and 
church. 2 
With reference to their ins·ti tutional arrangements 
Hooker alleges that all societies of his own day may be 
classified under three headings. There are infidel socie-
ties where church and society are two distinct bodies; 
Catholic societiesu where church and society are one body, 
but where authority is divided between Pope and Emperor 
or King; and Anglican Society, where church and society 
are one body and authority is not in any way di.vided" 3 
Thus in England 
0 there is not any man of the Church of England but the 
same man is also a member of the Commonwealth 8 nor any 
man a member of the Commonwealth, which is not also of 
the Church of Englando 0 4 
In a metaphor that attempts to sum up the natural distinction 
between essence and accident Hooker continuesu 
1. 
2. 
3 0 
4 0 
'therefore as in a figure triangular the base .doth 
differ from the sides thereof 1 and yet one and the 
ECCo ·Pol of VIIIu iu 2 0 
Ecc. Pol., VIIIu iu 50 
Ecc. Polo, VIIIu iu 7o 
Ecc. Pol.f VIII, iu 2 0 
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self-same line is both a base and also a side; a side 
simplyu a base if it chance to be the bottom and 
underlie the rest; so, albeit properties and ac·tions of 
one kind do cause the name of a commonwealthv qualities 
and functions of another sort the name of a Churchv 
to be given unto a multitude, yet one end the self-same 
multitude may in such sort be bothv and is so with usu 
that no person appertaining to the one can be denied 
to be also of the other. 0 1 
The arrangements that a society adopts and the authority 
it bestows are matters of things indifferent. That isu 
they are considerations of particular historical develop-
mentv and methods of solving the problem of order. Order 
itself must be imposed for the absence of order is "the 
mother of all confusion". Thereforev there must of neces-
sity be those who have authority and those whose duty it 
is to obey. Such an order is a hierarchy of "gradual dis~ 
position"v to which the order of the entire universeu 
divine in origin and purpose, gives testimony. It i.s the 
function of authority to ensure the durability of this 
order and the disposition of society in general. Its 
instrument is poweru and power is the ability to perform 
and enforce public actions. It "resides" in society and 
may be "given" to various of its members. In England the 
Crown has both spiritual and temporal supremacy, and this 
means that it has the power to command in religious and 
civil affairs. The monarch has no earthly superior; he 
is, in Hookervs wordsu "the highest uncommanded Commander". 2 
1. Ecc. PoLv VIIIu i, 2. 
2. Ecc. Pol., VIIIu iiu 3. 
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In general, Hooker follows the Act of Supremacy and defines 
the Royal Supremacy in England as 
0 that ruling authority, which neither any foreign state, 
nor yet any part of that body politic at homer wherein 
the same is established, can lawfully overrule. 0 1 
Since these are the institutional arrangements that 
England has adopted for the present occasion, and since 
such arrangements are clearly not contrary to any of the 
general stipulations of natural law, the Presbyterian 
insistence on the complete corruption of the church and on 
the necessity of return to a once existent ideal state is 
utterly illogical. For institutional arrangements occupy 
an area where necessary principles have no direct practical 
application as such. Thus what took place or is alleged 
to have taken place at a certain period in the past cannot 
be an absolute guide in regard to present arrangements 
at all. In short, 
0 as for supreme power in ecclesiastical affairs, the 
word of God doth nowhere appoint that all kings should 
have it, neither that any should not have it; for which 
cause it seemeth to-stand altogether by human right, 2 that unto Christian kings there is such dominion given. 1 
The monarch, in ecclesiastical affairs as in civilr 
is, however, subject to the rule of law and bound on 
various occasions to consult parliament. Positive lawsr 
0Whether by custom or otherwise established without 
repugnancy unto the law of God and nature, ought no 
1. Ecc. Pol., VIIIr ii, 3. 
2. Ecc. Pol.r VIII, ii, 5. 
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less to be of force even in the spiritual affairs of 
the Church. 0 1 
The necessity for order and the rule of law, then 1 supply 
a common foundation to a society of which both commonwealth 
and church are its accidents. They 1 church and common~ 
wealth, share common underlying principles in regard to the 
necessity for institutions in conditions of imperfection. 
Consequently in English society 8 the only "difference of 
these two regimentsu ecclesiastical and civilu consisteth 
in the matter about which the actions of each are conver~ 
sant. v• 2 And "with us u one society is both the Church and 
the Commonwealth .•• whole and entire ••. under one chief 
Governor. v• 3 It is true that church and commonwealth are 
distinct in functionu but not (as the extreme Protestants 
would have it) in essence. It was, amongst other thingsu 
because the Presbyterians considered church and common~ 
wealth as entirely distinct that they judged it necessary 
to destroy England 0 s ecclesiastical arrangements in order 
to elevate th~ir ministry into a distinct and higher 
society. Yet Hooker strongly asserts that any common~ 
wealth which possesses the Christian religion "in gross", 
is a church; in its political aspects it is a "state"u 
1. Ecc. Pol.u VIII, ii, 17. 
2. Ecc. Pol.u VIII, iu 1. 
3" Ecc. Pol. u VIII, iu 1. 
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in its ecclesiastical a church. They both have institutional 
arrangements appropriate to that function and to the situ~ 
ation in which they find themselves. FinallYv to Hookerv 
this identity of church and commonwealth was, in England 0 s 
case 1 a fact, not merely a legal fiction. It is this 
situation which the Presbyterians were endangering for corn~ 
pletely irrational reasons and from disreputable notions. 
Moreover, Hooker asserts that there are positive ad~ 
vantages (of 1 indeed, a political nature) that flow from 
having a supreme authority or governor who is head both of 
church and commonwealth. For in such an arrangement it is 
impossible, if acts stem from the appropriate principlesv 
to have a division of obligations. This identityp like~ 
wise, strengthens the institutional church in maintaining 
its authority and in reforming itself when occasion arises" 
For in conditions of imperfection merely spiritual disci~ 
pline is hardly enough" 
0 The custom which many Christian churches have to fly 
to the civil magistrate for coercion of those that will 
not othervlise be reformed, = these things are proof 
sufficient that even in Christian religion the power 
wherewith ecclesiastical persons were endued at the 
first is unable to do of itself so much as when 
secular power doth strengthen it; and thatp .not by 
way of ministry or service, but of predominancy 1 such 
as the kings of Israel in their time exercised over 
the Church of Godool 
Force, consequentlyv is legitimate in supporting or refor~ 
ming the institutional arrangements of any churcho It isu 
howeveru advantageous if the force required to effect 
lo Ecc. Polou VIIIv iii, 5. 
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reform is administered by a prince who is head both of 
commonwealth and church. 
In arguing for the appropriateness of the headship of 
the church and the commonwealth being combined in one con-
crete p~~§on Hooker again utilizes as the distinction be-
tween necessity and indifference. As there are various 
modes or levels of existence that the church as a whole 
occupies, so there are definable authorities at the various 
levels of the church 0 s existence. Since these distinctions 
are natural, the arguments proffered by the extreme Protes-
tants that the Sovereign or Head of the Church in England 
(merely by using those terms) is usurping the power of 
Christ are complete misrepresentations of reality. For 
the headship that Christ exercises over the church is dif-
ferent in "order, measure and kind" from that exercised 
by the Queen in England. 1 He differs in order because the 
church He rules comprises the mystical as well as the in-
stitutional church. The power to rule over this expanse 
has been granted to Him by God. Since this is the case, 
the kind of power He has differs from all others. His 
power is not "sensibly present" and 
0 impossible it is, that they the Presbyterians should 
so close up their eyes, as not to discern what odds 
there is between that kind of operation which we 
imply in the headship of princes, and th~t which 
agreeth to our Saviour over the Church. 0 
1. Ecc. Pol., VIII, iv, 5. 
2. Ecc. PoL, VIII 1 iv 1 5. 
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Forv indeedu kings rule only in sensible external thingsv 
and in no sense can they usurp the Powers that Christ Him-
self possesses. However, in history 11 Visible government 
is a thing necessary for the Church 11 , and the power that 
visible government exercises is power of dominion. This 
power may be "spiritual in regard of the matter about which 
it dealeth" 1 1 but must and can be distinguished from the 
actual spiritual power that Christ possesses. Thus in 
"external" government it is possible for a church to choose 
the arrangements it requires and to bestow authority on 
whom it pleases. The authority of the head of such a 
church is not to be confused with that exercised by Christ. 
To do otherwise is to proclaim oneself guilty of pernicious 
confusion. 
Hooker discusses a number of points in regard to the 
authority of the Head of the Church in Englandv such as 
the power to nominate bishopsu 2 the control of ecclesiastical 
courtsu 3 and the authority to call church assemblies. 4 
The discussion of these and other points is dependent upon 
a distinction between "power of dominion" and "power of 
order". In some ways this distinction parallels that 
1. Ecc. Pol. u VIIIv iVv 11. 
2. Ecc.· Pol., VIIIv vii, 1-7. 
3 0 Ecc. Pol. u VIII 1 viiiu 1-9. 
4 0 Ecc. Pol.u VIIIu Vv 1-2 0 
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between necessity and indifference. For in Hooker 1 s judg-
ment the power of order was instituted directly by God in 
the Scriptures. It is an aspect of the promise of sal= 
vationu and Jesus Christ, the Son of God, instituted the 
sacraments and the power to ailininister them. 1 Hooker, 
howeveru finds it necessary here to distinguish between 
instituting a power and bestowing it on successive persons, 
and again, between bes·towing a pmver and stipulating the 
conditions unde-r which that power may be exercised. 2 
In short, the matter is not merely one of origins 1 and 
Hooker rejects outright the claim of the Catholic Church 
that the right to select persons to exercise the power of 
order resides directly in the successors of St Peter. 3 
Thus, yet another claim of direct godly institution is 
rejected by Hooker. For on his terms whomever a church 
selects to exercise the paver of order is itself 
a matter of indifference. The actual choice of a person, 
of course, must be distinguished from the exercise of his 
1. 11 Even so Christ having given unto his Church the power 
whereof we speak, what she doth by her appointed agents, 
that duty though they discharge, yet is it not theirs 
peculiarly 8 but hers; her power it is which they do 
exercise. 11 Ecc. Pol., VIIIu vi, 3. 
3. Ecc. Pol., VIII, vi, 3. 
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poweru the power of consecration. 1 For the grace of the 
power of order is God 0 s alone to bestow, and the sacraments 
themselves are means of true grace only when they are ad= 
ministered by persons specifically ordained to Godvs 
service. Though the Head of the Church in England, as 
stipulated in the Act of Supremacy, may confer upon bishops 
the temporal requisites of their office (that is, he con= 
trols their election)~ it is their ecclesiastical conse= 
cration which 11gives being" to bishops. 2 In respect of 
their sacramental function bishops possess powers which 
kings do not haveo 3 
Hookeru howeveru equivocates on the power of excommuni= 
cation which priests possess, and it was on this point that 
a direct clash between the spiritual and the temporal 
powers might conceivably have occurred. The Presbyterians 
themselves wished to see the Crown directly subject to 
censure, but Hooker appears to argue against such a po= 
sition for political reasons. 4 That is, the commonwealth 
itself would be in grave danger if the person occupying 
the highest authoritative position in the social hierarchy 
were excommunicated, and removed from the ambience of 
his subjectso 
1. Ecc. Pol 01 VIIIu vii, 2. 
2. Ecc. Pol. 0 VIII, vii, 2. 
3. Ecc. Pol. 0 VIII, viiu 1. 
4. Ecc o Pol. u VIII, ix u 3 o 
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9 Where sith the kings of England are within their 
own dominions the most high, and can have no peer, 
how is it possible that any, either civil or ecclesi~ 
astical, person under them should have over them 
coercive power, when such power would make that person 
so far forth his superior 0 s superior, ruler and judge? 
It cannot therefore stand with the nature of such 
sovereign regiment that any subject should have power 
to exercise on kings so highly authorized the greatest 
censure of excommuniation according to the platform 
of Reformed Discipline ••o• For which cause, till 
better reason be brought, to prove that kings cannot 
lawfully be exempted from subjection unto ecclesias~ 
tical courts, we must and do affirm their said exemp-
tion unlawful. 0 1 
The most important aspect of the Head of the Church 0 s 
authority is the power to make laws in regard to ecclesiasti-
cal organization. Since the church is a society, it has 
the power to institute what it deems necessaryo 2 This 
authority to enact law need not be in the clergy aloneo 
There is no necessary reason why it should, nor is there 
any traditional warrant for it to do soo Hooker emphasizes 
the right of the laity to participate in the government of 
the church, and the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Parlia= 
ment embodied and safeguarded this righto For 
0 The Parliament of England together with the con~ 
vocation annexed thereunto, is that whereupon the very 
essence of all government within kingdom doth depend; 
it is even the body of the whole realm/ it consisteth 
of the king, and of all that within the land are sub-
ject unto him; for they are all there present, either 
in person, or by such as they voluntarily have derived 
their very personal rights untoo The Parliament is a 
court not merely temporal as if it meddle with nothing 
but only leather and woolo 0 3 
3o Ecco Polo; VIII, vi, lL 
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We have seenv then, how, by wide use of the distinction 
between necessity and indifference, by constant repetition 
of the need for orderv by constant emphasis on the indivi-
dual in his institutional setting, and by consequent stress 
on the importance of traditional modes of conduct 1 Hooker 
has arrived at his final conclusion~ 
vLet it stand for our final conclusion, that in a free 
Christian state or kingdom, where one and the self-
same people are the Church and the commonwealth, 
God through Christ directly the people to see it for 
good and we4ghty considerations expedient that their 
sovereign Lord and governor in causes civil have also 
in ecclesiastical affairs a supreme power; forasmuch 
as the light of reason doth lead them unto it, and 
against it Godvs own revealed law hath nothing, surely 
they do not in submitting themselves thereunto any 
other than that which a wise and religious people 
ought to do • 1 1 
It is such a conclusion and such remarks as these that have 
evoked two diametrically opposed responses in Hooker 0 s 
interpreters. On the one hand, we have the judgment offered 
by A. s. McGrade, who remarks that "if Hooker is committing 
an error, it is the error of spiritualizing the state 
rather than of temporalizing religionv•. 2 On the other hand 1 
H. F. Kearney (who, as we have seen, finds it necessary to 
employ the adjective "positivist") 3 and Peter Munz con= 
siders that Hooker 0 s conclusions are in some significant 
1. Ecc. Pol., VIII, iii, 6. 
2. A. S. McGrade, The Coherence of Hooker 1 s Polityg the 
Books on Power, Journal of the History of Ideas, volo XXIV, 
1963; p. 175. 
3 o H. F o Kearney, Richard Hooker g A Recons:ideration v 
Cambridge Journal, vol. 5, 1952, p. 310. 
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1 
sense secular. They both have occasion to refer to Mar-
silius of Padua in order to substantiate their opinionso 
Howeverv such an understanding of both Hookerus intentions 
and his conclusions is as much dependent on a misreading 
of the Defensor Pacis as on a reading of the Ecclesiastical 
Polity. 2 It is clear that in such disputes both parties 
have seized on one aspect of Hookerus remarks which appear 
to offer the key as to what he was abouto The answer in 
practically all such disputes lies to the side of such 
representations. 
We will concludeu therefore, with a few comments on 
the relationship of context to content in the Ecclesiastical 
Polityo For Hooker religious worship must be a matter of 
individual choice for on such a choice salvation itself is 
dependent. Thisu howeverv must be balanced by the fact 
that all paths now quite clearly lead to the doctrines of 
the Christian religion. The use of correspondence and the 
postulation of an objective moral reality in that sense 
removes choice. Forv indeedv an idea of a reality inde-
pendent of manus enquiring mind must at some stage remove 
lo Po Munz, The Place of Hooker in the History of Thought, 
London, 1952v chapter threeo 
2. For a correction to the "positivist" interpretation of 
Marsilius of Padua see E. Lewis, "The Positivism of 
Marsiglia of Padua" v Spec~Ul-1lJTiv vol o 38, 196 3 o 
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further enquiryo The doctrines offered in Scriptures have, 
in a moral and religious senseu completed this enquiryo 
The church in England has recognized the truths of 
these Christian doctrineso The citizens of England have 
chosen their religion, andv on Hooker 9 s terms, it would be 
irratj.onal to change or reject it at any time in the futureo 
In contrastv howeverv the detailed arrangements that the 
church deems necessary for its ex:i.stence and protec·t::.ion 
are a matter of custom and convenienceo They come within 
the purview of the political and ecclesiastical authoritieso 
Consequently there is no private choice as to ecclesiastical 
detail for that detail is now a matter for public delibera= 
tiono In effect, by attaching itself so closely to the 
political structure the church has become an involuntary 
and coercive community" It hasv to some degreev taken 
on the outward aspect of a commonwealtho It is as much a 
"public thing" as the commonwealth itself" This move may 
give to the Ecclesiastical Polity a political character; 
it hardly makes it a "secular" tracto For the status of the 
political and of the external arrangements of the church 
is dependent upon the natural and the super=natural contexto 
The supporting circular structure of this context pretexts 
the content from such a "secular" interpretationo 
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18 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen how the present essay has described and 
developed a number of points 1 notably the distinction be-
tween theory and practiceu the character of the various 
levels of discourse in the Ecclesiastical Polity, and the 
relationship between these levels of discourse. The elabor= 
ation of such points arises quite appropriately out of an 
investigation of what Richard Hooker was abouto The dis= 
tinction between theory and practice 1 for instanceu is in 
effect presented by Hooker in his own distinction between 
necessity and indifferenceo The differentiation between 
the various levels that discourse can and does take may be 
seen in the division between the description of the natural 
system in Book One of the Eccles·iast:ical: Poli·ty and the 
discussion of the various details in the latter books. 
Throughout the whole Ecclesias·tical Polity Hooker was en= 
deavouring to elaborate a relationship, or at least was 
proclaiming a connectionv between these levels of thought. 
The relationship between these levels of thought is 
determined by Hooker u s own particular notion of "nature u• 
or necessityo Nature and its concomitant principles are 
universal in character 1 they give direction to the whole 
of reality. Yet in theory they could still prescribe 
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particular actions in specific situationso Thus political 
discoursev even when directed to specific occurrenciesv 
was held to retain an objective charactero That is, 
argument of a political nature at a sufficient level of 
generality need,even on particular occasions, have little 
concern with the character of the audience addressedo 
It took its character and force from what it was 11 right 11 
to do; and this wasu or would be, deduced from general 
principles of an unchanging and objective Natureo Not 
only were the principles or ends there for all to 11 see"u 
there were also logical operations such that what it was 
right and correct to do in a specific situation could be 
11 deduced" o In shortu with the objective character of the 
principles involved and the precise way of deducing the 
required information from these principles, political argu= 
ment took on the identity of proof (the counter=point to 
'
1deduction") u that is 1 argument not distracted by the 
purpose of having to persuade anyoneu but designed to prove 
the 11 correctness 11 of what was being proposed or justifiedo 
The principles that Hooker considered to have been 
enunciated by the law of nature havev as we have seenv 
this objective charactero The arguments employed to support 
the apparently objective character of these principles are 1 
however, merely circumlocutionsv and the operation of 
"deducing" what to do in a specific situation such as that 
which England was facing with the radical character of the 
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Presbyterian movement, is nowhere properly indicated nor 
coherently explainedo That isv the claims that Hooker 
makes for the nature and force of his argument arev on the 
evidence of what he produced in the Ecclesiastical Polityu 
not substantiated¢ His argument does not proceed in the 
manner proclaimed nor display the characteristic features 
of "deductive 11 reasoningo In shortv it is systematically 
misleading; and the actual relationship between necessity 
and indifference is more complex than he allowso 
Even on his own terms, thenv Hooker failed to display 
the relationship proposed between the areas of necessity 
and indifferenceo This reveals the incoherence in his own 
set of presuppositionso Yet the actual incoherence of his 
argument in regard to necessity and indifference has not 
disposed of the direction and movement of hi.s argument 0 
In reality; Hooker 0 s inability to do what he propounds merely 
complicates any examination of his positiono In the present 
investigation of his argument a suggestion has been put 
forward as to how his argument actually proceedsi what he 
was doing was different from what he said he was doingo 
What Hooker 0 s failure to relate necessity and indifference 
in a properly coherent fashion left him with was two distinct 
levels or aspects of practical argumento The relationship 
between these levels of practical argument does not amount 
to a "formal 11 distinction between necessity and indifferenceo 
= 284 = 
In the present essayv thenu Hookervs general position 
is held to take the form of an extended metaphor. Corres= 
pondences in one aspect actually may be said to attempt 
to replace the "proof" that he frequently enunciates 
but fails to produce. This device of employing images is 
meant to distract atten·tion away from the dissimilarities 
of the identities compared and to concentrate it upon those 
aspects of the comparison which appear to lend cohesion 
and certainty to the argument in question. Such correspon= 
dencesv howeveru do not andu indeedv cannot replace the 
demonstrative proof. Theyv in factv display the practical 
nature of Hooker 0 s argumentu and what the so=called objec= 
tive principles revealed by Nature really leave him with 
is a new rhetorical device. In this way the circularity 
of Hooker 0 s argument enables him to consider as objective 
any principles his religion and his disposition demand or 
desire. This objectivity or necessity is not the result 
of demonstration, but is the stamp of approval that a 
thinker or a tradition cares to bestow on a principle or 
a precept. It isv clearlyv not the method of reaching such 
objective principles that is of particular importanceu 
but the content that the principles proclaim. In the 
Ecclesiastical Polity this content is Christian in characterv 
but Christian in such a way that it excludes a Presbyterian 
interpretation. Hooker 0 s political dispositionu the dis= 
position to be conservativev is to be seen in his attitude 
to political changer whichu in turnu is revealed in his 
examination of English political order. 
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II 
The character and relationship of necessity and 
indifference provides, then, the specific methodological 
context for Hooker 0 s argumentso The general objective 
principles of nature and historical particulars find their 
place within this contexte This distinction between neces= 
sity and indifference marks also the divisive point between 
means and ends, the particular and the general, and exter= 
nal and internalo On the one side, we have seen that the 
final end of man is to reside with God in eternity. This 
end and the various principles of conduct that are considered 
to follow from this are seen with 'the eye of the under= 
standing 0 " that is 0 internally. On the other side 0 that 
is, externallyu there are various means or practices 
in regard to conduct in general. It is this which accounts 
for the variety of human activity displayed in history. 
These particular practices, however 0 are not merely a 
matter of random and irrational choice 8 for they are all 
ultimately related or relatable to the general context of 
Nature. 
Nature 0 then, provides the context to the discussion 
of politics in general and to the particular arrangements 
of the English polity. Just as Hooker 0 s general argument 
finds its place in the context of the distinctions between 
necessity and indifference 0 ends and means, internal and 
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external, so various notions of the origin of political 
association and different ideas of political space and time 
affect the character and language of this argument. 
"Classical" political thought supplies the general con= 
textual explanation of the origin of political society 
and of political space 8 but not of political time. Yet, 
' 
while Hooker 0 s vocabulary is, for the most part, characteris= 
tic of the Christian/Classical tradition, his discussion 
of historical particulars often alters the nuances of such 
language in significant ways. In this manner he reveals 
independent but (to him) relatable ideas of political space 
and time. Again in this discussion we see a constant 
movement between different levels of discourse, and between 
different notions of political spaceu political time and 
change. 
One of the particular concerns'of "classical" political 
thought was the question of the origin of political society 
and of the nature and forms of various political constitutions. 
Such thinking was greatly influenced by various Latin 
Authors and after the thirteenth century by Aristotle. 
Yet there are significant differences of philosophical and 
theological bacJ(ground between Aristotle and the Scholas= 
tics to say the least. In scholastic thought it was recog= 
nized that men 0 despite their ostensibly different pursuits, 
are all ultimately determined to seek God as the common 
end and as the final cause of all things. Aristotle, who 
did not explore any theological background in his political 
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thoughtv found it necessary to employ a classification of 
different kinds of polity which is itself (in part) the 
specification of the different goods that may seek in 
common. On the one handv the theological background in 
Aquinas and Hooker in theory places direct limitations 
on the forms of political action. On the other handr for 
Aristotle legal arrangements are a function of the prevail= 
ing distribution of political power; to resist this power 
is to undertake to change this distribution and hence 
those legal arrangements; and this in itself is to change 
by violent means the form of that polity. 
Now certainly the understanding of the universe and the 
nature of man may provide a context for political activity. 
Christianityu in the sense that the Fall is seen as the 
necessary cause of all specifically mundane activityu must 
consider the origin of political activity in evil. Yet 
under the influence of Aristotle the character ascribed 
to politics by Hookerv for instanceu is softened and changed. 
In this way both the emphasis on the natural character 
of society and also on the Aristotelian notion of political 
order and constitutionalism enter into the political think= 
ing of the Christian Hooker. In Book One of the Ecclesias= 
tical Polity as well as in Book Eight Hooker subscribes to 
the notion of a constitution as having a definite foundation 
and a form ("soul") fixed in space. Time and change as such 
do not enter into consideration; and in Aristotle at leastu 
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time was generally regarded as an area of corruption" 
to 
Change was the evil/~,)3 warded off, and reformv if it was 
possiblev meant a return to first principles. 1 
Hooker, then, when he has subscribed to the principles 
of classical political thought, goes on, within the context 
of his distinction between necessity and indifference, to 
discuss the character of historical change. The precise 
character of the world at any specific time, or of a parti~ 
cular political orderv cannot be completely captured within 
the confines of general and abstract thought. Here Hooker 0 s 
reliance on the nature of the English constitution and on 
a conservative disposition leads him to a view (not expli~ 
citly expressed as his general theory was) of political 
change in which the passing of time need not necessarily 
be destructive of political order. What we have in Book 
Eight of the Ecclesiastical Pol·i ty is a notion of political 
activity as a traditional engagement. It is in regard to 
particulars that Hooker's traditional sense is revealed. 
Conservatism is a disposition appropriate to the consideration 
of change in time. 
1. In the few pages that he allows himself, Gunnell is 
particularly interesting on the political thought 
of Aristotle, especially in regard to time and change. 
See J. G. Gunnellr Political Phi·losop}lY and Time, · 
M~ddletown, Connecticut, 1969u pp. 225-240. 
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Man and God 0 s works areu to employ Hooker 1 s termi~ 
nology, in a state of possibil.i.tyu that is 5 they are 
permeated by a desire to become 1'perfecter than they now 
are". 
0 And because there is not in the world anything 
whereby another may some way be made the perfecteru 
therefor all things that are are good. 0 L 
When, consequently, political order is viewed through 
"the glass of possibility" 2 , a man disposed to be conser= 
vative is in a position both to defend an association 
whose imperfections are part of a larger whole and to ad= 
mit that human skillu within the limits set by the Fall, 
may devise means whereby the possible may be made actual. 
Thus the change from possible to actual is subsumed under 
a conservative image of political change. There is 1 however, 
no notion of a return to first principles, and this is a 
step beyond the argument as used by certain Conciliaristsr 
for examplev who held that every society may be able to 
rid itself of corrupting defects; in this the defect is 
innovation, the reform a return to first principles. 
The occasion for Hookervs elaboration of his position 
wasu of course, provided by the fundamentalist challenge 
of the extreme Protestants. In effect, they argued that 
the main principles informing ecclesiastical arrangements 
had been provided by the Scriptures, and any movement away 
from these principles was in reality a degeneration. A 
1. Ecc o Polo u I u v u 1 o 
2o Sheldon Wolin°s phrase • 
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return to those principles was the only possible manner of 
reform. This particular not.ion of a return to first prin= 
ciples 'i7as not influenced (as far as we can tell) by any 
Aristotelian or classical notion of political order, but 
it was similar in that it placed especial emphasis on 
ordered spa~e (i.e. on strictly ordered modes of conduct 
appropriate to its u•form") which was or should be unchanging 
in time. It was such a funda..llentalist argument that Hooker 
endeavoured to dispose of at a number of levels. At the 
lowest level 9 that of "external" particulars, we have 
attempted to display how his opponents 0 argument and his 
own particular disposition altered the nuances of his 
inherited thought. In this way traditionalism and the 
proper disposition in regard to institutional order came 
to the fore. 
The nuances of traditionalism are 1 then 9 revealed in 
the changing facets of Hooker 0 s argument. It may be seen 
both in his statements of intent and in his discussion of 
English society in the later books. Clearly the notion of 
tradition is at the best of times difficult to grasp and 
understand. In a writer of Hooker 0 s calibre it becomes 
even more difficult if only for the simple reason that he 
does not attempt to discuss tradition or even traditionalism 
explicitly. However, this much is clear. It is that 
Hooker 0 s traditionalism emerges out of his modifications 
of the notions of the origin and foundation of political 
society and of space=bound constitutionalism. It is 
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in the margins of such ideas as these that the notion of 
slowly ordered change is seen neither as a corruption ofu 
nor as a necessary return tou first principles. It is true 
that any institutional arrangements have principles which 
are the result of reflection on conduct but these are not 
~first" principles in the classical manner. Nor are they 
employed in the theological sense by Hooker. For at this 
point traditionalism in Hookeris argruuent undercuts ex= 
ternal (i.e. non-historical) accountability, both at the 
level of natural law and at the level of a constitutionalism 
which views reform as a necessary return to those principles 
that "in=fo:r-m 11 a. f.Gliticc.l .order. 
t" 
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III 
A conservative disposition is, for Hooker, appropriate 
when change in historical order is under consideration. 
The occasion for Hooker 1 s articulation of this disposition 
in the Ecclesiastical Polity was provided by the challenge 
of radical ideas stemming from the extreme Protestants. 
Our examination has led us to agree with both Lord High Cecil 
who considered that 
0 Before the Reformation it is impossible to distinguish 
conservatism in politics (i.e. in practice] 0 not 
because there was none, but because there was nothing 
else,ul 
and with Michael Walzer who has shown that the sixteenth 
century saw the birth of radical politics. This radicalism, 
as we have seen, took the form of an effort at restoration 
and not of an imposition of "progressn. This distinction, 
as we have noted 0 is important theoretically since the 
emphasis in radical Protestant thought was placed on a 
notion of a "return" and not on a notion of inevitable 
progress. Nonetheless in practice the results of such 
thinking are often similar, they have both a destructive 
potentiality in regard to present order. For the times 
important to them, distant future and distant past 0 have 
in practice, in the present 0 little or no concrete content. 
Nothing within the categories of past or future can be 
1. Lord Hngh Cecil, Conservat·ism 0 Londono 19111., p. 25. 
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directly experienced. In factu it is from their wilful 
nescience ar~ to actuality v and not from any bright "ideas" 
that they might dream up that their revolutionary destructive= 
ness comes. 
In the face of this revolutionary potential that the 
radicalsv arguments and actions displayedu Hooker endeavoured 
to apply certain distinctions as a context in which to 
examine and destroy this posi·tion. In the movement of the 
book we see emerge what we have described as a notion of 
tradition and a conservative disposition" Unlike his radical 
opponents Hooker has come to terms with the gradual change 
of society. Actionu thereforeu need not, indeed must not, 
be the inevitable destruction of what is valuable in the 
world. In this way conduct and order are slowly changing 
to preserve themselvesv that isv what is valuable. Unlike 
the. arprogressi ve", who is the "modern ur counter=part of the 
radical in so=called traditional societiesv this inevitable 
change cannot be guided to some end where conduct may be= 
come merely the repetition of what is considered perfect 
and cannot be changed for the better. With the notion of 
the accumulation of particulars change may be considered 
as an unfolding, the realization of potential. There is, 
thenv always a betteru but never a perfect political order. 
Alongside this emphasis on tradition and slowly un= 
folding possibilityv where political time and space need 
not be in direct conflictu we have the conservativevs 
regard for the importance of the rule of law. The rule 
of law is the expression of order_and harmony within a 
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political associationo Laws, thereforeu must only be 
changed when convenience requires ito The rule of law 
and the notion of tradition are, indeed, cornplarnentaryo 
Such notions as the importance of law and the necessity of 
slowly ordered change must be reflected in the thought and 
action of those engaged in political activity" Ignorance 
of the notion of slowly unfolding change must 1 consequently, 
disqualify anyone from participating in political action 
at all 1 for these are the appropriate criteria by which to 
judge any political situationo 
One criteria from the conservative 1 s holy trinity 
remains, and that is the notion of hierarchyo This idea 
of a hierarchy appears to be purely political in character, 
although the peculiarities of the extended metaphor in 
the Ecclesiastical Polity allow the transfer of this attri~ 
bute to nature as a whole and then back again to society as 
an aspect of the larger hierarchy of natureo Nonethelessv 
because this notion is political in character, it is par~ 
ticularly suited to the institutional vision with its 
emphasis on historical arrangements and external particularso 
In this historical (external) sense society may be viewed 
as a hierarchy of skills of which the most important in 
regard to action and general order is the politicalo This 
skill occupies the pinnacle for on the rule of the prince 
the order of society dependso On political order the success 
of lesser desires turnso Such is the nature of society 
that. caution, not private ambition 1 must be the keynote 
of princely ruleo 
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With these criteria (and remembering his distinction 
between necessity and indifference) Hooker is able to con-
demn the radical Protestants for applying the most ina= 
ppropriate notions not only to political society, butv more 
important 1 to the institutional arrangements of the Church 
in England. For the church in this ex-ternal sense cannot 
be the City of God on earth at all. Certainly man is 
primarily a religious creature 1 and the church is the in-
strument of God 0 s grace. It is notv however, the organi-
zation of the historical church itself that may reveal in 
some way Gadus workings on the soul. In the Ecclesiastical 
Polity the outward manifestations of the Church are subject 
to the standards governing all external things. Of coursev 
both political and ecclesiastical order are in their way 
necessary means to higher spiritual goods. Yet 1 within the 
context of the distinction between necessity and indifference, 
they do have a certain self-sufficiency in that standards 
appropriate to them as external particulars may be employed. 
What we have in the Ecclesiastical Polity is 1 then 1 a 
combination of Christian belief and conservative disposition. 
What is important for Hooker is the precise identity of 
that external particular, the English Commonwealth 1 of which 
the church, insofar as the power of dominion was involvedu 
was a part. In general, Hooker 0 s thought is a peculiar 
combination of faith and scepticism. His faith itself is 
centered on the Christian religion and on what Reason may 
achieve in unravelling the workings of Gadus universe. His 
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scepticism may be seen in his consideration of change and 
of human action" The Presbyterians, in contrast, show 
themselves to be pessimistic in regard to the value of 
present arrangementso They are, however, supremely opti= 
mistic in their faith and in the possibilities and poten= 
tiality that action possesses in being able to bring about 
a "perfect" state of affairs" Hooker himself is similarly 
optimistic in the sense that God has promised salvation to 
mankind, but he is pessimistic as to the effects that action 
may bring about for, in the conditions of imperfection in 
which man exists historicallyu there can be no permanent 
resting place until the end of time" It is not by his own 
actions but by the Grace of God that man may be dragged 
ashore from the sea of inevitable changeo 
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